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Since initial concerns were raised by disability studies scholars and the disability 
movement with the Australian government’s Welfare to Work reforms there has been 
a dearth of scholarship on how the partial capacity to work category, created through 
the reforms, is governed (particularly through other policies). The 2006 Welfare to 
Work reforms implemented by the former Howard government (1997 – 2007) 
excluded those people with disability assessed as capable of working 15-29 hours per 
week from the disability specific income support payment, the Disability Support 
Pension. Instead, they were eligible for the unemployment benefit Newstart 
Allowance and, alongside the unemployed, had to meet certain state requirements to 
remain eligible for payment, such as applying for jobs and attending interviews. This 
research, in addressing this gap, examines how people with a partial capacity to work 
are governed with regard to recent changes to the income support system and the 
disability care and support system through the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
for people with disability. The research examines the possibility that people with a 
partial capacity to work in the Northern Territory could have their income support 
payments managed by the government through a policy intersection between the 
Welfare to Work reforms and Income Management. By applying both 
governmentality and critical disability studies as the methodological approach and 
undertaking a Foucauldian discourse analysis of key policy documents, the research 
found that people with a partial capacity to work are governed through sameness and 
difference, which negatively impacts on their equality and access. The research 
suggests that people with a partial capacity to work are governed in Welfare to Work 
and income management through an able-bodied norm. This is problematic as it 
ignores the social barriers that people with disability experience, such as inaccessible 
vi 
 
communities; impairment barriers, such as pain and episodic illness; and the meaning 
subscribed to impairment. The research also found that people with a partial capacity 
to work are governed by authoritarian rationalities in the income support system as 
opposed to participants in the National Disability Insurance Scheme, who are 
regulated by social rationalities of government. These findings suggest that there is a 
need to move beyond governing people with a partial capacity to work through 
sameness and difference and emphasises the importance of examining policy 
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The disability movement and disability studies scholars suggest that people 
with disability were excluded from employment with the advent of industrialisation 
where they were seen as inefficient, unproductive and incapable of keeping up with 
the demands of the modern labour force (Barnes & Mercer, 2005; Galvin, 2004; 
Humpage, 2007a). The exclusion of people with disability relegated them to the 
private sphere (Galvin, 2004) or institutions (C. Thomas, 2004). People with 
disability were also ‘protected’ in the income support system receiving a disability 
specific income support payment. The disability movement and disability studies 
scholars criticise the exclusion of people with disability from employment as well as 
their relegation to the private sphere, segregation in institutions and placement on a 
disability specific payment. This is because it has led to their marginalisation, 
oppression and isolation from society and denies their right to economically and 
socially participate (Barnes & Mercer, 2005; Galvin, 2004; Goggin & Newell, 2005; 
Oliver, 1989). 
 
There has recently been an emphasis by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and various Australian Federal governments 
on moving persons with disabilities who have a capacity for employment from 
disability specific payments in the income support system into formal paid work. 
This shift has also occurred in other global contexts, such as Canada and the United 
Kingdom (UK) and though there are local variations, this positions Australia as part 
of a global trend in the Anglo-Sphere to restructure the welfare state (Chouinard, 
2010; Hyde, 2000; Roulstone, 2000). The emphasis on moving people with disability 
into employment is partly reflected in the OECD Report Transforming Disability into 
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Ability: Policies to Promote Work and Income Security for Disabled People (2003), 
which discusses twin goals of disability policy. The Report states: 
  
[o]ne [goal] is to ensure that disabled citizens are not excluded: that they are 
encouraged and empowered to participate as fully as possible in economic and 
social life, and in particular to engage in gainful employment, and they are not 
ousted from the labour market too easily or too early. The other goal is to 
ensure that those who are or who become disabled have income security: that 
they are not denied the means to live decently (OECD, 2003, p. 3).  
 
Also reflecting this emphasis, successive Australian federal governments have 
made several legislative changes to the Disability Support Pension (DSP), the 
disability specific income support payment in Australia, to encourage people with 
disability with what has been termed a partial capacity to work (PCW) into 
employment to their capacity. In 2000, the Howard Liberal National Coalition 
Federal government (1996 - 2007) formulated and commissioned the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform chaired by the then Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
charity organisation Mission Australia, Patrick McClure AO, to conduct a welfare 
review (Yeend, 2000). The review recommended that the government review the 
capacity to work criterion for people with disability, indicating the need to move 
those capable into employment (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000). 
Legislatively there were numerous attempts to move some people with disability into 
employment by the Howard government between 2001 and 2003 (Daniels & Yeend, 
2005), however, they finally succeeded with the Employment and Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006 
(Commonwealth) (Cth). This Act made changes to income support for people with 
disability, excluding from the DSP those assessed as capable of working, within the 
next two years, between 15 and 29 hours per week, independent of a program of 
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support (POS). Those excluded were to be encouraged into employment and would 
need to apply for another payment such as Newstart Allowance (NSA), the primary 
unemployment benefit, in order to receive income support. Those people became 
categorised in the welfare state as people with a PCW and are regulated alongside the 
broader NSA population. This means that they are required to search for employment, 
attend interviews and could be penalised if they fail to fulfil their obligations with the 
state. This thesis examines how people with a PCW are constructed and governed 
with regard to recent changes to the income support system and in relation to the 
reforms made to disability care and support in Australia. By examining how people 
with a PCW are constructed and governed this research is influenced by the work of 
governmentality scholars and employs governmentality as one part of its 
methodology. “Governmentality seeks to distinguish the particular mentalities, arts 
and regimes of government and administration” (Dean, 1999, p. 2). It also considers 
the construction of subjects and categories as a means of organising and governing 
people (Bacchi, 2009).  
 
The dearth of existing scholarship on the PCW category following the creation 
of the category in Welfare to Work led to questions about whether the category still 
existed beyond its initial construction in the Welfare to Work reforms. This dearth of 
literature however, could in part be attributed to the tendency to consider NSA 
recipients as one category without acknowledging differences within the NSA 
payment category (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, October 24, 2012). 
Nonetheless, confirmation that the PCW category still continues to operate in income 
support policy came whilst working as a Summer Scholar at the Federal 
Parliamentary Library in Canberra, where it was found that in fact people with a 
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PCW were anticipated to make up 20 per cent of the NSA population by early 2014 
(Department of Education, Employment & Workplace Relations (DEEWR), 
Department of Families Housing & Community Services & Indigenous Affairs, 
Department of Human Services (DHS) & Department of Industry Innovation Science 
Research & Tertiary Education, 2012), that is, approximately 135, 000 people.1 The 
combination of an absence of literature on the PCW category following the Welfare 
to Work reforms and the high proportion of NSA recipients categorised with a PCW 
establishes part of the contribution of this research and its importance in examining 
how people with a PCW are constructed and governed.  
 
This research can be placed alongside the original scholarship on the Welfare 
to Work reforms which have been described by the disability movement and 
disability scholars as “draconian provisions” (Hartman & Darab, 2006, p. 1). 
However, it also extends this scholarship and examines further changes to DSP 
eligibility which could have resulted in increases to the PCW category. For example, 
the Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth) introduced 
under the Labor Gillard Federal government (2010 - 2013) continued the legislative 
shift to encourage some people with disability into employment. This Act required 
people with disability applying for the DSP to prove that they had previously 
engaged with a POS such as a Disability Employment Service (DES), for 18 months 
within the previous 36 months, before applying (Department of Social Services 
(DSS), n.d.). Those who could not demonstrate previous engagement with a POS 
were excluded from the DSP, had to apply for an alternative income support payment 
such as NSA, and had to engage with a POS for 18 months. Those new NSA 
                                                          
1 This is based on a NSA figure of 659, 829 people as at 27 September 2013 (See, Senate Community 
Affairs Committee, 2013). 
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recipients excluded from the DSP were likely to be categorised as NSA recipients 
with a PCW (Kim, Enquiries Officer, Feedback Coordination Team, DSS, personal 
correspondence via email, 3 February 2014).  
 
Additionally, this research examines further provisions subscribed to NSA 
recipients in the Northern Territory (NT), specifically, income management. Income 
management is examined through this research because of the probability of 
capturing people with a PCW and automatically subscribing them to income 
management under the New Income Management reforms and its criterion. Income 
management is where a proportion of a recipient’s income support payment is 
quarantined by the government in order to ensure that it is spent on priority goods 
and services. New Income Management superseded a version of income management 
included in the Howard government’s Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(NTER) (2007) (also known as, the Northern Territory intervention) which was 
criticised for being racially discriminatory, quarantining the income support 
payments of Indigenous welfare recipients. In 2007, the Howard government 
declared an emergency in remote Indigenous communities in the NT in response to 
allegations of child sexual abuse and dysfunctional communities. In 2010, in 
response to critiques that income management in the NTER was racially 
discriminatory the Rudd Federal Labor government (2007-2010, 2013) extended 
income management to target Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare recipients in 
the NT through reforming the criteria. This was called New Income Management and 
included the “disengaged youth” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) and the 
“long-term welfare payment recipients” measure (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, 
p. 3). The long-term payment recipients measure targets welfare recipients aged 25 
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years and over who have been receiving income support payments for 12 of the 
previous 24 months. The long-term payment recipients measure is the type of income 
management that is the focus of this research.  
 
However, there is a lack of existing scholarship on the possible automatic 
income management of people with a PCW in the NT under New Income 
Management measures, in particular the long-term payment recipients measure. This 
is despite evidence suggesting that this is indeed probable. This asserts the 
significance of examining policy intersections and the connections between policies 
in governing. As Bacchi suggests “[p]olicies are usually located within a web of 
related or interconnected policies that need to be considered as part of … analysis” 
(2009, p. 4). In recognition of this, the researcher will analyse a range of policy 
documents in order to understand how people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed in recent reforms to the income support system for people with disability as 
well as in relation to changes to the disability care and support system. This analysis 
includes the Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (SSOLA) (Welfare 
Reform and Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA)) Act 2010 (Cth), 
which legislated New Income Management.  
 
This trend to move more people with disability into employment through 
welfare reform is however, continuing. Recently, the 2014-15 Budget measures of 
the Federal Abbott Liberal National Coalition government (2013 – present) 
announced further changes to DSP eligibility. These changes included placing 
compulsory work-focused activities on DSP recipients aged 35 years and under who 
have a capacity to work at least 8 hours per week (Buckmaster, 2014a). Additionally, 
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from July 1, 2014 those aged 35 years and under, who have a work capacity of 8 
hours or more per week and who were granted the DSP between 2008 and 2011 will 
have their capacity for work reassessed (DHS, 2014b). This could mean further shifts 
into the PCW category. These recent legislative proposals additionally highlight why 
an examination of the PCW category is of crucial importance based on the dearth of 
literature on the category’s construction and government beyond Welfare to Work 
and potential increases to the PCW category.  
 
Sameness and Difference  
 In Western thought and societies, people with disability have been cast as 
abnormal, ‘different’ and as deviating from the able-bodied norm in society. This is 
because the white, able-bodied, heterosexual male has occupied a position of power 
and privilege, cast as the norm, ideal and universal human. Those who differ from 
this norm or ideal, such as people with disability are represented as ‘different’ or 
‘other’ and categorised. People with disability are thus produced into a homogenous 
social category which is “used for administration service delivery, for political 
containment and management of difference” (Meekosha & Pettman, 1991, p. 77). 
This difference is often manufactured on “the personal tragedy theory of disability” 
(Oliver, 1996, p. 31) and biological discourses, which construct people with 
disability as defective and subhuman. Oliver (1996) has termed this theory the 
individual model of disability which encompasses the medical model of disability, 





the medical model of disability understand disability as a ‘problem’ to be fixed 
within the individual. In this model the medical profession are represented as 
assessing, diagnosing, managing, controlling, treating and curing disabled bodies 
(Humpage, 2007a).  
 
As a result of defining and categorising people with disability as ‘other’, based 
on their ‘difference’ from the able-bodied norm, people with disability are unsure 
whether to emphasise their differences or similarities to the norm (Wendell, 1996). 
This is because the norm occupies the point of reference (Bacchi, 1990), determining 
sameness or difference and equal treatment. This constructs a sameness/ difference 
dilemma. Both sides of the dilemma have positive and negative effects on people 
with disability who are socially constructed as ‘other’. With regard to sameness, 
Wendell suggests that positively, sameness reduces the scope of ‘otherness’, 
“enabling the non-disabled to identify with [… persons with disabilities], recognize 
their humanity and their rights, paving the way to increasing their assimilation into 
all aspects of social life” (1996, p. 74). Problematically though sameness negates the 
‘differences’ and diversity of people with disability in requiring that the ‘other’ be 
the same as the able-bodied norm (Hosking, 2008). Alternatively, difference, is 
argued to provide scope for recognising the ‘differences’ of people with disability as 
well as their disadvantaged position and provide ‘special’, ‘different’ or 
redistributive treatment based on providing equal access (Morris, 2001). However, 
‘special’, ‘different’ or redistributive treatment is problematised as objectifying and 
reinforcing the ‘differences’ of people with disability from the able-bodied norm. 
Both sameness and difference then treat people with disability as problematic, failing 
to transform disability as a relationship of power and privilege.  
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Although both sameness and difference are fraught with problems which are 
also emphasised by countless other scholars, they nevertheless, become a useful lens 
through which to analyse and understand the PCW category and how people with a 
PCW are constructed and governed. For example, it is used to suggest that people 
with a PCW, previously, governed through difference on the DSP are, as a result of 
the Welfare to Work reforms, being governed through sameness. This means that 
similar to the unemployed, that is, the broader NSA population, they have to search 
for and maintain employment, uphold the obligations of their contract and will be 
penalised if they fail to do so. It is argued through this research however, that 
sameness fails to deliver equality and access to people with a PCW as it upholds the 
able-body as the normative standard through which people with a PCW are regulated 
on NSA. This means that existing systems of privilege and disadvantage are ignored; 
the needs of people with a PCW are neglected because they differ from the able-
bodied norm and the structural barriers that people with a PCW experience to 
employment, for example, as a result of their previous exclusion, continue 
unaddressed.  
 
This research and the evidence it presents then supports other scholars who 
suggest the need to move beyond governing through sameness and difference (See 
for example, Bacchi, 1990; J. C. Williams, 1991). For example, Williams (1991) 
suggests: 
 
both sameness and difference are equally vulnerable to being used to reinforce 
the status quo, and for the same reason neither formulates a direct challenge to 
the structures that disadvantage outsiders … To join our society on anything 
but equal terms, minorities[, …] women [and persons with disabilities] must  
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demand neither mere entry [through sameness] nor special accommodation 
[through difference]. Instead, they must demand transformation (J. C. 
Williams, 1991, p. 305). 
 
It is suggested through the research that there is a need to redirect and 
challenge the ableist underpinnings of income support payment categories upheld 
through sameness, in order to consider human diversity and the embodied experience 
of people with a PCW including, what they would need to economically and socially 
participate and contribute.  
 
The social model  
Shifting from locating the difference of people with disability in biology and 
the individual, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 
the UK developed the social model as termed by UK academic and disability rights 
advocate, Michael Oliver (Shakespeare & Watson, 2002; C. Thomas, 2004). The 
social model draws a distinction between impairment and disability, suggesting that 
impairment is the bodily and material dimension and disability is the social barriers 
experienced to social and economic inclusion and participation. The social model 
proposes that people with disability are disabled by the social and structural barriers 
that they experience to participation in society imposed on their impairments. These 
include the structure of institutions, the organisation of society, social relations and 
discrimination (C. Thomas, 2004). In this model, it is society which oppresses people 
with impairments and with which the problem is located (Shakespeare & Watson, 
2002) shifting attention away from the individual (Shakespeare, 2006). However, 
although the social model is an important tool for thinking about the social 
construction of people with disability as ‘different’ (Goggin & Newell, 2005), it has 
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been criticised for focusing on disability and leaving out impairment and establishing 
a dichotomy between impairment and disability (Morris, 1993; Shakespeare & 
Watson, 2002; Sherry, 2002). This has been raised as problematic for three reasons. 
Firstly, the social model by marginalising impairment ignores “the personal 
experience of pain and limitation which is often a part of impairment” (Shakespeare 
& Watson, 2002, p. 9). Secondly, impairment and disability are difficult to separate 
in the lived experience of the individual (Shakespeare, 2006). Thirdly, this ignores 
the social construction of impairment and the body.  
 
Scholars who suggest that the body is socially constructed move away from the 
work of others who suggest that the body is biological, arguing that social and 
historical contexts give bodies and their capacities meaning beyond biology. Bodies 
thus take on meaning, or meaning is imposed on bodies in space and through their 
interaction with other bodies (Gatens, 1996; Lorber & Martin, 2005), such as those 
constructed as ‘normal’ (Coleman-Fountain & McLaughlin, 2013). This impacts on 
the subjective experience of the body (Coleman-Fountain & McLaughlin, 2013). The 
social construction of the body is embedded in power which scholars argue needs to 
be challenged through examining, highlighting and interrogating specifically how 
bodies become marked (Gatens, 1996). Theorists who discuss the social construction 
of the body do not deny that differences between the bodies of the able-bodied and 
people with disability exist. However, “they claim that many, if not most, of the uses 
of these differences are ideological” (Lorber & Martin, 2005, p. 242) and are used in 




The theory of the body as socially constructed also challenges the impairment/ 
disability binary established in the social model. This is because its examination 
requires an investigation of the historical and the biological together (Foucault, 
1978). As Foucault suggests:  
 
deployments of power are directly connected to the body – to bodies, functions, 
physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures; far from the body having to 
be effaced, what is needed is to make it visible through an analysis in which the 
biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another … but are 
bound together in an increasingly complex fashion (Foucault, 1978, pp. 151-
152).  
 
This also challenges the biological fixity assigned to disabled bodies and 
impairments which remain undisrupted by the social model in constructing an 
impairment/ disability binary (Young, 2002).  
 
This research as well as contributing to the debate on sameness and difference 
also contributes to discussions on the impairment/ disability binary and existing 
research by critical disability studies (CDS) scholars on the importance of 
recognising the body as socially constructed. CDS is the second methodological 
approach of this research alongside governmentality, providing a framework to 
interpret the findings of the research, supplying a language through which to explain 
the concerns identified and a way to move forward. This is because it suggests that 
by governing people with a PCW through sameness the combination of social 
barriers, impairment barriers, such as pain, and the way bodies and impairments are 
socially constructed are ignored for people with a PCW through upholding the able-
bodied norm. This can impede the delivery of equality and access to people with a 
PCW in the income support system. It consequently suggests that an embodied 
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approach which considers experience with social barriers, impairment barriers and 
impairments as socially inscribed with meaning should be employed to destabilise 
the able-bodied norm and move beyond governing through sameness and difference, 
much like CDS scholars. 
 
Furthermore, CDS scholars have also raised concerns with the social model 
because it excludes other social divisions such as, gender, race and sexuality which 
may also impact on a person’s lived experience; instead, primarily focusing on 
disability (Vernon, 1998). The social model though has been defended from such 
criticisms. For example, Oliver (2009) suggests that although the social model did 
not initially include other social divisions this does not mean that there is no scope 
for their inclusion, stating that those who criticise the social model for failing to 
include other social divisions should instead focus on working to include them.  
 
However, CDS scholars’ criticisms of the social model relate to others made 
with regard to other social movements. For example, women with disabilities suggest 
that the women’s movement privileges the experience of able-bodied women, and 
the disability movement reflects the experiences of men with disabilities, neglecting 
the intersection of gender and disability in the lived experiences of women with 
disabilities (Morris, 1993). Much the same criticisms have been made of 
discrimination law which focuses on the experience of discrimination as one 
dimensional, for example as disability discrimination or sex discrimination rather 
than disability and sex discrimination. This led to the development of 
intersectionality in the late 1980s (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013). 
Intersectionality is a “heuristic term to focus attention on the vexed dynamics of 
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difference and the solidarities of sameness in the context of antidiscrimination and 
social movement politics” (Cho et al., 2013, p. 787) and was coined by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, a Professor of Law in the United States. It draws attention to the one 
dimensionality of social categories suggesting that they undermine claims for social 
justice. Instead intersectionality focuses on “the relationships among multiple 
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations” (McCall, 2005, 
p. 1771).  
 
This research draws on the work of intersectionality taking inspiration from 
it. It undertakes part of what McCall (2005) labels an intracategorical analysis, when 
she discusses the different types of intersectional analysis, examining “differences 
within the social category of disability and impairment” (Meekosha, 2006, p. 172). 
Specifically, the thesis also examines how people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed in the income support system, in comparison to participants in the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), persons with severe and profound disabilities. 
The NDIS is a new approach to disability care and support in Australia, providing 
individualised funding packages for the care and support needs of those who are 
eligible, enabling them to exercise choice, control and autonomy. Though the thesis 
focuses on a single-axis, specifically disability, it highlights, like intersectionality, 
the complexity of social categories in relation to how impairment and disability 
divisions within the social category of disability become constructed and governed. 
 
By adopting this aspect of intersectionality the research further emphasises 
the importance of not drawing a distinction between impairment and disability and 
provides evidence of impairment and the body as socially constructed. This is 
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because the research investigates the value and meaning given to impairment in 
constructing people with a PCW and governing them differently to NDIS 
participants. This again provides evidence of the need for an embodied ontological 
approach in the welfare state because it moves beyond categorisation, instead 
assessing and embracing individual embodied experiences.  
 
What becomes clear from the research then is that by establishing a PCW 
category in the format designed by the government people with a PCW continue to 
be disadvantaged. This is through being constructed and governed through an able-
bodied norm in sameness, potentially being subjected to income management and 
being constructed and governed differently to NDIS participants, persons with severe 
and profound disabilities. However, what too becomes clear is the scope for this 
researcher to become trapped in one’s own sameness and difference dilemma, by 
raising problems with both sameness and difference. Hence, in response to this, there 
is a continued emphasis on the need to assume an embodied ontological approach 
which would move beyond debates and binaries on sameness and difference.  
 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis will begin by outlining the policy context. Firstly, in order to 
provide context, it will discuss how changes in the Australian income support system 
can be attributed to the influence of the increasing ageing population, globalisation, 
international ideologies and neoliberalism. Secondly, it will define the key terms of 
the welfare state including, welfare dependency, mutual obligation and active citizen.  
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Thirdly, it will contextualise the emergence of each policy to be examined in this 
research, describe how each policy operates and how it is possible for them to 
intersect in governing people with a PCW.  
 
Following this, the literature review will examine how existing scholarship 
has analysed the policies, summarising the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
analysis. This chapter identifies a gap in research on people with a PCW since 
Welfare to Work, that is, how other policies govern people with a PCW. The 
literature review is comprised of three sections. The first section examines how 
governmentality scholars analyse the welfare state. This section will draw attention 
to the mechanisms, modes or technologies of governing. The second section, 
‘Disability Studies Scholars and the Welfare State’ will begin by discussing the way 
that disability scholars have framed changes in the income support system and 
specifically consider the Welfare to Work reforms. This section will also examine 
existing literature on the NDIS Act 2013 (Cth). The final section of the literature 
review will explore how critical race and whiteness studies (CRAWS) scholars 
analyse income management. As suggested, income management was included as 
part of the Howard government’s NTER therefore, as the initial income management 
policy targeted Indigenous Australians a great deal of existing research on income 
management is by CRAWS scholars. This research needs to be included because 
there is a dearth of literature on the income management of people with disability, in 
particular, people with a PCW and the effects of this on them. This begins to 
demonstrate the limitations of existing studies on people with a PCW which are 
focused on the category’s initial inception in Welfare to Work and do not highlight  
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the category’s intersection with other policies. While the effects on people with a 
PCW may be different, highlighting the literature on income management by 
CRAWS scholars draws attention to possible implications for people with a PCW.  
 
Chapter Three describes the methodological approaches and method of the 
research. It will begin by explaining the methodologies of this research, 
governmentality and CDS, and discussing their relevance for this study. Then it will 
explore the method, a Foucauldian discourse analysis of policy documents, justify 
the use of policy documents and detail the relevant aspects of each policy analysed. It 
will conclude with an examination of the limitations of the study.  
 
Chapter Four discusses how people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed through sameness in the Howard government’s Welfare to Work reforms. 
As a result of being constructed and governed through sameness it is suggested that 
people with a PCW are thus regulated through an able-bodied norm which they have 
to aspire to. Continuing a discussion of governing through sameness, Chapter Five 
provides evidence suggesting that people with a PCW are also constructed and 
regulated through sameness in the long-term welfare recipients income management 
measures. Being constructed and governed through sameness is argued to result in a 







Chapter Six suggests that people with a PCW are also governed through a 
hybrid rationality predominantly comprised of neoliberalism and authoritarianism.  
This is compared and contrasted to the hybrid rationality governing NDIS 
participants, persons with severe and profound disabilities and is argued to also result 
in a lack of equality and access for people with a PCW.  
 
The conclusion outlines and reiterates the central findings and arguments of 
the thesis. The findings suggest that people with a PCW are governed through 
sameness and a hybrid governmental rationality of neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism in the income support system which fails to produce equality and 
access for them. The conclusion then emphasises the need to move beyond 
constructing and governing through sameness and difference to instead embrace an 
embodied ontological approach. It also asserts that while this research has shed light 
on how people with a PCW are constructed and governed with regard to the income 
support system and in relation to disability care and support in Australia there is a 






CHAPTER ONE: POLICY CONTEXT 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides the policy context. It explores the emergence of the 
Australian welfare state; changes in the Australian welfare state which are suggested 
to be influenced by the increasing ageing population, globalisation and 
neoliberalism; the core concepts associated with the welfare state including, welfare 
dependency, mutual obligation and active citizenship; and the emergence of the 
policies analysed. In particular, it contextualises the emphasis on moving those 
persons with disabilities capable of employment into formal paid work and the 
consequent establishment of the PCW category under the Howard government. It 
also discusses the emergence of income management and details the type of income 
management that is the focus of this research, that is, the long-term payment 
recipients measure under New Income Management. In addition, it explores the 
development of the NDIS. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the 
future and the PCW category particularly, with regard to the 2014-15 Budget 
changes highlighted in the Introduction. What becomes clear in this chapter is the 
connections between the policies analysed in this research and thus implicitly the 
importance of examining policy intersections in constructing and regulating subjects.  
 
Australia’s welfare state 
The Australian welfare state predominantly emerged during the Second 
World War (Fenna, 2004). While pensions for the elderly and people with disability 
existed prior to World War II, established in 1908 through the Invalid and Old-Age 
Pension Act, the welfare state in a broader capacity emerged during World War II 
(Fenna, 2004). Australia’s welfare state was slow to develop protections in 
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comparison to other countries. This was because of the ‘White Australia’ policy 
(1901) which protected Australian workers from competition from “cheap non-white 
labour” (Mendes, 2008, p. 17). It was also because of Justice Higgins’ Harvester 
Judgment (1907) in the industrial courts which secured a daily wage standard for a 
man supporting his wife and children (Mendes, 2008). Prior to the welfare state’s 
broader development during World War II, welfare was distributed via charities who 
discouraged reliance on handouts and assessed who was deserving or undeserving of 
support (Bessant, Watts, Dalton, & Smyth, 2006). In addition, particularly during the 
Depression, the state provided those who were destitute with food coupons and 
sustenance. Often, in return, individuals had to contribute through relief work.  
 
When the broader welfare state was legislated in the 1940s relief became 
framed as a right and entitlement (Harris, 2001) recognising and supporting events or 
risks experienced within the life course such as old age and disability and those 
experienced as part of a capitalist economy, such as unemployment (Shaver, 2002). 
This was because “[i]n the postwar period, welfare states came to represent ideals of 
social citizenship in which all members of a society were to be assured a minimum 
standard of well-being and their recognition as of equal worth and dignity” (Shaver, 
2002, p. 332). Thus welfare was understood as a social right of citizenship which 
sought to provide some economic protection and enable citizens to participate in 
their societies (Marshall, 1950). Economic and social policy in Australia at this time 
was underpinned by Keynesianism based on the philosophies of British economist 
John Maynard Keynes (Bessant et al., 2006) and a policy of full employment which 
understood unemployment as temporary (Marston & McDonald, 2007). The policy 
of full employment was supported through encouraging and stimulating consumer 
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demand for goods and services (Fenna, 2004; Harris, 2001) and establishing 
government protections to support and safeguard Australia’s workforce. For 
example, the government supported and provided employment through the creation 
of capital works and infrastructure projects (Marston & McDonald, 2007). According 
to Harris, “[s]ocial welfare became an integral part of economic planning as it 
provided the preconditions for the security to plan, work, spend and invest” (2001, p. 
13). However, it also operated in a secondary position to employment, and though a 
right of citizenship was seen as a safety net only in times of need (Mendes, 2008).  
 
Australia’s welfare state, however, like many others internationally, has 
undergone change since its emergence during the Second World War. This was 
because concern emerged in the 1970s about the deterioration of Keynesianism and 
full employment policies as well as assumptions about the short term nature of 
unemployment previously held under Keynesianism and full employment (Fenna, 
2004; Marston & McDonald, 2007). In addition, the increasing ageing population, 
globalisation and neoliberalism contributed to changes in the Australian welfare state 
during this time (Fenna, 2004). Policy-makers and many politicians were of the 
opinion that the market rather than state intervention was the way forward (Bessant 
et al., 2006). As a result, “[e]limination of programs, reductions in benefit rates and 
duration, tightening of eligibility, greater reliance on private sector service delivery, 
and new forms of conditionality have all been used to reduce and redirect welfare 





Australia’s ageing population has affected the structure of Australia’s welfare 
state. In particular, increases to Australia’s ageing population as a result of the ageing 
of Australia’s ‘baby boomers’ generation has resulted in suggestions that the 
government needs to intervene to curb the increasing costs of the Age Pension as 
well as health and aged care facilities. In response, there has been an emphasis on 
encouraging more working age persons accessing the income support system into 
employment to supplement the additional costs to the welfare state through paying 
taxes, to fill the void and to remove them as a cost to the government. While 
compulsory superannuation is now part of the Australian policy landscape introduced 
by the Hawke Labor government (1983-1991) (Fenna, 2004) many ‘baby boomers’ 
have a working history which was not part of the compulsory superannuation years 
(Australian Associated Press, 2014). As a result it becomes important to increase the 
working population in order to compensate for the possible increased demand to the 
welfare state.  
 
Globalisation has also influenced changes to the Australian welfare state. 
Globalisation has facilitated an increase in international competition. In order to 
remain globally competitive government’s need businesses to invest in creating 
capital and employment. However, high taxes and social spending are a deterrent for 
business investment in a global market filled with choice (Myles & Quadagno, 
2002). Though Myles and Quadagno (2002) argue that global competitiveness 
increases the need for social protection, the need to be economically competitive sees 
the welfare state as economically costly. In relation to this, Esping-Andersen 
however, suggests that “[i]t would, indeed be a sad irony if the West engaged in 
welfare state dismantling in its drive to remain competitive if, at the same time, the 
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main competition were to raise its labour costs” in order to “build more 
comprehensive social protection systems” (1996, p. 27). In spite of this, in order to 
be globally competitive the Australian government has adopted and restructured the 
welfare state through neoliberal principles (Mendes, 2008).2 Additionally, various 
Australian governments and policy changes have also been influenced by global 
organisations such as the OECD (Mendes, 2008) and reflect global trends in Anglo-
sphere nations, such as the UK and Canada which have also restructured their 
welfare states (Chouinard. 2010; Wilton, 2004).  
 
Neoliberalism has additionally effected changes in the welfare state. Key 
tenets of neoliberalism include an emphasis on deregulation, privatisation, the free 
market, a preference for non-state interference and “limited social expenditure” 
(Mendes, 2008, p. 53). Neoliberals emphasise deregulation, in particular of the 
labour market, arguing that protections such as minimum wages impact on the job 
prospects of those who are less skilled who may find it difficult to obtain 
employment (Mendes, 2008). By removing minimum wages and awards it increases 
their chances of employment. A neoliberal perspective also suggests that state 
interference to redistribute economic resources in the name of social justice impedes 
initiative and produces laziness and dependency. In response there should be an 
emphasis on the income support recipient giving back for payment receivership and 
active engagement with the income support system. State interference also affects the 
                                                          
2 Esping-Andersen (1996) suggests employing neoliberal principles to respond to the need for welfare 
state reform as a result of for example, the ageing population is only one option. He discusses for 
example, the “Scandinavian route” (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 10) where employment is 
supplemented “with a comprehensive network of public services” (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 27). For 
women for instance, this means that they are supported to have children through provisions for 
maternity and paid parental leave schemes and supported to return to work through public day care 
provisions thus addressing the increasing ageing population through two means. He does concede 
however, with this model that “the fiscal strains of contemporary welfare states generally prohibit 
such an expansion” (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 27). 
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freedom of the market and individuals, hence in order “to reduce government 
interference with free market outcomes … access to social security payments [should 
be restricted]” (Mendes, 2008, p. 33) and targeted rather than universal. The market 
is valued in neoliberalism as providing choices and its principles should be emulated 
in all spheres (Dean, 1999). A neoliberal perspective additionally emphasises that 
instead of relying on the government for welfare individuals should take 
responsibility for their own welfare (Mendes, 2008). Neoliberal principles have 
further affected the Australian welfare state evidenced through the privatisation of 
employment services and the adoption of workfare policies. “‘[W]orkfare’ [is] a 
social policy measure that seeks to re-regulate the intersection of welfare and labour 
market policy” (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 78), it disciplines welfare recipients and 
seeks to reform their behaviour to ensure it is consistent with social norms associated 
with paid employment.  
 
The shift in the welfare state saw a policy change from the creation of 
employment opportunities by the government to “supply-side active labour market 
policies” (Marston & McDonald, 2007, p. 235). Through this, responsibility for 
unemployment became framed as the individual’s responsibility. Moreover, 
unemployment became represented as a ‘choice’ based on the assumption that the 
individual failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them in the market. 






Alongside the individualisation of unemployment welfare recipients became 
framed as welfare dependent. This is because it is assumed that the unobligated 
receivership of income support from the government provides a disincentive for 
welfare recipients to move off welfare and into work, undermining their work ethic 
and self-reliance and creating a sense of entitlement (Mendes, 2008). For example, 
according to Mendes  
 
American neoconservative political scientist Charles Murray … argues that the 
welfare state, by providing automatic support for the disadvantaged, has 
undermined individual responsibility and made it profitable for the poor to 
become dependent on welfare (2008, p. 55).  
 
This unobligated receivership is also suggested to result in problematic anti-social 
behaviour that is inconsistent with social norms such as, self-reliance and a work 
ethic. This ‘dependency culture’ - a concept developed to define the reliance of 
recipients on government benefits - has led to entrenched generational dependency 
for some families and individuals on income support (Mendes, 2008).  
 
This shift in the welfare state has also led to “new understandings of 
citizenship” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 141). These new understandings shifted 
welfare from a right and entitlement of citizenship to a right based on a responsibility 
and obligation to the government and broader society for some groups of welfare 
recipients who are assumed to be welfare dependent (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010). 
Citizenship has thus shifted to be based on the premise of activeness rather than 
passivity. This emphasis underpins one of the key concepts of the welfare state, 
mutual obligation. Mutual obligation suggests that with welfare receivership comes 
an obligation to participate and contribute to society, often through paid employment. 
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Failing to tie an obligation to receiving income support is represented as supporting 
and facilitating welfare dependency and passivity (Billings, 2010b; Maddison, 2008; 
McClausland & Levy, 2006). This is because there are no conditions or mechanisms 
of accountability placed on people’s spending which can result in dysfunctional 
behaviour. Mutual obligation then becomes a way of teaching welfare recipients 
appropriate conduct, self-reliance and responsibility which is consistent with broader 
social norms (Buckmaster, Ey, & Klapdor, 2012; Humpage, 2007a) and undermines 
previous notions of welfare as an entitlement or right.  
 
These changes also sought to produce active as opposed to passive citizens. 
The emphasis on an active society first emerged in a review of the social security 
system (1986-89) and was posed as a solution to the problem of unemployment 
which was acknowledged by the OECD to be enduring, unlike during full 
employment. The OECD suggested that welfare policies be reformed accordingly to 
promote an active society model which, in the face of extensive unemployment, 
“would preserve job readiness, promote job-ready skills, and sustain a pro-work 
ethic” (Bessant et al., 2006, p. 106). The purpose of this was to make welfare 
recipients active and produce competent citizens who would be able to participate 
effectively in employment (Rose, 1996). Active citizens were to be self-reliant, 
abiding and learn to regulate their own conduct. They were to actively search for 
employment and attain and further strengthen their skills to make themselves a 
marketable investment, that is, able to take up any employment opportunities. In this 





Additionally, an active society approach to welfare:  
 
not only acts upon the financial plight of the unemployed, and upon their job 
prospects but also upon [their] … attitudes, affects, conduct and dispositions 
that present a barrier to … [them] returning to the labour market, and [that] 
alienate them from social networks and obligations (Dean, 1995, p. 572).  
 
Policy emergence  
The key concepts of welfare dependency, mutual obligation and active citizen 
highlighted above first emerged in Australia in the welfare policies of the Hawke-
Keating Labor government (1983-1996) where “neo-liberalism [also] had its 
genesis” (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 77). However, critiques of unemployed 
individual’s did emerge earlier. For example, during the Whitlam Labor government 
(1972-1975) (Mendes, 2008) as well as  the Liberal National Coalition government 
(1975-1983) where “Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, used the term ‘dole bludger’ to 
refer to the growing numbers of people joining the unemployment queue in 
Australia” (Marston & McDonald, 2007, p. 235). Despite this, the Hawke-Keating 
government and the subsequent Howard government were “strongly influenced [to a 
degree unlike previous Federal governments] by the joint ideological constructs of 
neoliberalism and globalisation” (Mendes, 2008, p. 16).  
 
The Hawke-Keating government pursued those who took advantage of the 
welfare system, targeted welfare payments to those most in need through assets tests, 
means tests and compliance regimes and “introduce[d] compulsory training schemes 
for the long-term unemployed” (Mendes, 2008, p. 33). During the Hawke 
government (1983 – 1991) the unemployment benefit system was replaced by the 
“Active Employment Strategy [AES] – or, as it later became known, Newstart … 
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The AES was in part an attempt to ensure that jobless people remained in active 
pursuit of employment or in some form of training” (Bessant et al., 2006, p. 110). 
This active society model, accepted from the OECD “largely informed social policy 
reforms … as extensive changes were made to disability social security legislation, 
employment programs and community supports” (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 79). For 
example, in 1991, the Disability Reform Package replaced the Invalid Pension with 
the DSP (Yeend, 2002) and “introduced a more ‘active’ system of income support, 
with more rehabilitation, training, and labour market programs to assist people with 
disabilities into employment” (Goggin & Newell, 2005, p. 65). In this there was a 
focus on recognising the capacity of some people with disability to undertake 
employment (Goggin & Newell, 2005). Applicants had to pass a medical impairment 
test and be incapable of working 30 hours per week in order to be eligible for the 
DSP (Soldatic & Grover, 2013). 
 
Later in the Labor government’s reign under Keating (1991-1996), an “active 
society model” (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 79) was furthered through Working Nation, 
an initiative which placed obligations on unemployed welfare recipients (Mendes, 
2008). Working Nation used “the language of entitlement and government as well as 
responsibility” (Harris, 2001, p. 20) and introduced tougher assets and means testing 
for welfare payments. It also introduced the Job Compact, a scheme which provided 
short-term job placements for those unemployed for 18 months or more with the 
expectation that they accept any offer, and a new activity test, embedding a 
‘reciprocal obligation’ philosophy (Bessant et al., 2006). This tied “citizenship rights 
and social rights with labour market participation” (Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 79) and 
sought to breakdown welfare dependence. Additionally, in line with neoliberalism 
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the Hawke-Keating government began the process of privatisation (Harris, 2001), in 
part privatising the case management of welfare recipients. However, during the 
Hawke-Keating government, disability was largely excluded from reciprocal 
obligations attached to other groups of welfare recipients (Soldatic & Pini, 2009). 
The foundations laid during the Hawke-Keating government and the focus on an 
active society and reciprocal obligations to combat welfare dependency were 
continued and extended during the Howard government as well as privatisation. 
Soldatic and Pini (2009) suggest that neoliberalism achieved orthodoxy status under 
the Howard government.  
 
In 1997, the Howard government introduced the Work for the Dole workfare 
program. Work for the Dole encapsulated mutual obligation, individualised 
unemployment and assumed that those unemployed were welfare dependent 
(Henman, 2004). Work for the Dole sought to encourage the unemployed to develop 
a work initiative through regular involvement in employment. In 1998 the Howard 
government also privatised the Commonwealth Employment Service establishing the 
Job Network (Mendes, 2008). Through the Job Network, commercial and not-for-
profit organisations compete for government contracts to provide employment 
services to welfare recipients. The privatisation of employment services was 
suggested to “be more effective … due to greater competition, increased flexibility to 
respond to individual circumstances, and emphasis on job placement outcomes, 




In 1999, Senator Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Family and Community 
Services at the time, outlined the Howard Government’s intentions to reform the 
welfare system and establish two groups of persons with disabilities. These two  
groups featured “those who could not work at all and required ongoing access to 
government-funded disability pensions, and those who could participate in a rapidly 
expanding part-time labour market” (Soldatic & Pini, 2012, p. 188). This is not 
dissimilar to changes made to the welfare state in other Anglo-Sphere countries, such 
as Canada due to restructuring under neoliberalism. For instance, Chouinard and 
Crooks describe how groups previously considered as part of the ‘deserving poor’ in 
the province of Ontario experience restrictions with regard to accessing welfare 
payments because they were assessed as “not ‘disabled enough’” (2005, p. 23).  
 
Also, in 1999, the Howard government formed and then commissioned the 
Reference Group on Welfare Reform to investigate the welfare system and provide 
alternatives to the current system (Daniels & Yeend, 2005). The Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform was chaired by Patrick McClure AO. The intentions of the Review 
were to broaden the application of mutual obligation to other welfare payments and 
to mitigate the trap of welfare dependency in order to encourage greater self-reliance 
(Bessant et al., 2006). The Green Paper of the Reference Group Participation 
Support for a More Equitable Society recommended that the income support system 
be underpinned by a participation for support model seeking to produce social and 
economic outcomes in return for benefit receivership (Buckmaster, 2014b). It also 
recommended that “the capacity for work criterion (the 30-hour threshold) for people 
with disabilities [be reviewed] ensuring that any such criterion is in line with  
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contemporary patterns of labour market participation” (Reference Group on Welfare 
Reform, 2000, p. 44). This recommendation in part led to some of the most 
significant changes to disability and welfare policy.  
 
In 2006 the Howard government implemented the Employment and Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006 
to legislatively address changes announced in the 2005-06 Federal Budget 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2005; Daniels & Yeend, 2005). The Welfare to Work 
Act tightened the eligibility criteria for the DSP excluding those with a PCW. The 
reforms sought to reduce increasing claims for the DSP (Daniels & Yeend, 2005) 
which was taken as an indication of a culture of welfare dependency (Galvin, 2004; 
Goggin & Newell, 2005; Humpage, 2007a). Additionally, the changes were justified 
as a solution to establishing a higher working age population in order to address 
concerns about the decreasing working age population caused by the retirement of 
the ‘baby boomer’ generation (Mendes, 2008).  
 
The successful passing of Welfare to Work and changes to the DSP eligibility 
criteria is attributed to the Coalition’s control of both chambers of Parliament, that is, 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, at this time (Humpage, 2007a, 2007b; 
McDonald & Chenoweth, 2006; Sarah Parker & Cass, 2005; Soldatic & Chapman, 
2010; Soldatic & Pini, 2009). The Coalition had previously attempted three times to 
pass similar reforms (Daniels & Yeend, 2005). Legislation in Australia is generally 




The Howard government, through Welfare to Work, decreased “work criterion 
hours” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 142) for people with disability, cutting “the 
disability work test … in half” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 149) from 30 hours 
per week to 15. Those persons with disabilities assessed through the Job Capacity 
Assessment as capable of working 15 hours per week were excluded from the DSP 
and had to apply for an alternative income support payment, such as NSA (Humpage, 
2007a). This exclusion established the PCW category which does co-exist in other 
payment types apart from NSA such as Youth Allowance (YA) and Parenting 
Payment (PP) single and partnered (Senate Standing Committee on Education 
Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010). However, this research specifically 
focuses on the PCW category in the NSA payment, as since the category’s inception a 
higher proportion of people with a PCW are on NSA rather than another payment 
type, according to Senate Estimates hearings (See for example, Senate Standing 
Committee on Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010, 2012).  
 
However, people with a PCW “have reduced participation requirements” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, p. 9) unlike the broader NSA population and are 
able to access concessions and allowances, such as pensioner concessions, a 
telephone allowance and a pharmaceutical allowance (Daniels & Yeend, 2005). 
Through retaining access to such concessions it is claimed that the government is 
continuing to provide a similar level of support to people with a PCW 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, p. 129). They are also required to look for part-




Welfare to Work established a contract between people with a PCW and the 
government, a mutual obligation which required them to search for work, attend 
interviews and apply for positions as well as document this process for payment 
eligibility. It also legislated breaching sanctions to penalise NSA recipients, including 
people with a PCW, who fail to comply with their agreements seeking to produce an 
active citizen. If a recipient breached their contract once or twice within a 12 month 
period then they were suspended from receiving payment, unless compliance ensued 
(Marston & McDonald, 2007). However, upon a third breach in a 12 month period 
payment is suspended for eight weeks with no option to re-engage (Marston & 
McDonald, 2007). An eight week suspension of payment is also applied  
automatically if a recipient behaves ‘inappropriately’ in a workplace and loses a job 
or fails to take up employment opportunities (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005; 
Daniels & Yeend, 2005).  
 
The establishment of a PCW category is consistent with policies of other 
OECD member countries, such as Canada also treating people with a PCW like the 
unemployed and jobseekers (Chouinard & Crooks, 2005; OECD, 2007). This has 
seen “a re-orientation of disability policy from passive compensation to active 
integration” (OECD, 2007, p. 4). The OECD report New Ways of Addressing Partial 
Work Capacity, suggests that ideally, people with a PCW should not be excluded 
from employment nor leave the labour market after acquiring an impairment when 
they have a partial work capacity (OECD, 2007). This would ensure their social 
inclusion, “raise the living standards of the individuals in question and maintain 
effective labour supply in the face of an ageing population” (OECD, 2007, p. 4). 
However, this is not the case and often people with a PCW receive disability benefits 
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because of inadequate policies to support them in employment (OECD, 2007). The 
OECD (2007) states that because countries are increasingly concerned about creating 
a dependency on benefits by placing persons with some work capacity on disability 
benefit, there is an emphasis on policy change to ensure that people with a PCW do 
not access disability income support.  
 
In 2007, the Howard government was not re-elected and the Rudd Labor 
government assumed power. The Rudd Labor government did not make any changes 
to the disability criterion retaining the distinction between DSP recipients and people 
with a PCW. However, it did “increase… focus on training and increased funding for 
disability employment supports” (Soldatic & Pini, 2012, p. 191).  
 
The Labor leadership was challenged and won by Julia Gillard who became 
Prime Minister in 2010. The Gillard Labor government further extended the Howard 
government’s Welfare to Work measures by tightening the eligibility criteria for the 
DSP (Soldatic & Pini, 2012) through the Family Assistance and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011. As outlined in the Introduction the changes meant that in order 
to assess whether an applicant had a ‘continuing inability to work’ they had to 
demonstrate that they had previously actively engaged with a POS, like DES. Active 
engagement with a POS was assessed as complying with the program requirements 
as well as being engaged with the program for 18 months within the three years 
immediately prior to claiming DSP (DSS, n.d). If a person could not prove that they 
had previously engaged with a POS then they were excluded from the DSP, had to 
apply for an alternative income support payment, such as NSA and engage with a 
POS for 18 months. The National Welfare Rights Network (NWRN) (2011) describe 
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this change as requiring people to test their work capacity before becoming eligible 
for the DSP. “[T]he majority of people who would have their DSP claim rejected and 
referred to undertake a program of support, would be eligible to receive NSA with 
PCW status while they undertake the program” (Kim, Enquiries Officer, Feedback 
Coordination Team, DSS, personal communication via email, 3 February 2014).  
 
However, those with a ‘severe disability’ were automatically eligible for the 
DSP. ‘Severe disability’ is measured through being assessed as unable “to undertake 
any work or training within the next two years” and “reach[ing a minimum of] 
twenty points in one impairment table alone” (Daniels, Garden, Buckmaster, & 
Yeend, 2011, p. 13). Impairment tables assess the severity or impact of impairment 
in relation to work and assign a rating (DSS, 2014a) and are used as part of the 
broader Job Capacity Assessment which assesses whether an applicant is capable of 
working 15 hours per week (Daniels, Buckmaster, & M. Thomas, 2011).  
 
The Gillard government also removed the impairment tables from the Social 
Security Act 1991 (Cth) and revised them, placing them in a Legislative Instrument. 
This enabled the government to regularly update the tables, as previously to make 
changes to the Act a bill was required to be passed by both chambers of Parliament 
(Daniels, Buckmaster, et al., 2011). The revised impairment tables were operational 
from January 1, 2012 (DSS, 2013c). “Given … the … commitment to increasing the 
workforce participation of people with disabilities, … changes to the Impairment 




The reforms made to DSP eligibility by the Howard government established 
the PCW category in several welfare payments, though this research will focus upon 
the PCW category in the unemployment benefit NSA. The following section will 
outline the emergence of income management and identify the type of income 
management that this research is concentrating on. What becomes significant in the 
next section is how the income management of NSA recipients could lead to the 
income management of people with a PCW at the policy intersection of Welfare to 
Work and income management. This emphasises the need to examine policy 
intersections with regard to constructing and regulating subjects.  
 
Income management 
Income management controls and quarantines part of the income support 
payments of selected welfare recipients in specific areas (Billings, 2011; Yeend & 
Dow, 2007). Most income support payments can be income managed depending on 
the type of income management applied to the individual. Income management seeks 
to ensure that welfare payments are adequately spent on ‘priority goods’ (Billings, 
2009) such as, food and healthcare and is considered by the government as “a tool to 
reduce alcohol related violence, to protect children, to guard against humbugging3 
and to promote personal responsibility” (Gartrell, 2008, p. 4). It also encourages 
responsible behaviour consistent with social norms. Income management was the 
first time that conditions were placed on how welfare recipients could spend their 
income support payments (Buckmaster et al., 2012). Income managed welfare 
payments are put into an Income Management account (Yeend & Dow, 2007). From 
there limited funds are available to the welfare recipient often via a BasicsCard. The 
                                                          
3 “‘Humbugging’ has various definitions but generally refers to the practice of (sometimes violently) 
demanding money from relatives” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 4).  
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BasicsCard is a pin protected Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) 
card that income managed funds are stored on (DHS, 2014a). A BasicsCard can be 
used at “approved stores and businesses” (Billings, 2011, p. 168) with recipients 
restricted on the items they can buy; for example, they cannot buy alcohol and 
tobacco. The amount quarantined or managed is dependent on the type of income 
management applied to the individual and the type of welfare payment they receive 
(Yeend & Dow, 2007). For instance, some have 50 per cent of their disposable 
income quarantined, whilst others have 70 per cent. Generally, 100 per cent of lump 
sum payments are managed. Income management becomes an extension of mutual 
obligation linking the receivership of income support to behavioural changes.  
 
There are various types of income management; however, this research 
focuses on one form of income management, that is, the long-term payment 
recipients measure of New Income Management. Nevertheless, this section will 
discuss the emergence of income management and describe the various types in 
order to provide the policy context and distinguish the site of study.  
 
Income management emerged as a policy to predominantly regulate 
Indigenous welfare recipients, particularly in the NT, and in fact, despite the 
expansion of some types of income management to target Indigenous and non-
Indigenous welfare recipients in some of the forms of income management it is a 
policy which still mainly regulates Indigenous people (Bray et al., 2012; Buckmaster 
et al., 2012). However, this expansion, particularly in relation to the NTER, becomes 
the point at which this research examines income management’s intersection with the 
PCW category through the long-term payment recipients measure.  
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Income management and the NTER 
Income management or welfare quarantining was first introduced during the 
NTER, through the SSOLA (Welfare Payment Reform (WPR)) Act 2007 (Cth) in 
remote Indigenous communities in the NT. The SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 was part of 
a package of five Bills implemented through the NTER legislation by the Howard 
government in response to the Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle “Little Children 
are Sacred” (LCAS) Report (A. Brown & Brown, 2007; Buckmaster, Gardiner-
Garden, M. Thomas, & Spooner, 2010; Maddison, 2008).4 The LCAS Report was 
produced by the NT Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from 
Sexual Abuse which was commissioned by the NT government to investigate reports 
of widespread child sexual abuse in Indigenous communities and the barriers to 
redressing such abuse (Wild & Anderson, 2007). The NTER legislated, in 73 
predominantly Indigenous prescribed areas in the NT, widespread alcohol 
restrictions, welfare reform measures, enforced school attendance, ensured 
compulsory health checks for Indigenous children, increased police presence in the 
communities, acquired townships for a five-year period, removed the permit system 
and condition of customary law when sentencing and encouraged a ground clean up 
and repair of the communities to make them safer and healthier (Bacchi, 2009; 
Hinkson, 2007; Kelada, 2008; Maddison, 2008; Tedmanson & Wadiwel, 2010; Thill, 
2009). While Indigenous people with a PCW could have been income managed 
through the SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007, the Act was superseded in 2010 and is not a 
focus of this research. 
 
                                                          
4 Although it has been contested that the NTER served an alternative agenda of the Howard 
government (A. Brown & Brown, 2007; Hinkson, 2007; Langton, 2007; Maddison, 2008).  
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Through the NTER the Federal government indiscriminately subscribed 
Indigenous people in these prescribed areas in the NT receiving welfare payments for 
at least two years to income management (Billings, 2011; Langton, 2007). The 
SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 also suspended the RDA 1975 (Cth) as well as State and 
Territory anti-discrimination legislation because those subscribed to income 
management were treated differently based on their race (Buckmaster et al., 2012).  
 
The indiscriminate and racially targeted application of income management 
to Indigenous welfare recipients in prescribed areas in the NT was extensively 
problematised. In 2008, there was a review into the NTER commissioned by the 
Rudd Labor government, which suggested that income management only apply to 
those referred to it by a child protection officer or for poor school attendance and 
non-enrolment rather than automatically to all Indigenous welfare recipients in 
prescribed areas (Maddison, 2008). This recommendation was ignored by the then 
Indigenous Affairs Minister, Jenny Macklin, with income management and the 
suspension of the RDA 1975 continuing for a further 12 months from October 2008 
(Billings, 2010b). The United Nations (UN) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Committee also raised problems with income management, suggesting that Australia 
review income management because it negatively disadvantaged, discriminated 
against and impacted upon Indigenous people (Billings, 2010b). This similarly did 
not occur.  
 
In November 2009, the Rudd government announced its intention to reinstate 
the RDA 1975 and broaden income management to theoretically target both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare recipients, initially in the NT. Practically, 
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however, the New Income Management measures still predominantly impacted on 
Indigenous welfare recipients in the NT through the target categories (Bray et al., 
2012; Buckmaster et al., 2012). “According to the Government, this was to be the 
‘first step in a national roll out of income management in disadvantaged regions’” 
(Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 5). The SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 was superseded by the 
SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010, which reinstated 
the RDA 1975. The Act extends income management to those who receive income 
support in specific ‘vulnerable’ and ‘disadvantaged’ locations deemed ‘at risk’ 
(Billings, 2011; Buckmaster et al., 2012) theoretically irrespective of their race. The 
extension of income management is “needs-based” (Billings, 2011, p. 169) with “the 
new system … designed to target and support especially vulnerable welfare 
recipients “due to their high risk of social isolation and disengagement, poor 
financial literacy and participation in risk behaviours”” (Billings, 2011, p. 180). 
“Indicators of vulnerability are: financial hardship; financial exploitation; failure to 
undertake reasonable self-care; and homelessness or risk of homelessness” (Billings, 
2011, p. 181). Unlike, the original NTER income management, this type of income 
management does not target payments deemed less at risk such as the DSP, unless 
recommended by a child protection officer or Centrelink social worker (Buckmaster 
et al., 2012). Centrelink forms part of the DHS and is responsible for the distribution 
of social security payments and supports (Australian Government, n.d.).  
 
This extension to target both Indigenous and non-Indigenous welfare 
recipients in the NT to make the policy consistent with the RDA 1975 included the 
Parenting/ Participation Measure. This Measure automatically targets those classified 
as “disengaged youth” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) and long-term 
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welfare recipients who receive YA, NSA, Special Benefit or PP, single or partnered, 
and is automatically triggered by the length of duration on payment. “Disengaged 
youth” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) refers to those aged between 15 and 
24 years who have been receiving income support for three of the last six months 
(Buckmaster et al., 2012). Long-term welfare recipients are those aged 25 years and 
above who have been receiving income support “for more than one of the last two 
years” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 11). The long-term welfare recipients part of the 
Parenting/ Participation Measure is the type of income management examined in this 
research with an emphasis on NSA recipients with a PCW.  
 
In spite of the automatic nature of the “long-term welfare payment recipients” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) measure there is scope for these recipients 
to apply for an exemption from the Parenting/ Participation Income Management 
Measure. In order to apply for an exemption they must demonstrate “‘responsible 
parenting or participation in employment or study’” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 25), 
that they can meet the priority needs of themselves and their family, that they “are 
not vulnerable to financial exploitation” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 25) and that 
they are behaving in a socially responsible manner (Buckmaster et al., 2012). 
Concerns with this exemption criteria for people with a PCW will be discussed later 
on in the thesis.  
 
Other Types of Income Management  
However, there are many forms of income management which will be 
highlighted below. The reason for drawing attention to the other forms of income 
management is to emphasise the uniqueness of the automatic income management of 
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welfare recipients in the Parenting/ Participation Measure, in particular the long-term 
payment recipients measure which could include NSA recipients with a PCW. This 
automatic subscription to income management is significant because people with a 
PCW are not referred or recommended to be income managed by a Centrelink social 
worker, a child protection officer or the Family Responsibilities Commission (FRC), 
like in the other types of income management, but under the long-term welfare 
recipients measure are automatically subscribed once receiving welfare for 12 of the 
last 24 months. Additionally, it does not “target specific classes of individuals whom 
it is considered would benefit from income management” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, 
p. 33) like in an opt in or voluntary approach nor does it operate on a “last-resort 
suspension approach” (Buckmaster et al., 2012, p. 32). This is problematic because 
as Altman and Hinkson (2010) suggest with regard to NTER income management, 
there is the possibility of capturing those who already spend their income support 
payments responsibly and thus do not require their income to be managed.  
 
Further, particularly with regard to people with a PCW the criteria to 
designate long-term payment recipients is likely to automatically capture people with 
a PCW disregarding the fact that long-term unemployment rates are higher for 
Indigenous people and people with disability (Fowkes, 2011) and the role of 
discrimination in effecting the employment outcomes and opportunities of 
Indigenous people and people with disability.  
 
Income management was also trialled in four remote Indigenous communities 
in Cape York, Queensland. This was called the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial and 
involved a partnership between the Federal government, the Queensland State 
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government and the Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership, chaired by 
Indigenous leader Noel Pearson (Buckmaster et al., 2012). Unlike in prescribed areas 
in the NT, people in Cape York were not automatically subscribed to income 
management. Instead, the Cape York trials established a FRC which oversaw the 
cases of those who engaged in dysfunctional behaviours (Billings, 2009). The FRC 
was commissioned to make agreements with community members who violated one 
of five triggers. Income management could be included in an agreement between the 
individual and the FRC although it was “a measure of last resort” (Billings, 2010b, p. 
174).  
 
The SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 also legislated the school enrolment and 
attendance income management measure. This form of income management linked 
welfare payments to school attendance and intended to “stem the flow of cash into 
[prescribed Indigenous] communities [in the NT]” (Maddison, 2008, p. 43). 
However, under the Howard government this type of income management was not 
introduced anywhere in Australia (Buckmaster et al., 2012). However, in 2008, the 
Rudd government introduced the School Enrolment and Attendance Measure 
(SEAM). Through SEAM income support payments could be suspended as a final 
option in cases of non-enrolment and poor school attendance after attempts of 
discussion and planning with a NT Attendance and Truancy Officer (Buckmaster et 
al., 2012; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2014). This applies in 





People can also be referred for income management by a child protection 
officer, under Child Protection Income Management (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2007) which predominantly operates in parts of the NT and Western Australia (WA) 
(Buckmaster et al., 2012) or by a Centrelink Social Worker, under the Vulnerable 
Welfare Payment Recipients Income Management. These types of referrals form the 
main components of Place Based Income Management operating in five 
disadvantaged locations across Australia (DHS, 2014c), Income Management in 
Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands, South Australia, and Income 
Management in the Ngaanyatjarraku Shire, Laverton Shire and Kiwirrkurra 
Community, WA (DHS, 2014c; DSS, 2013a). Additionally, through the Supporting 
People at Risk Measure, authorities in the NT can direct people with alcohol related 
problems to income management (Buckmaster et al., 2012). Finally, welfare 
recipients in certain locations can choose to be voluntarily income managed 
(Buckmaster et al., 2012). 
 
In spite of the various forms of income management, this research focuses on 
the long-term payment recipients measure in the NT implemented through the 
SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010. This is because of 
its capacity to capture people with a PCW through automatic income management. 
Whereas, the other forms of income management are based on referrals, used as a 
last resort or an opt in process, income management under the long-term welfare 
recipients measure is triggered by receiving income support payments for at least 12 
of the last 24 months. As suggested, this income management criterion is likely to  
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capture people with a PCW based on the high rates of long-term unemployment 
among people with disability and the discrimination they experience in accessing 
employment opportunities. This will be explored in more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
The NDIS  
The NDIS provides a person-centred, self-directed approach to reasonable 
and necessary care and support for people with severe and profound disabilities in 
Australia. It uses an individualised funding model (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013) 
and is a significant shift in the provision and funding of disability services in 
Australia (NDIS, 2012b). It is underpinned by the principles of choice and control for 
participants who are able to, for example, choose the provider of their care and 
support needs. The need for the NDIS is well documented, based on problems with 
the previous disability care and support system, including its fragmentation and 
complexity (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013).  
 
Previously, the disability care and support system in Australia provided 
different levels of care and support depending on how impairment was acquired and 
in what State or Territory the person lived (NDIS, 2012b). The previous system also 
struggled to address the needs of many persons with disabilities, their families and 
carers (NDIS, 2012b). In addition, the increasing ageing population provides further 
evidence of the need for a NDIS. An ageing population could, for example, place 
increased demand on an already under resourced and underfunded system and could 
contribute to a decrease in the number of unpaid carers, including family members  
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available to support and care for persons with disabilities (NDIS, 2012b). This is 
problematic because the previous disability support system was propped up by the 
extensive unpaid and informal work of family members as carers.  
 
The NDIS emerged as a ‘Big Idea’ of the Rudd Labor government’s 2020 
Summit in 2008 (Bonyhady, 2009; Soldatic & Pini, 2012). The 2020 Summit was an 
Australian government forum which gathered “1,000 of the “best and brightest 
brains”” (M. Davis, 2008, p. 1) from outside the government to discuss Australia’s 
long-term future in an array of policy areas. The NDIS’ acceptance as a ‘Big Idea’ of 
the Summit followed a proposal submitted to the Summit outlining the need for a 
care and support scheme for persons with disabilities by Bruce Bonyhady and Helen 
Sykes (See, Bonyhady & Sykes, 2008).  
 
In 2009, the Rudd government committed to investigating a care and support 
scheme for persons with disabilities “in response to the campaign for national 
disability insurance” (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013, p. 6) by disability and carer 
organisations, in conjunction with developing a National Disability Strategy 
(Australian Government, 2009c). The government requested specifically that the 
Productivity Commission investigate the feasibility of a long-term care and support 
scheme for people with disability (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). Additionally, in 
2009, the report by the National People with Disabilities and Carer Council, Shut 
Out, was released. This report was to inform the development of a National 




In July 2011, the Productivity Commission recommended a NDIS 
problematising the adequacy of the previous care and support scheme (NDIS, 
2012a). The Productivity Commission report outlined a three-tiered care and support 
scheme. The first tier was intended for all Australians providing protection and 
insurance “in the event that they or a family member, acquire a significant disability” 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 10). This tier also sought to reduce the impact of 
disability on people with disability through “promoting opportunities for people with 
disability”, “creating awareness … of the issues that affect people with disability and 
the advantages of inclusion” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 12). Additionally, it 
intended for the data and research acquired by the National Disability Insurance 
Agency (NDIA), the body in charge of administering, delivering and managing the 
NDIS, (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013) to be used “to engage with other agencies to 
improve public health and safety” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 12). The 
second tier is for all persons with disabilities and will provide “information and 
referral services (as distinct from [the] funded support [provided in Tier three])” 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 12). It will also have a community capacity 
building component where local area coordinators (LAC) (NDIS case managers) will 
connect persons with disabilities to existing community organisations and provide 
small grants to these organisations assisting them to involve persons with disabilities. 
This “strengthen[s] the voluntary links between the community and people with 
disabilities … stimulat[ing] social capital” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 13). 
The third tier provides funded support “for people with significant care and support 
needs” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 13) who meet the age, disability or early 




The ‘Every Australian Counts’ campaign emerged to push the government to 
implement the recommendations of the Productivity Commission report and 
consequently the NDIS. The ‘Every Australian Counts’ campaign included persons 
with a lived experience of disability, carers, families, service providers and advocates 
(Della Bosca, 2011). Its plan was to “build a movement”, “spread the word” (Della 
Bosca, 2011, p. n.p.) about the need and importance of a NDIS and encourage 
campaigners to speak to their local MPs, to tell their stories and get their local MPs’ 
support for the NDIS.  
 
A month after the Productivity Commission report, the Gillard Labor 
government committed to the NDIS and announced funding for it in the 2012-13 
Federal Budget (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). In November 2012, the NDIS 
legislation was introduced into Parliament, passing in March 2013. The NDIS is 
comprised of three tiers following the recommendations of the Productivity 
Commission (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). The NDIS operates through “complex 
bilateral agreements between the relevant States and Territories and the 
Commonwealth” (Bigby, 2014, p. 313).  
 
The NDIS is not means tested. However, in order to be eligible for Tier 3 
people have to meet age, disability or early intervention and residency requirements 
(Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). Specifically, the age requirements exclude persons 
aged 65 and over from becoming participants in the Scheme unless supported 
through the Scheme prior to turning 65 (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). “A person 
meets the disability requirements if: (a) the person has a disability that is attributable 
to one or more intellectual, cognitive, neurological, sensory or physical impairments 
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or to one or more impairments attributable to a psychiatric condition” (NDIS Act 
2013, p. 28). The impairment has to be permanent and impact on one’s psychosocial 
functioning or functional capacity to communicate, socially interact, learn, be 
mobile, self-care and self-manage (NDIS Act 2013). It also has to impede on an 
individual’s economic and social participation and require lifetime care and support 
under the NDIS (NDIS Act 2013). The early intervention requirements require that 
the person has a disability defined as above that is likely to be permanent or “is a 
child who has a developmental delay” (NDIS Act 2013, p. 29). Additionally, the CEO 
of the NDIA must be satisfied that the early intervention supports provided are likely 
to decrease the supports required in the future and be beneficial to the recipient 
(NDIS Act 2013). In relation to residency requirements, persons accessing the NDIS 
must be “an Australian citizen, permanent visa holder or holder of a protected special 
category visa” (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013, p. 30).  
 
The NDIS will commence in full across Australia from 2018 (Buckmaster & 
Tomaras, 2013) though Tier 3 is currently operating in and being rolled out to trial 
sites (previously ‘launch sites’). These trial sites are testing different aspects of Tier 
3 and the best ways to transition persons from the existing disability care and support 
system to the NDIS. For example, the South Australian trial site targets children aged 
0-14 years and considers mainly early intervention supports. The Tasmanian trial 
targets young persons aged 15-24 years, focusing on the school to work or higher 
education transition. New South Wales is trialling the Scheme in the Hunter local 
government area and from July 1, 2014 the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) began 
trialling the whole Scheme (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013). However, there has been 
less of a focus on Tier 1 and Tier 2. 
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The future and the PCW category: 2014-15 Budget Changes and McClure 
Although excluded from analysis in this research, it is important to outline the 
2014-15 Abbott government Federal Budget changes because they could have an 
impact on the PCW category. The changes from July 1, 2014 will reassess DSP 
recipients under 35 years of age who were declared eligible for the DSP between 
January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2011 and who are capable of working eight hours 
or more (Buckmaster, 2014a; DHS, 2014b). These people will be assessed through 
the revised impairment tables introduced by the Gillard government on January 1, 
2012. Those then assessed as no longer eligible for the DSP will have to apply for 
another payment, such as NSA in order to receive income support (Buckmaster, 
2014a).  
 
Also from July 1, 2014 DSP recipients under the age of 35 and capable of 
working at least eight hours per week will have compulsory work-focused activities 
tied to payment receivership. Those who do not complete their activities could have 
their payment suspended or cancelled (DHS, 2014b). 
 
Additionally, there is currently a review being conducted into the income 
support system. The review was commissioned in late 2013 by the then Minister for 
Social Services, the Honourable Kevin Andrews. The investigation, conducted by Mr 
Patrick McClure AO, who previously reviewed Australia’s income support system in 





2014a). According to Karvelas, “[t]he McClure review will call for the sweeping 
overhaul of the Disability Support Pension, suggesting it be linked to the NDIS with 
a tougher “capacity” test to see how many hours people are capable of working” 
(2014b, p. 1). 
 
Conclusion  
 Australia’s welfare state emerged following the Second World War, although 
pension provisions had been in place for people with disability from 1908. The post-
war welfare state supported Keynesian policies and notions of full employment and 
receiving income support was seen as a right of social citizenship, although 
unemployment was seen as temporary. Upon the realisation that unemployment was 
not temporary the emphasis of welfare shifted.  
 
 Reforms to the Australian welfare state have been influenced by the 
increasing ageing population, globalisation and neoliberalism as well as international 
ideologies such as, those by the OECD. This shift largely occurred during the 
leadership of the Hawke-Keating Labor government and the Howard Liberal 
National Coalition government. However, it was suggested that the Howard 
government made the most significant policy reforms to disability and welfare.  
 
 In 2000 the Howard government commissioned the Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform to examine possible changes to the welfare state. The Group 
recommended that the work capacity test for people with disability reflect the 
contemporary workforce norms (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000). 
Legislatively, the Howard government attempted to make changes to the work test 
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criterion for people with disability several times before succeeding with the 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and 
Other Measures) Act 2006. The Welfare to Work Act changed the work capacity test 
meaning that those persons with disabilities assessed as capable of working 15 hours 
or more per week were excluded from the DSP. As a result they had to apply for an 
alternative income support payment, such as the unemployment benefit, NSA. This 
subscribed them to job search requirements and meant that they could be regulated 
through breaching penalties should they fail to meet their obligations with the state.  
 
 Following the Howard government, the Rudd government made no changes 
to the DSP eligibility criteria for people with disability, however, the successive 
Gillard government did. The Gillard government’s changes by requiring people with 
disability applying for the DSP to have previously engaged with a POS could have 
forced more persons with disabilities onto NSA with a PCW.  
 
 Income management emerged as part of the Howard government’s 
emergency response in the NT to allegations of child sexual abuse in remote 
Indigenous communities. NTER income management applied to Indigenous 
Australians however, was superseded by New Income Management measures in 
response to the racially discriminatory application of NTER income management. 
The “long-term welfare payment recipients” measure (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2009, p. 3), part of the Parenting/ Participation measure of New Income 
Management, is the type of income management analysed in this research. Long-
term payment recipients income management theoretically applies to Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous welfare recipients who have been in receipt of income support 
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payments including NSA for 12 of the last 24 months. Based on the criteria 
determining long-term payment recipients it was suggested that it was likely to 
capture people with a PCW. This was because of the automatic way in which the 
measures are applied, disregarding the fact that a higher proportion of the long-term 
unemployed are people with disability who lack the same opportunities for 
employment. 
 
 Despite not explicitly focusing on the need to acknowledge, recognise and 
analyse the intersection of policy, this chapter lays the foundations of the research 
through establishing the policy context and provides evidence of the potential for 
these policies to intersect in governing subjects on NSA, including people with a 
PCW. Rather than intersectional the policies are seen as distinct documents. This 
ignores their potential for intersection in constructing and governing subjects which 
is worth drawing attention to. It also ignores the common employment of discourses 
of welfare dependency, mutual obligation and active citizenship in governing. The 
following chapter examines existing scholarship by governmentality scholars on the 
welfare state, disability studies scholars on the welfare state and CRAWS scholars on 
income management. This chapter enhances the emphasis of a gap in existing 
scholarship which does not highlight the intersection of the Howard government’s 
Welfare to Work changes and income management in regulating subjects of the 
income support system, in particular, people with a PCW.  
54 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the policy context. It described the influence of 
neoliberalism in the reformation of the welfare state. This chapter will highlight the 
impact of political rationalities on the welfare state and the way that they operate to 
govern citizens through the exploration of existing literature by governmenality 
scholars and the welfare state, disability studies scholars and the welfare state and 
CRAWS scholars and the welfare state.  
 
Evident will be instances of neoliberal, neo-paternalistic and neo-
conservative rationalities. Though neoliberalism and neo-conservatism are arguably 
distinct political rationalities (W. Brown, 2006), they operate together alongside neo-
paternalism to regulate welfare recipients in Australia. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
a neoliberal rationality emphasises deregulation, privatisation, the free market, a 
preference for minimal state intervention and a reduction in state expenditure 
(Mendes, 2008). A neo-paternalistic or paternalistic rationality justifies intervention 
to regulate problematic populations or citizens. Neo-paternalism is underpinned by 
the importance of mutual obligations in the welfare state in order to encourage or 
coerce welfare recipients into employment (Mendes, 2008). A neo-conservative 
rationality whilst supporting the market as the means to distribute goods and 
services, does not support the free market. It supports notions of equality of 
opportunity, rather than equality of outcome and understands the welfare state as 
having an important function in society. However, from a neo-conservative  
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perspective the welfare state can produce dependency and should not inhibit 
initiative and responsibility thus supporting policies which seek to discourage 
welfare dependency.   
 
In addition, the conclusion of the previous chapter implied that exploring the 
policy context drew attention to the potential for policy intersection in governing 
people with a PCW. It also highlighted the importance of analysing this intersection 
for how people with a PCW are constructed and governed in the recent reforms to the 
income support system for people with disability and in relation to changes to 
disability care and support in Australia. This chapter continues the emphasis on 
acknowledging and analysing policy intersections through identifying a gap in 
existing scholarship. Specifically, there is a dearth of literature on the income 
management of people with disability generally and people with a PCW more 
particularly hence requiring this section to examine how CRAWS scholars discuss 
how Indigenous Australians are constructed and governed in income management. It 
is a contention of this chapter then that existing scholarship does not acknowledge or 
examine the intersection of policy’s governing people with a PCW rather primarily 
focuses on the initial inception of the category in Welfare to Work.  
 
Governmentality scholars and the welfare state 
Governmentality theorists are influenced by the work of French philosopher 
Michel Foucault and examine the mechanisms and modes of rule employed to 
govern citizens and direct conduct (Dean, 1995, 1999). Governmentality theorists 
suggest that policy constructs policy ‘problems’ simultaneously creating policy 
subjects and how they are to be regulated or ruled and through what mechanisms 
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(Bacchi, 2009; Dean, 1999). However, governmentality scholars are not simply 
concerned with how the government regulates its subjects but with all the 
mechanisms and techniques which are employed to direct conduct (Dean, 1995). 
Governmentality scholars who analyse welfare policy largely discuss the 
unemployed. The unemployed were the first group of welfare recipients to be 
affected by the shift in understandings of welfare and the individualisation of the 
‘problem’ of unemployment which began during the Fraser government in the 1970s. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this began as a result of the realisation that 
unemployment was not a short-term condition anticipated under policies of full 
employment and Keynesianism. The Fraser government invoked the term ‘dole 
bludger’ thus reframing the problem (Marston & McDonald, 2007) of welfare 
receivership through a discourse which focused on the individual as the ‘problem’ 
and as their own barrier to employment. The unemployed were assumed in this 
regard to be welfare dependent and devoid of any work ethic (Henman, 2004). 
Additionally, the receivership of income support was presumed to be a disincentive 
to participating in the market (Dean, 1995). These assumptions and reforms were 
continued and extended under the Hawke-Keating government and the Howard 
government as evidenced in Chapter One. This shift in understanding saw “… an 
income support system with limited obligations on the unemployed … [be] replaced 
by a system deeply entwined with the market centred philosophy of neoliberalism 
and the paternalism of social conservativism” (Lantz & Dee, 2012, p. 2). This 
justified the close scrutiny of welfare recipients and policies underpinned by 
reciprocal or mutual obligations in order to produce self-reliance and compliance 




Discourses of welfare dependency thus “construct … particular 
subjectivities” (Hartman, 2005, p. 63) about the underemployed and unemployed, 
such as the ‘dole bludger’. The underemployed and unemployed are represented as in 
need of discipline and coercion because they are assumed to be lazy, passive and 
problematic as a result of their unemployment. This produces unemployment as an 
individualised ‘problem’ suggesting that there is something wrong with the 
unemployed which causes their unemployment. Unemployment is also represented 
as a ‘choice’. Dean suggests the use of the concept welfare dependency “condenses 
and in a sense confuses moral and psychological characteristics with the simple 
administrative condition of requiring poor relief” (2002, p. 46). Although its 
continued use has justified the regulation of the unemployed through increased 
surveillance and monitoring practices which are institutionalised in the structure and 
organisation of the income support system and employment services. This increased 
regulation of the unemployed reflects the operation of social conservatism in this 
context where the unemployed are monitored and disciplined for their lack of 
compliance with mainstream social values around self-reliance and employment. 
Lantz and Dee (2012) suggest that this surveillance, control and regulation is at odds 
with the freedom and choice underpinning neoliberalism, however freedom is 
suspended for the unemployed because of assumptions made about their character 
based on their unemployment.  
 
The unemployed however, through the reforms of the Hawke-Keating 
government and the Howard government, also became constructed as ‘job-seekers’. 
For example, Dean (1995) suggests that welfare payments in the context of the 
Keating government were not given to the unemployed but to the ‘job-seeker’ who 
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must complete their reciprocal obligations with the state. In this way, the 
unemployed shift from being classified through the passive term ‘unemployed’ to the 
active identity of the ‘job-seeker’. Therefore, “[i]nstead of granting a claimant 
her/his rightful benefit, the state provides an allowance and services on the condition 
that the client engages in job-search activities” (Dean, 1995, p. 574). This seeks to 
invoke behavioural change which is produced through the expectations of the state. 
The operation of paternal regulation through conditional welfare receipt in this 
context suggests that the unemployed are unable to act in their own best interests, 
hence justifying government surveillance and discipline (Lantz & Dee, 2012).  
 
Henman (2004) suggests that subject positions, such as the ‘dole bludger’ and 
the ‘job-seeker’, can be produced through targeting which is increasingly used to 
govern and manage populations, particularly the unemployed, through welfare 
reforms. Targeting occurs through segmenting certain populations or individuals 
from others, similar to racial profiling. Targeting and classifying individuals into 
categories is assumed as normal. However, Henman (2004) argues that common 
sense, normalised assumptions about targeting and categorising need to be 
destabilised, challenged and recognised as a means to organise and manage 
populations. Additionally, “while discrimination [and targeting] in terms of gender, 
race, age, etc. has been increasingly outlawed and outmoded, these new forms of 
discrimination [and targeting] emerge on the basis of new rationalities that recast 





Targeting and profiling is exemplified for example through the technologies 
used to monitor, survey and track any activity agreement breaches of the unemployed 
in the welfare reforms and assists in constructing “risk profiles” (Henman, 2004, p. 
180). Lyon describes how “‘surveillance today sorts people into categories assigning 
worth or risk, in ways that have real effects on their life-chances’” (2002, p. 1). 
Surveillance is not simply watching and monitoring but a deliberate process which 
can control and direct the conduct of those surveyed (Henman, 2004). Surveillance in 
this way becomes a mechanism of governing (Henman, 2004) and is often justified 
through the observation of risk. 
 
Governmentality scholars also draw attention to the extensive use of risk 
discourses in the welfare state where different levels of risk are assigned to particular 
constructed categories. Risk discourses and determining risk populations divide 
subjects into, “those who are capable of managing risk and those whose riskiness 
requires management under what might be called a ‘tutelary’ relationship, a division 
that might be expressed as one between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘marginalized’” 
(Dean, 1995, p. 580). In the determination of job-readiness for example, there is a 
division between those who are considered ‘job-ready’ and those who have been 
unemployed for a considerable amount of time (Dean, 1995). For those who are ‘job-
ready’ and who may require income support as an intermediary between 
unemployment and work and some assistance locating a job it “can be provided by 
relying on their liberty and by only limited resort to … [disciplinary] means” (Dean, 
2002, p. 46). Alternatively, those who are deemed at high ‘risk’ of welfare 
dependency require increased levels of surveillance through breaching penalties, 
workfare programs, coercive measures, and authoritarianism. Essentially, “despotic 
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practices for those populations who do not have, or do not yet possess, the capacities 
and attributes of responsibility and freedom” (Dean, 1999, p. 209). This assumption 
of welfare dependency provides the justification for an active rather than passive 
system of welfare (Dean, 1995). 
 
Henman (2004) similarly highlights how risk figures into what level of 
employment service one receives through the Job Network. A recipient is considered 
‘at risk’ if they have been unemployed for a ‘long period of time’, that is, a period of 
12 months or more. Claimants are assessed and then sorted into one of three levels of 
employment assistance. For example 
 
job-matching services are provided to those deemed at low risk of long-term 
unemployment. Job search training services are more supported assistance for 
those deemed to have reduced employment prospects. Intensive assistance is 
allocated to those considered to have severe barriers to employment (Henman, 
2004, p. 180).  
  
However, it is not only through the lens of risk and the income support system 
that the unemployed become surveyed as broader society is also encouraged by the 
government to survey the unemployed. This is a tenet of neoliberal government 
where responsibility is then placed on broader society to support the government in 
managing the unemployed subject (Edwards, 2003). Similarly, “observations by 
others is a key strategy in the policy panoptic of mutual obligations, where 
government and its agents enlist the assistance of others, including the general 
public, who are invited to gaze upon welfare recipients” (Edwards, 2003, p. 104). 
The gaze then becomes another way of surveying the unemployed and is applied to 
those in need of discipline (Hartman, 2005). The gaze is coupled with the  
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normalising gaze which is a means of exercising power. Individuals ‘gazed’ as 
abnormal are subject to regulation and discipline for their abnormality or deviance 
from normality. 
 
Governmentality scholars also discuss the mechanisms used to discipline the 
unemployed for such deviance from normality; for example, breaching penalties are 
applied when a welfare recipient fails to fulfil their obligations with the state. 
Breaching penalties were meant to signal that welfare was the “offer [of] ‘a hand up 
but not a hand-out’” (Marston & McDonald, 2007, p. 239). Failing to comply with 
the expectations and obligations in Activity Agreements, a contract between the 
unemployed and the employment service provider, was labelled a ‘participant 
failure’ where participants would lose their payment for up to eight weeks.  
 
[S]ocial security recipients who commit a ‘participant failure’ are 
automatically suspended from payment for a period of non-compliance – a 
process that is called a ‘participant solution’. Payment is resumed once the 
person complies with the agreement; however a strike is registered against their 
record (Marston & McDonald, 2007, p. 240).  
 
Such techniques or mechanisms of rule seek to encourage or coerce compliance with 
the norm which operates as a mechanism of disciplinary power to shape conduct in 
specific ways. Recipients are further penalised for consistent non-compliance which 
includes an eight week non-payment period for those who commit three participation 
failures within a 12 month period. This led Marston and McDonald (2007) to suggest 
that contemporary social security law with its disciplinary focus seeks to nudge 
claimants into compliance. Breaching penalties work to reform the deviant  
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unemployed individual, disciplining and coercing them into internalizing the 
measures of discipline so that they govern themselves and their conduct (Henman, 
2004).  
 
Thus governmentality scholars argue that the structure of the reforms and 
mutual obligation also focuses on the formation or reformation of the self, seeking to 
manage, construct and regulate the behaviour of those claiming income support. 
These “practices of self-formation, [involve] practices concerned to shape the 
attributes, capacities, orientations and moral conduct of individuals and to define 
their rights, obligations and statuses” (Dean, 1995, p. 567). Welfare recipients are 
expected to be compliant with self-moulding and self-regulating strategies (Dean, 
1995). The measures seek to construct the aspirations and desires of the unemployed 
by implicitly shaping what they should want in society (Dean, 1995), motivating 
them into employment. Welfare recipients, through activities and their expectations, 
are also encouraged to analyse and survey themselves and their own conduct, 
reforming it, if necessary. For example, in Welfare to Work this can be seen through 
the requirement that unemployed individuals record their attempts to obtain 
employment or follow up a job advertisement. This could also be achieved through 
encouraging recipients to report their income to Centrelink on a specific day, by a 
specific time. The regular reporting of income to Centrelink relates to Foucault’s 
discussion in Discipline and Punish on “the control of activity” (1977, p. 149). This 
is because it regulates, manages and controls the conduct of the individual in 
accordance with the expectations of Centrelink. Rose and Miller similarly suggest 
that “making people write things down, and the nature of the things people are made 
to write down, is itself a kind of government of them, urging them to think about and 
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note certain aspects of their activities according to certain norms” (1992, p. 200). 
Therefore welfare recipients receive a conditional allowance based on self-
reformation (Dean, 1995). The welfare state seeks to produce then, an active 
individual who is capable of managing their own conduct and of marketing their 
skills and qualifications to potential employers (Dean, 1995).  
 
Marston (2004) suggests that the severity or need for disciplinary measures is 
rarely questioned. This is because of the focus on welfare dependency by the 
government and the media. Marston and McDonald (2007) argue that the acceptance 
of the Welfare to Work reforms by the public demonstrates the success of the 
Howard government’s propaganda about welfare dependency, prior to the policy’s 
implementation and the need to tie an obligation to the receivership of income 
support. The perpetuation of discourses of welfare dependency by the government 
and dividing practices encourages broader society to individualise welfare 
dependency as the fault of the individual welfare recipient. Dividing practices are 
employed in this context to distinguish the ‘good citizen’ who is responsible and thus 
whose life is free from intervention, supervision and observation from the ‘deviant 
one’ who is unemployed. Dividing practices was “a term used by Foucault to 
describe practices that set some (marginalised) groups against other (mainstream) 
groups and/ or that set up divisions or tensions within political subjects” (Bacchi, 
2009, p. 275).  
 
 The unemployed are subjectified as ‘dole bludgers’ who are lazy, welfare 
dependent and choose to be unemployed thus individualising the ‘problem’ of 
unemployment. They are also represented as deviant in comparison to the employed 
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citizen. Representations such as these have justified increased levels of surveillance 
and management of the unemployed whose behaviour is reshaped through discipline. 
However, policy also constructs the unemployed as ‘job-seekers’ who have an 
obligation to the state to search for employment. The extension of these themes 
occurred through Welfare to Work to people with disability, in particular extending 
the individualisation of unemployment as a supply-side problem. However, in ways 
this continued the control of people with disability and the erosion of their autonomy.  
 
Disability studies scholars and the welfare state 
Disability studies scholars and the disability movement argue through the 
social model that disability is constructed by society. The social model of disability 
emerged from the ideas of the “UPIAS (1976) … an organization whose membership 
was exclusive to disabled people” (Oliver, 2009, p. 42). The UPIAS campaigned and 
advocated for the inclusion of people with disability in society as opposed to their 
segregation and for people with disability to have independence and choice (UPIAS, 
1976). The term ‘social model’ though was devised by Michael Oliver, UK academic 
and disability rights advocate (Barnes & Mercer, 2004; Oliver, 2009; Roulstone, C. 
Thomas, & Watson, 2012).  
 
As suggested in the Introduction, the social model of disability makes a 
distinction between impairment and disability. Disability is suggested to reside in the 
domain of power and “social organisation rather than personal limitation” (Oliver, 




occurs through the structures, practices and interactions of society and its institutions 
(Carlson, 2010; Goggin & Newell, 2005; Oliver, 1996). Through the social model 
the projected naturalness of disability and its status as taken for granted is challenged 
(Goggin & Newell, 2005).  
 
Although the social model has been criticised for various reasons (See for 
example, Shakespeare & Watson, 2002), some of which will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the social model is significant for people with disability, 
disability scholars and the disability movement. This is because it empowers people 
with disability and challenges the social landscape to eliminate the experience of 
disability (that is, disability as understood in social model terms), providing scope for 
inclusion and participation in broader society. Additionally, it can challenge the 
experiences of discrimination and disadvantage felt by people with disability, thus 
delivering social change.  
 
In contrast to the social model the other model affiliated with disability is the 
medical model, part of the individual model of disability according to Oliver (1996). 
In the medical model disability is considered as a deficit and a ‘problem’ with the 
individual who is regulated, controlled and managed by the medical profession 
(Goggin & Newell, 2005). In this model the medical profession is understood to 
categorise people with disability as ‘disabled’ as evidenced through medical ‘proof’. 
Disability scholars and the disability movement problematise the medical model 
because the knowledge of the medical profession is privileged over the knowledge of 
the individual with disability, undermining the agency and autonomy of people with 
disability (Goggin & Newell, 2005).  
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Disability studies scholars argue that disability was socially constructed 
through the institution of work during industrialisation (Galvin, 2004). Historically, 
people with disability were excluded from participating in the workforce because 
employment and one’s ability to contribute to the workforce was premised on the 
norm of ableism, thus governing people with disability through an able-bodied norm 
(Galvin, 2004). People with disability were represented as unproductive and 
inefficient and thus incapable of fulfilling the demands of the modern labour force 
which sought to maximise profits (Barnes & Mercer, 2005; Galvin, 2004; Humpage, 
2007a). As a result people with disability were excluded from employment and 
relegated to the private sphere (Galvin, 2004). 
 
In contrast, prior to industrialisation, the separation between the public 
institution of work and the private institution of family was less pronounced and 
“[d]isabled people did not constitute a socially recognized group’” (Paterson & 
Hughes, 2000, p. 37). Through industrialisation the previous contribution that 
persons with disabilities may have made was disregarded (Humpage, 2007a). This 
period “broadly corresponds to the feudal period … [Where] economic activity 
consisted primarily of agrarian or cottage based industries, a ‘mode of production’ … 
which does not preclude people with perceived impairment from participation” 
(Barnes, 1997, p. 6).  
 
Thus, with assistance from the medical profession, which measured and 
determined one’s capacities and abilities, disability was constructed historically 
through the domain of work (Barnes & Mercer, 2005; Humpage, 2007a). This 
established a dividing practice between those who could participate in wage labour, 
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the able-bodied and those who could not, the ‘disabled’. Work thus became a site of 
subjectification for disability (Humpage, 2007a), with the structure of employment 
then largely linked to the exclusion of people with disability (Barnes & Mercer, 
2005). 
 
As a result of their exclusion from paid employment many persons with 
disabilities were institutionalised (C. Thomas, 2004). Institutions controlled, 
marginalised and oppressed people with disability although they were represented as 
‘helping’ people with disability (Goggin & Newell, 2005). Goggin and Newell 
(2005) suggest that institutions were premised on the notion of people with disability 
as biologically inferior. People with disability through institutions were governed 
through the medical profession who assessed, managed and treated their ‘condition’. 
Institutions reproduced disability through disabling the autonomy of people with 
disability through their subscription to the authority of ‘professionals’ (Goggin & 
Newell, 2005).  
 
The exclusion of people with disability from employment has led disability 
studies scholars to argue that people with disability are forced into a state of 
dependency on the welfare state (Barton, 1989; Oliver, 1989; Roulstone, 2000). This 
impeded their independence, participation and inclusion (Galvin, 2004). People with 
disability were thus placed into dependent relations (Brisenden, 1986) leading to 
suggestions that their dependency is socially constructed. Goggin and Newell (2005) 
question why people with disability need or require income support in the first place 
suggesting that the ableist norms perpetuated by society, particularly with regard to 
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employment, led to the exclusion of people with disability producing their economic 
and social disadvantage. As they explain:  
 
[i]f we ask why people with disabilities should be in a situation where they 
may need ‘special income support’, we can start to unpack the complex power 
relations and ideologies of disability … As a starting point, it might be 
contended that it is only because of our narrow norms of work, productivity 
and what it is to be a contributing member of society that we create people 
within whose minds and bodies we locate inability to contribute (Goggin & 
Newell, 2005, p. 21).  
 
Disability has thus been constructed and reshaped by definitions of work 
historically and the contemporary context is no exception, particularly with regard to 
the Welfare to Work reforms (Humpage, 2007a). Welfare to Work reformed how 
people with disability were understood and constructed in the welfare state. 
Disability scholars suggest that the reconstruction of disability established a 
hierarchy of disability based on one’s perceived work value and profitability as well 
as how much one could contribute to the workforce (Soldatic, 2013). This 
contribution, assessed through how many hours one is capable of working, 
determined one’s disability status (Soldatic, 2009, 2013). Those assessed as unable to 
work 15 hours per week were categorised as DSP recipients in contrast to those 
assessed as capable of working between 15 and 29 hours per week who then had to 
apply for another welfare payment in order to access income support, such as NSA. 
Unsuccessful applicants for the DSP shifted from being classified through the 
welfare state as persons with disabilities to being considered as unemployed 




classified through time which “maintain[s] social order” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 234). The 
Welfare to Work reforms of the Howard government thus established  
 
two new classes of disabled people – a fully dependent class, worthy of what 
Goodin, et al. (1999, p. 43) refer to as liberal sympathy and charity, and a class 
‘somewhere in between’, receiving some state support, coupled with the 
discipline of the market (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 147).  
 
This meant that for some people with disability they lost the protection of the social 
category of disability through the Welfare to Work reforms including various forms 
of social rights and entitlements and were pushed into the open labour market which 
continues to be structured around an able-bodied norm (Soldatic, 2013). In Ontario, 
Canada, Chouinard and Crooks (2005) describe a similar situation for women with 
disability who have been impacted by welfare state restructuring and who are 
governed by ableist norms in the welfare state and employment. This indicates trends 
in Anglo-sphere restructuring of the welfare state.  
 
In an Australian context, then, as a result of the continuation of the able-
bodied norm in structuring employment, people with disability still require some of 
the protections which are affiliated with a disability specific income support 
payment. These are however removed through Welfare to Work. As will be seen 
later, this also fails to recognise, acknowledge or challenge the higher costs of 
participation for people with disability or breakdown social barriers, such as 
inaccessible public transport, inaccessible buildings, the failure to provide 
information in accessible formats and discrimination, making it then problematic that 
some people with disability lose the protection of the social category of disability 
through the Welfare to Work reforms.  
70 
 
The Welfare to Work reforms challenged the deserving and undeserving poor 
notion where historically people with disability were seen, with the assistance of the 
medical profession, as unquestionably deserving of income support or pensions 
because of their disability status (Humpage, 2007a; Soldatic, 2009; Soldatic & 
Chapman, 2010). This challenge to notions of deserving and undeserving also 
reframed welfare from a social right or entitlement for people with disability to one 
based on who was perceived to be the most deserving. . 
 
This shift from seeing welfare as an unconditional entitlement to a payment 
based on obligations is also discussed in a UK context by Hyde (2000) and a 
Canadian context by Wilton (2004). This shift in notions of deservingness that goes 
alongside this is also examined in a UK context. For example, Roulstone (2000) 
describes the impact of the New Deal for people with disability. He suggests that 
through the New Deal the clear cut notion between deserving and undeserving 
welfare recipients is blurred. This is as a result of welfare reforms placing obligations 
on some people with disability. Different policy mechanisms employed during this 
time including the New Deal sought to determine the ‘legitimacy’ of disability 
‘claims’ and those who are capable of employment. He describes the “redrawing of 
the disability category” (Roulstone, 2000, p. 435). Reflecting trends in Anglo-Sphere 
welfare state restructuring this reclassifying of disability also occurred in Ontario, 
Canada in relation to the Ontario Disability Support Program (Wilton, 2004).  
 
Soldatic (2009) argues that some people with disability became constructed 
though a new lens of disgust as a result of the Welfare to Work reforms which were 
coupled with notions of deserving and undeserving. “Disgust was used to identify, 
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separate out and exclude a particular class of disabled citizens within the polity to 
redefine them as undeserving” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 179) and thus illegitimate 
recipients of welfare (Soldatic & Pini, 2009). It disrupted and challenged previous 
assumptions that people with disability legitimately deserved state support. Soldatic 
and Pini (2009) suggest that the most common mechanism employed to represent 
welfare recipients through a lens of disgust during the Howard government was the 
media and while often the media represented welfare recipients as a homogenous 
category, at times distinctions between different types of income support recipients 
were made. Media representations and parliamentary debates represented people 
with disability as lazy, deviant and immoral, similar to representations of the 
unemployed discussed above, and the voices of people with disability were excluded 
from challenging these representations (Soldatic, 2009). In particular, after the 
release of the 2005-06 Federal Budget, people with disability became represented as 
having previously shirked their responsibilities with the state (Soldatic & Pini, 2009), 
and were now represented as “workshy scroungers, defrauding the welfare system” 
(Soldatic, 2013, p. 409). “Disgust had finally stuck, and the normative realm of 
deservingness had been categorically reclassified and reconstituted to depict a new 
class of disabled citizens as inherently undeserving of state welfare” (Soldatic & 
Pini, 2009, p. 88) as opposed to the ‘truly’ disabled who were seen as deserving 
(Soldatic, 2009; Soldatic & Grover, 2013).  
 
Those cast as undeserving, were subscribed to a similar mode of paternalistic 
regulation, control, surveillance and discipline as the unemployed, from which they 
were previously excluded. Such regulation sought to produce a self-productive 
subject whose behaviour would be consistent with social norms and values around 
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employment and a work ethic (Lantz &Marston, 2012). At the core of this, similar to 
the regulation of the unemployed, “is a focus on bureaucratic, measurable, rational-
technocratic procedures and interventions to ensure compliance and to move welfare 
recipients into job-search training and employment” (Dee, 2013, p. 272).  
 
Welfare to Work: the medical model or the social model of disability?  
Prior to Welfare to Work Sherry (2002) suggested that welfare reforms 
announced in the 2001-02 Federal Budget by the Howard government in relation to 
disability showed a commitment to the medical model rather than the social model. 
This is because they failed to acknowledge the broader barriers experienced to 
participation by people with disability. In a UK context Roulstone (2000) examines 
whether the New Deal for Disabled People reflects the medical model or the social 
model. The New Deal was a workfare policy introduced by the Blair government 
(1997-2007). One of its measures was to withdraw payment for people with 
disability who refused a work placement, work trial or training opportunity (Hyde, 
2000). Roulstone (2000) suggests that the delivery of the scheme does not reflect the 
ideals of the social model despite at times being discussed through the language. 
Similarly, Humpage (2007a) has compared the Welfare to Work reforms with the 
medical model of disability. This is despite changes to the DSP appearing to use the 
same language of the disability movement and the social model with terms like 
inclusion, empowerment and participation. This is because the focus on economic 
policy in a neoliberal discourse reduces social inclusion, empowerment and 
participation to participation in the labour market (Humpage, 2007a; Soldatic & Pini, 
2012). For example, Humpage (2007a) argues that mutual obligation while 
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linguistically appearing to link to the social model rather perpetuates the medical 
model. This is because: 
 
language [used in mutual obligation of self-reliance, participation and being 
active] appears to overlap with that used to articulate the social model, which 
places emphasis on participation in the community and attempts to shift away 
from reliance on the medical profession (Humpage, 2007a, p. 215).  
 
Galvin, who discusses the government’s devising of welfare reforms to impact 
people with disability prior to Welfare to Work, similarly, argues that while 
government policy appears to align with the objectives of the disability movement 
for social participation and independence, there is no consistency between “welfare 
reform policy and the disability rights movement” (2004, p. 343). Therefore, in spite 
of appearing so, the welfare reforms do not support or are not informed by the social 
model. Instead, the language of the disability movement is appropriated to a regime 
which does the opposite of the objectives of the social model (Galvin, 2004). This is 
because the Australian government has reformulated the language of the social 
model “into neoliberal forms, stepped in individualism and economic rationalism” 
(Galvin, 2004, p. 346). Roulstone (2000) in a UK context suggests that the New Deal 
appeared to provide for the social inclusion of people with disability, who were 
previously excluded. However, the structure of the policy perpetuated the social and 
economic dependency and exclusion of people with disability (Hyde, 2000; 
Roulstone, 2000). Roulstone (2000) argues that in some ways the rhetoric of getting 
people with disability out of poverty and off income support has to appear humane 




Galvin (2004) argues that part of the reason for the seamless application of 
the liberating language of the social model by the Australian government with what 
Hartman and Darab (2006) have described as draconian, coercive welfare reforms 
comes at the fault of the disability movement. This is because the social model 
prioritises the values of capitalism such as work and independence (Galvin, 2004). 
Instead, a theory which liberates people with disability necessitates the rejection of 
“work as crucially definitional of social membership” (Abberley, 1999, p. 13). 
 
Humpage (2007a) identifies three links between Welfare to Work’s mutual 
obligation and the medical model. Firstly, the Howard government’s reforms, like 
the medical model, produce the individual person with disability as the ‘problem’ 
and locate the intervention within the individual, similar to discussions of the 
unemployed earlier. This is not unlike arguments made by Roulstone in a UK context 
who suggests that the movement away from government intervention and provision 
of social welfare through welfare state restructuring has shifted to “enabling 
dependent groups to identify routes out of their predicament” (2000, p. 427). This 
produces a more individualised focus for dependency and the site of intervention. 
Essentially Roulstone (2000) suggests in relation to the New Deal that the main 
object of the change is the dependent individual. With regard to Welfare to Work, 
disability scholars argue that, in particular, mutual obligation’s focus on the 
individual implies two things. Firstly, it represents people with disability as having a 
poor work ethic and lacking the desire to work who thus must be coerced into active 
participation and employment through mutual obligation and workfare. Secondly, it  
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assumes that they lack sufficient skills to undertake or participate effectively in 
employment (Humpage, 2007a, 2007b) as evidenced through an increase in training 
programs and places in employment support services.  
 
By focusing on the individual, Welfare to Work and mutual obligation do not 
acknowledge government responsibility to provide an accessible and inclusive social 
landscape for people with disability, failing to consider the social barriers which 
impede people with disability from accessing and participating in employment 
(Humpage, 2007a; Soldatic & Chapman, 2010). This point is also made in a UK 
context by Roulstone (2000) during his discussion of the New Deal for people with 
disability. He suggests that the state has not addressed the exclusionary market. In 
addition, employers have only been given some encouragement to employ people 
with disability. This ignores the overwhelming evidence of the barriers experienced 
by people with disability which impact on their capacity to exercise agency in this 
context. Social barriers to employment include employer attitudes, education 
experience, inaccessible public transport, insufficient transport infrastructure, 
inaccessible buildings, discrimination and the cost of participating in the labour 
market for people with disability (Galvin, 2004; Humpage, 2007a). Soldatic and 
Chapman, for example, argue that workfare discourses, adopted by Welfare to Work 
fail to consider discrimination as a barrier to employment which “further entrenches 
… [persons with disabilities] structural position of poverty” (2010, p. 142). This 
makes it inconsistent with the social model. Disability scholars such as Humpage 
thus argue that mutual obligation is a “fundamentally flawed concept” (2007a, p. 
221) because there is no mutuality in the obligation. This is because the obligation is 
only held by people with disability to the government and the government does not 
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address or acknowledge through Welfare to Work the social barriers to employment 
in return or create any employment opportunities for people with disability (Galvin, 
2004). Goggin and Newell (2005) also question the capacity of Australia’s 
employment sector to provide work to people with disability, particularly, in a 
context where, as Galvin (2004) suggests, there are more job applications than jobs 
available. Roulstone (2000) argues that by ignoring this broader context social 
exclusion or the lack of employment is blamed on personal deficit. In addition, 
responsibility is attributed to the individual, rather than the state (Hyde, 2000; 
Wilton, 2004). 
 
Secondly, in the medical model and the Howard government’s welfare 
reforms medical professionals are sources of authority on disability who manage, 
control and determine access to resources for people with disability, constructing and 
governing them. Disability scholars argue that mutual obligation and the changes 
made to DSP eligibility through Welfare to Work further subscribe people with 
disability to examination by the medical profession. This is because the medical 
profession has to assess and certify their capabilities and disabilities hence 
controlling their access to income support. For example, through the Job Capacity 
Assessment there is a medicalised focus on the ability of the individual to participate 
in employment based on assessing what the individual is capable of with their 
impairment. This is rather than on society’s adequate provision of employment 
opportunities for people with disability (Galvin, 2004; Humpage, 2007b). This focus 
on capacity, however, positively recognises the capacity of people with a PCW for 
employment, unlike previous assessments which focused on the incapacities of 
people with disability (Humpage, 2007b). Despite this, the recognition of capacity 
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for employment is not met with structural change which will address the social 
barriers to employment participation experienced by people with disability thus 
failing to enable such capacity through the individualisation of unemployment. 
Additionally, medical certification works as a mechanism to structure, inform and 
regulate disability categorisation (Goggin & Newell, 2005) with “administrators … 
ultimately … [having] the power to determine who is or is not disabled” (Soldatic, 
2009, p. 230). The power assigned to the knowledge of the medical profession in 
assessing one’s capacity and administrators’ powers in determining access to 
payment type privileges others’ knowledge over the knowledge of people with 
disability, similar to the medical model.  
 
Thirdly, the medical profession as dominant in the medical model and the 
Howard government’s welfare reforms subscribe people with disability to 
surveillance and control (Humpage, 2007a). Humpage (2007a) argues that the 
medical model overlaps with and is reinforced by mutual obligation. This is because 
“work-testing and work obligation requirements associated with mutual obligation 
invoke a new era of surveillance and compliance for welfare recipients [with 
disability]” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 225) following on from such mechanisms applied 
in institutions and by the medical profession.  
 
Humpage (2007a) also highlights how the mechanisms employed to regulate 
people with disability could in ways be detrimental to their health and do not 
encourage compliance in ways appropriate for people with disability. She 
specifically problematises the breaching penalties implemented through the Welfare  
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to Work Act which could be applied to NSA recipients with disability. This is because 
the penalties were designed for people without disabilities. This, and the implications 
of this, particularly for people with a PCW, will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
However, like breaching penalties, which regulate people with disability 
without the consideration of disability, time also becomes a mechanism employed in 
the Howard government’s reforms which surveys and manages people with disability 
but in ways is not examined for its ableist underpinnings. Soldatic (2013) highlights 
how as a result of neoliberal workfare restructures to the welfare state people with 
disability are governed through temporalities particularly with regard to ‘the 
Appointment’. People with disability are expected to attend appointments as part of 
their mutual obligations with the state in order to remain eligible for income support. 
“[T]he neoliberal workfare Appointment frames and reframes individual biographies 
and the experience of everyday life, determining access to a range of social supports 
and services” (Soldatic, 2013, p. 407). The Appointment is a time set by the clock 
and the calendar, often through a mutual agreement between attendees. However, 
Soldatic (2013) questions what happens when the time is not set in mutual agreement 
and when some bodies are unable to synchronize with the Appointment time. This 
assumes that “the people involved are in a position to control and synchronize the 
competing set of temporalities managed in everyday life to make the Appointment” 
(Soldatic, 2013, p. 411). The Appointment then acquires a commanding form which 
controls numerous spheres including the body. It also performs a disciplining and 
surveying role in the sense that those who do not attend the Appointment are 
disciplined and the conduct of persons with disabilities is managed, surveyed and 
regulated in the Appointment. The Appointment has thus become an important 
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mechanism in governing people with disability in the welfare state and “while 
appearing as a neutral, rational, calculable action, is in fact a social relation of 
power” (Soldatic, 2013, p. 415). However, Soldatic (2013) argues that there is no 
consideration of the difficulties that people with disability experience in keeping the 
Appointment, including, coordinating the supports and services of home workers. 
Soldatic (2013) also suggests that the state lacks understanding of the competing 
temporalities for people with disability, in particular, women with disabilities who 
often have to coordinate their body temporalities, with childcare responsibilities and 
maintaining the Appointment.  
 
Humpage (2007) problematises the surveillance and control subscribed to 
people with disability in the welfare state questioning its impact on achieving 
government objectives of activeness. Additionally, the power assigned to the medical 
profession and administrators determining access to payment does not facilitate 
agency and activeness, rather, overrides the autonomy of people with disability.  
 
Deinstitutionalisation, reinstitutionalisation and the NDIS  
 The autonomy of persons with disabilities was also overridden in institutions. 
For instance, while in institutions, people with disability, particularly persons with 
intellectual disabilities and mental illness, could have their finances controlled and 
managed. Bidmeade suggests that “[u]ntil 1979 in South Australia, for example, a  
person’s finances could be placed under the Public Trustee at the stroke of a pen of 
the Superintendent of public hospitals (for persons with mental illness), or 




Advocacy for the rights of persons with disabilities emerged in the 1960s and 
sought to return freedom to people with disability. From this, there was an emphasis 
on deinstitutionalisation and integration which sought to close down large 
institutions and integrate people with disability back into the community (Bigby, 
2014). 
 
However, despite deinstitutionalisation which began in the 1970s, Goggin 
and Newell suggest that “deinstitutionalisation has been accompanied by its own 
institutional values and practices, … constitut[…ing] a problematic 
reinstitutionalisation” (2005, p. 129) of people with disability. People with disability 
for example, are still excluded from broader society because adequate community 
supports were not put in place upon deinstitutionalisation. In addition, the social and 
structural barriers which could have been experienced by persons with disabilities 
were not deconstructed impeding their inclusion and participation in broader society 
(Goggin & Newell, 2005). Therefore, while deinstitutionalisation occurred, the 
community was not adequately altered to include persons with disabilities, 
continuing their exclusion from society and expecting them to change or adapt in 
order to be included (Bidmeade, 1997). 
 
Therefore, Goggin and Newell (2005) suggest that deinstitutionalisation did 
not result in the end of oppression for people with disability, but rather began a new 
phase of oppression. This is in part because people with disability and their lives 
became controlled through professionals who determined, for example, the type of 
accommodation the person would reside in and the activities that would structure 
their lives. For instance, people with severe intellectual disability “in work and 
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community access programs” (Shaddock et al., 1993, p. 48) have limited scope to 
exercise choice. This is despite the fact that our quality of life is largely dependent on 
our ability to makes choices and decisions about our own lives (Shaddock et al., 
1993). This overrides the agency and autonomy of people with disability.  
 
Similarly, for ageing people with intellectual disability, Bigby and Knox 
(2009) found that large decisions were often made for them over which they had 
little control. Interview participants expressed and also Bigby and Knox (2009) 
documented how people with disability were frustrated by their lack of control in day 
programs. Day programs aim to “provide opportunities for people with disability to 
participate in their community and enjoy a range of purposeful, recreational and 
leisure activities” (Family & Community Services Ageing Disability & Home Care, 
2013, p. n.p.). Particularly, they had little control over whether they were able to 
move to another day program, their forced movement to another day program and the 
activities in which they had to participate in in their day programs. For example, 
“they always say you have to do what everybody else does … well say when 
everyone else is dancing they say “you’ve got to dance” … And you do it … I just 
keep on my own way … always doing things the way other people want me to do” 
(Bigby & Knox, 2009, p. 223).  
 
Also, Goggin and Newell (2005) note that despite people with disability 
having the most superior knowledge about the services they require, their voices and 
experience are rarely considered in determining what services should be available. 
Often decisions are based on service availability and capacity for delivery rather than 
centred on the individual. For example, services often focus on conforming with 
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existing staff rosters and resources instead of considering the individual desires of 
recipients and how staff and resources can be employed to meet such desires 
(Laragy, 2004).  
 
Additionally, services rather than focusing on the individual instead, 
concentrated on fulfilling or upholding procedures. For example, duty of care, risk 
minimisation and safety procedures though congruent with Occupational Health and 
Safety regulations undermined individualised activities or the “focus on the little 
things that enhance life satisfaction” (Wilson, Parmenter, Stancliffe, & Shuttleworth, 
2011, p. 284). Shaddock, et. al. (1993) discuss how for staff in group homes, despite 
recognising the importance of choice for people with disability often enabling such 
choice or allowing a choice to be acted upon conflicts with their duty of care because 
sometimes the choices are at odds with procedures. Bleasdale (2001) suggests that 
control by people with disability and enabling their individual choice is often 
considered in disability policy through a risk lens. People with disability are seen as 
vulnerable and in need of protection. Service providers feel they have a responsibility 
to ‘look after’ people with disability and to ensure they do not come to any harm or 
risk.  
 
Bigby and Knox (2009) suggest that many ageing persons with intellectual 
disabilities had desires, plans and goals for their future. However, often they were 
not encouraged or given strategies to make such desires or goals a reality. The failure 
of the two worlds important to the lives of ageing people with intellectual 
disabilities, the service world and their families and friends, to interact, meant that 
their future plans were not discussed, addressed or actuated. This undermined their 
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autonomy. Instead, both worlds focused on current situations, decisions and lifestyles 
rather than the future. As a consequence, although ageing people with intellectual 
disability led busy lives they were often directionless (Bigby & Knox, 2009). Bigby 
and Knox thus question “why do services not support the implementation of people’s 
own ideas about the future? What stops services from listening and taking notice of 
what older people are saying? What stops both services and families letting go of 
some of the control over people’s lives?” (Bigby & Knox, 2009, p. 278). 
Professionals “have to learn to share decision-making power” (Laragy, 2004, p. 528). 
 
 Further, people with disability continue to have their finances managed, 
which has been suggested to erode their autonomy (Epstein, 2011). Epstein (2011), 
who specifically discusses the context of financial management orders and 
guardianship in New South Wales suggests how financial management orders are 
placed on those people with disability who are assumed to be incapable of managing 
their finances. She describes how this could create increased stress and/ or anxiety 
“associated with dealing with a statutory body whenever one wishes to spend money 
… particularly for those who suffer from mental illnesses and cognitive 
impairments” (Epstein, 2011, p. 838). Epstein (2011) particularly problematises the 
structure of financial management orders in New South Wales which are not 
reviewed unless requested by the person having their finances managed. Even then, 
she suggests that this possibility for exemption is concerning, given that the 




By placing a financial management order on an individual it ignores the preference 
for supported decision-making in situations “where such arrangements are 
necessary” (Epstein, 2011, p. 845).  
 
Supported decision-making encompasses mechanisms which allow an assisted 
person to maintain a higher level of control of their decision-making … [and 
r]ather than an independent manager stepping in to take over total control of a 
person’s finances, supported decision making allows the protected person to 
maintain continuing involvement in their finances (Epstein, 2011, p. 845).  
 
Thus the continued control of the finances of some people with disability, as seen in 
the example that Epstein (2011) discusses erodes the autonomy of persons with 
disabilities.  
 
In contrast to the control of people with disability, a rights discourse argues 
that people with disability have a right to self-determine and control their own lives 
and decisions rather than other people controlling their lives and decisions (Goggin 
& Newell, 2005). As a result there has been a focus on individualised funding by the 
disability movement and in policy for people with disability. “Individualised funding 
is synonymous with self-determination” (Bleasdale, 2001, p. 2) and is where 
consideration is made for the individual persons with disability (Bigby & Knox, 
2009). “Individualised funding mechanisms … aim to increase the control, choice, 
and flexibility of people with disability over the support they receive” (Bigby & 
Knox, 2009, p. 217). In this way individualised funding has the capacity to build 
self-esteem and have a positive influence on people with disability and their quality 
of life (Bleasdale, 2001). Laragy (2004) suggests that individualised funding also 
encourages innovation from services who have to compete for the dollars of people 
with disability.  
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Under the new NDIS, individualised disability funding packages are 
distributed to most Tier 3 participants in the Scheme. The individualised funding 
packages reflect a shift from block funding for disability care and support programs. 
It also shifts care and support for people with disability to an entitlement (Bigby, 
2013, 2014; Fawcett & Plath, 2014). The NDIS is described as enabling participants 
to exercise choice and control regarding the supports they require for their care and 
support (T. M. Williams & Smith, 2014) and who will provide them. This is 
“identified as an important source of personal power” (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 
750).  
 
The NDIS has also to a certain extent reframed and reconstructed disability, 
representing disability as acquirable by everyone (Bigby, 2013; Bonyhady, 2009). 
The NDIS is presented as a resource for broader society who could acquire disability 
and is often discussed alongside the social and economic benefits that could arise 
through enabling people with disability to socially and economically participate 
(Bigby, 2013). This reconstruction could move disability from the margins (Fawcett 
& Plath, 2014).  
 
However, although individualised budgets are suggested to enable choice, 
control, self-determination and individualisation Fawcett and Plath in their 
discussion of the NDIS suggest that “[i]t would be wrong to assume … that a direct 
individualised payment scheme necessarily equates with a person-centred approach” 
(2014, p. 753). For example, they discuss the difference between choice associated 
with a liberal/ market framework and choice within a human rights framework 
suggesting that a human rights framework has a bottom up perspective on choice. 
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The individual in this regard is understood as a subject with rights. Alternatively, a 
liberal/ market perspective has a top-down approach where the consumer is “seen as 
an atomistic agent with wants” (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 754). In this approach 
Fawcett and Plath (2014) suggest that the market will only respond to the needs or 
wants of consumers if it is financially viable for them. However, some consumers 
will be better at negotiating for their needs and wants than others. Fawcett and Plath 
(2014) suggest that this is problematic for marginalised groups who could be 
disadvantaged by their structural position and have difficulties negotiating their 
needs and wants. Another problem with a liberal/ market approach with regard to 
choice is the nature of choice itself. Choice, though appearing otherwise is limited. In 
the NDIS  
 
[t]he individualisation of service agreements and the privatisation of services 
do not necessarily provide avenues for consumer-driven approaches to service 
provision. Rather, the power of consumer choice is narrowed to ‘taking 
business elsewhere’ (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 756).  
 
This discussion on the problems with choice will be taken up in Chapter Six.  
 
Additionally, Fawcett and Plath (2014) suggest that while there have been 
some positive outcomes from individualised funding packages in other schemes, 
these results often reflect schemes where it is a choice to have an individualised 
budget implying that this is not a choice in the NDIS. However, while the NDIS 
promotes individualised funding the Productivity Commission report, discussed in 
Chapter One, recommended retaining block funding for rural and remote areas 
particularly, Indigenous communities. This is because remote Indigenous 
communities face significant access barriers to disability services in part as a result 
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of such remoteness. Thus it was recommended to “block fund … suitable providers 
where services would not otherwise exist or would be inadequate” (Buckmaster & 
Tomaras, 2013, p. 30). Buckmaster and Tomaras (2013) suggest that though the Bill 
does not create this mechanism, it also does not disallow or impede this component 
as part of an Indigenous specific NDIS strategy to attend to the care and support 
needs of Indigenous people with disability.   
 
Further, similar to earlier discussions regarding the reflection of the medical or 
social model in disability income support policy, debate also occurs as to whether the 
NDIS embodies the medical model of disability or the social model. Leipoldt (2009a, 
2009b) suggests that providing care and support through the NDIS as well as aids 
and equipment while needed does not change values nor address discriminatory 
attitudes. For example, he states:  
 
you cannot really insure against disability, just some of the financial costs of it. 
The reason you cannot is that the experience is largely determined by social 
attitudes towards people who have impairments of some sort … Those social 
attitudes ensure social exclusion, isolation, abuse, unemployment and poverty 
… (Leipoldt, 2009b, p. n.p.).  
 
Alternatively, Fawcett and Plath (2014) suggest that in some ways the NDIS is 
consistent with the values of the social model, enabling participants to be self-
determining and exercise their autonomy and control with regard to the services that 
will provide for their care and support needs. Additionally, through Tier 1, the NDIS 
seeks to challenge discrimination, enhancing community awareness and the inclusion 
of people with disability. However, Fawcett and Plath problematise how eligibility 
for Tier 3, which is based on assessing functional capacity, appears to “retain … a 
clinical/ individualised focus” (2014, p. 752). Fawcett and Plath question whether the 
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NDIS “will mark a shift in perspective in Australia or whether it will serve only to 
add a veneer of inclusivity to existing values and perspectives on disability that focus 
on medicalised, ‘impaired’ individuals, rather than disabling social barriers” (2014, 
p. 752). This will be clearer, they suggest, once the details of Tier 1 are operational. 
They contend though that if the focus on individualised budgets and personal 
responsibility is at the expense of social and structural change “then [there is] strong 
cause for concern” (Fawcett & Plath, 2014, p. 753). Also concerning is the NDIS’ 
appearance to align with a liberal/ market approach rather than a human rights 
perspective (Fawcett & Plath, 2014). The research will engage with this discussion 
about whether the NDIS reflects the medical model of disability or the social model 
of disability briefly in Chapter Six.  
 
 People with disability were upon industrialisation excluded from employment 
because they were assumed to be inefficient and unproductive. As a result, people 
were disability were relegated to the private sphere, excluded in institutions and/ or 
forced to be dependent on the income support system. Work was argued to become a 
site for subjectifying people with disability as seen historically through their 
exclusion and then with reference to the Welfare to Work reforms, which divided 
those capable of working 15 hours per week from those assessed as incapable. The 
Welfare to Work reforms continued the individualisation of unemployment discussed 
in the previous section on governmentality, failing to recognise the structural barriers 
that people with disability experience to employment. The erosion of the autonomy 
and agency of people with disability both historically and contemporarily was also 
discussed. This was raised as consistent with policies which governed people with 
disability historically. The social construction of disability as a product of power 
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relations and the undermining of the agency and autonomy of people with disability 
can be seen in discussions by CRAWS scholars on income management which also 
draws on the social construction of race and the historical and contemporary loss of 
autonomy experienced by Indigenous Australians. 
 
CRAWS scholars and income management 
CRAWS scholars argue that whiteness is universalised as the standard of 
normality and the manifestation of humanness; “whites are not of a certain race, 
they’re just the human race” (Dyer, 1997, p. 3). CRAWS scholars affirm that race, 
like disability discussed above, is a social construct, a “product … of social thought, 
[power] and relations” (Delgado, Stefancic, & Liendo, 2012, p. 8). Race is not 
biological or based on valid scientific evidence rather, it is a social category 
constructed for the organisation of subjects. As Meekosha suggests, “physical 
appearance becomes racialized in a social relationship where, particular features of 
an individual trigger pre-existing frames of interpretation, linked to social hierarchy, 
privilege and exploitation” (2006, p. 163). As a consequence of equating whiteness 
with the human race, whiteness remains invisible, avoiding interrogation, unlike 
racialised bodies which are examined (Moreton-Robinson, 2004). CRAWS scholars 
draw attention to the relationship between whiteness and power, exposing and 
interrogating the dominance, hegemony and privilege upheld by the white race in 
society (Riggs, 2007). CRAWS scholars argue that the privilege assigned to 
whiteness is entrenched and often reproduced in social institutions which are 
grounded in historical assumptions of biological ‘superiority’ and a discourse that 
constructs Indigenous people as sub-human, underdeveloped and lacking rational 
capacity (Moreton-Robinson, 2004). Whiteness expresses its dominance and sustains 
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its superiority through acts of control, management, regulation, discipline and 
surveillance often employing violence and coercion through such acts (Tedmanson & 
Wadiwel, 2010). 
 
Indigenous people and the welfare state  
Indigenous Australians have predominantly been constructed and governed 
separately to non-Indigenous Australians since colonisation in 1788. Before 
federation of the Commonwealth of Australia, the colonies of Australia established a 
separate legal category for Indigenous Australians to ‘protect’ them and moved 
Indigenous Australians onto missions and reserves. Protectionism served to ‘smooth 
the pillow of the dying race’5 and continued to inform Indigenous policy following 
federation in 1901 (Altman & Sanders, 1994). 
 
In the 1930s, assimilation emerged as the new rationale to govern Indigenous 
Australians, particularly those who were part-Indigenous. In the 1950s, however, 
assimilation operated to regulate all Indigenous people who were expected to  
 
attain the same manner of living as other Australians and to live as members of 
a single Australian community enjoying the same rights and privileges, 
accepting the same responsibilities, observing the same customs and influenced  
by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as other Australians (Commonwealth 




                                                          
5 This statement is attributed to Daisy Bates, “Edwardian anthropologist … [who] thought the 
Aboriginal people were a dying race” (K. Marks, 2008, p. n.p.) and has also been linked to policies of 
protectionism. It encapsulates the assumed demise and extinction of Indigenous Australians and 
captures the sentiment that all non-Indigenous Australians could do until this time was ‘smooth the 
pillow of the dying race’ (Van Krieken, 1999).  
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Altman and Sanders (1994) suggest that the shift from protectionism to assimilation 
introduced the concept of ‘welfare’ into Indigenous policy. However, the welfare 
authorities referred to with regard to Indigenous Australians were distinct to the 
broader Australian welfare state from which Indigenous Australians were excluded.  
 
The exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the welfare state incrementally 
broke down and from the 1940s some Indigenous Australians who were assessed on 
their character, intelligence and social development were permitted to receive some 
types of welfare payments. These individuals could not reside on missions or 
reserves. This qualification was removed in 1966 (Altman & Sanders, 1994). 
However, prior to and for a short while after this, social security legislation allowed 
for Indigenous welfare payments to be paid to a third party. This meant that when 
social security payments were granted to those who lived on reserves the Aboriginal 
welfare authorities were allowed to retain payment on behalf of Indigenous people 
having only to give them an allowance. Indigenous Australians received direct 
payment “once they had demonstrated their ‘ability to handle money wisely’ and to 
‘manage’ their ‘own affairs’” (Altman & Sanders, 1994, p. 210). From the 1960s, 
there was increased pressure to allow Indigenous Australians to directly access their 
welfare payments. However, despite their access to welfare payments the 
Department of Social Security felt that the unemployment benefit was unsuitable for 
remote Indigenous Australians (Altman & Sanders, 1994). In 1972, a framework of 
self-determination informed Indigenous policy and by the 1980s those in remote 





Indigenous Australians have been extensively criticised for being welfare 
dependent historically and contemporarily. Altman and Sanders (1994) suggest that 
concerns of Indigenous welfare dependence explain their incremental inclusion onto 
welfare payments historically and can be assumed to justify some contemporary 
policies governing Indigenous Australians. Pearson (2000), though critical of 
Indigenous welfare dependence and passive welfare, argues that Indigenous welfare 
dependency is partly attributable to the exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the 
market economy. He explains, “[t]he great tragedy of Aboriginal history in the last 
decades was the Australian failure to remove the discrimination that our people 
suffered in the mainstream economy” (Pearson, 2000, p. 141) forcing them into 
welfare dependency. Pearson (2000) also discusses the impact of awarding 
Indigenous Australians with the right to equal pay, suggesting that as a result it was 
difficult for them to find employment, causing them to withdraw from the market 
economy. Like the systematic exclusion of people with disability from the labour 
market then, the exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the labour market has 
produced their dependency on the welfare state.  
 
The NTER “allowed for new disciplining, prohibitive and corrective 
practices” (Howard-Wagner, 2010, p. 3) to be invoked on Indigenous people in 
prescribed communities in the NT. This was permitted because of the construction of 
the NTER as an ‘emergency’ by the Howard government to protect children and 
restore social norms to ‘dysfunctional’, ‘broken down’ and welfare dependent 
Aboriginal communities (Howard-Wagner, 2010; Maddison, 2008). The NTER has 
been deemed racist (Tedmanson & Wadiwel, 2010) and paternalist because of its 
explicit targeting and disciplining of Indigenous people “with restrictive 
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administrative regimes of surveillance, control and financial tutelage” (Tedmanson & 
Wadiwel, 2010, p. 8). However, these mechanisms of governance applied through 
the NTER are not new, reflecting historical policies and techniques used to regulate 
Indigenous people.  
 
Income management became a measure implemented in the NTER to govern 
Indigenous welfare recipients in prescribed communities in the NT. Income 
management initially sought to remedy the occurrence of “substance abuse”, 
“educational lawlessness and child neglect” (Altman & Hinkson, 2010, p. 194) in 
remote Indigenous communities and to protect Indigenous women from violence and 
humbugging (Mendes, 2013). Income management quarantined part of recipients’ 
income support payments and 100 per cent of lump sum payments, ensuring that the 
payments were spent on priority needs and not on excluded goods or excluded 
services. “Income quarantining [became] … a means to control Aboriginal 
consumption practices (although the focus was on expenditure patterns)” (Altman & 
Hinkson, 2010, p. 193) and people’s personal choices were regulated and controlled 
as alcohol, gambling and tobacco were not allowed. Tedmanson and Wadiwel 
suggest that “the message in these controls was clear: pleasures that are tolerable 
elsewhere were deemed intolerable within the racialized ‘zones of exception’ created 
by the intervention” (2010, p. 14). Indigenous Australians cannot be given the 
freedom to spend their income support payments at their discretion and hence require 
management and control by a third party (Altman, 2010). The control of Indigenous 
Australians and their welfare payments in this context resonates with arguments  
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made above about the regulation of the unemployed who are assumed to be incapable 
of acting in their own best interests. This then justifies paternalistic measures which 
survey, monitor and discipline Indigenous welfare recipients.  
 
Income management in the NT extended welfare conditionality and mutual 
obligation for Indigenous welfare recipients beyond participation in employment 
(Billings, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Mutual obligation in income management sought to 
produce behavioural change, individual responsibility and appropriate spending 
(Billings, 2010b, 2011) as well as target passive welfare (Anthony, 2009). Income 
management assumes “a link between social dysfunction, child neglect and substance 
misuse on the one hand and ‘passive’ welfare on the other” (Altman & Johns, 2008, 
p. v) and assumes that through state controlled welfare payments individuals will 
reform their conduct (Billings, 2010a). Income management directly affected the 
everyday lives of Indigenous people living in prescribed areas, seeking to produce 
‘responsible’ citizens.  
 
Income management also regulated Indigenous people to comply with the 
values of whiteness through discourses of normalisation in the NTER, reproducing 
the dominance of whiteness and destroying “Aboriginal practice and identity” 
(Altman & Hinkson, 2010, p. 197). The NTER was a three phased project designed 
to be implemented and maintained over a number of years. One of these phases was 
labelled the ‘normalisation’ phase. This phase was where services and infrastructure 
were normalised and the social norms of remote Indigenous communities were 
modified to become consistent with the broader, mainstream social norms of non-
Indigenous Australia (Altman & Hinkson, 2010; Altman, 2010). Tedmanson and 
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Wadiwel (2010) describe normalisation mechanisms as coercive and argue that the 
NTER’s focus on normalisation essentially meant the relinquishing of Indigenous 
culture. This was because the values of Indigenous culture were seen as incompatible 
with neoliberalism and other values of the dominant white culture. Dawson 
(2011/2012) suggests that normalisation is an evolution from the concept of 
assimilation, which although seeking the same goals, moves from a concept 
underpinned by a colonial objective to one underpinned by a liberal objective. 
Income management and the NTER in general, placed an emphasis on ‘restoring 
social norms’ which had broken down and ‘normalising’ remote Indigenous 
communities and individuals (Anthony, 2009; Billings, 2011) suggesting that 
Indigenous Australians have failed to conform and absorb the mainstream values of 
responsibility. Altman and Hinkson describe “the irresponsible native who is either 
so utterly different that he/ she cannot be improved or else he/ she can be 
transformed but must remain in a waiting room of deferral, until properly trained or 
acculturated” (2010, p. 202).  
 
In relation to income management and Indigenous Australians, Indigenous 
Australians are seen as a ‘risk’ to themselves as well as to broader Australian society 
because they do not conform to the mainstream (Altman & Hinkson, 2010). 
Indigenous Australians and Indigenous culture generally was represented as the 
cause of social problems and dysfunction through the NTER measures and 
“Indigenous peoples were targeted as ‘the problem’” (Tedmanson & Wadiwel, 2010, 
p. 18). Howard-Wagner for example states: “violence and abuse were thus 
discursively constructed as a feature of Aboriginal culture in government and media 
narratives about violence and sexual abuse in Indigenous communities” (2010, p. 16) 
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in the NTER. The gaze of the media and society thus reflected the problematic 
assumptions and discourses produced by the government about Indigenous 
Australians. These assumptions and discourses posit and reinforce Indigenous 
Australians and Indigenous culture as a ‘risk’ to broader Australian society. This risk 
Altman and Hinkson argue is “at the level of subjectivity and cultural commitment: 
quite simply, Aborigines do not behave like other Australians and are not necessarily 
motivated by the same aspirations” (2010, p. 188), hence the need for normalisation.  
 
Income management and the NTER signalled a shift in the way remote 
Indigenous communities, people and individuals were governed, involving a change 
from “community to individuation” (Altman & Hinkson, 2010, p. 185). This focus 
on the individual in neoliberalism and a capitalist society is somewhat inconsistent 
with Indigenous culture; however the paternalist regulation of Indigenous Australians 
is consistent with historical policy which governed Indigenous Australians. 
Indigenous Australians have a different epistemology to white people informed by 
the Dreaming, and value and emphasise the community as a site to care for and also 
to seek welfare from. “The Dreaming is many things in one. Among them, a kind of 
narrative of things that once happened; a kind of charter of things that still happen; 
and a kind of logos or principle of order transcending everything significant for 
Aboriginal man” (Stanner, 1979, p. 24). Alternatively, in capitalism, the individual is 
responsible for their own welfare and neoliberalism proposes the market as an 
institution of provision for all individuals. Lawrence and Gibson thus highlight that 
“the Indigenous population is one section of society that within the rationality of 
neoliberalism cannot – at least without some techniques of ‘improvement’ – be 
governed through their capacities and freedoms” (2007, p. 662); therefore, being 
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governed through disciplinary and authoritarian measures such as income 
management which are seen as necessary. The intention of the NTER became to 
develop self-governing individuals who are capable of responsible conduct and 
action, much like the unemployed discussed earlier. The measures of the first 12 
months of the NTER sought to produce a well “disciplined Aboriginal subject; one 
who would embrace the individualised aspirations of neo-liberalism” (Altman & 
Hinkson, 2010, p. 193). It also encouraged and directed Indigenous Australians into 
economically governing their own lives through participating in the market; an 
objective heavily consistent with neoliberalism. For income management’s part in 
this Dawson suggests that it “seek[s] … to normalise individuals within perceived 
Indigenous communities to become stable and autonomous citizens of the free 
market” (2011/2012, p. 7) invoked through neo-paternalistic measures (Altman & 
Dee, 2012).  
 
The emphasis placed on individual responsibility through income 
management is argued to ignore, however, the structurally disadvantaged position of 
Indigenous Australians (Dawson, 2011/2012; Mendes, 2013) produced through 
colonisation, dispossession and historical policies. This is similar to arguments made 
by disability scholars earlier where the ‘problem’ of unemployment is individualised 
to people with disability, without considering or addressing the social barriers, which 
impede their economic participation. Altman and Hinkson suggest then that rather 
than focus on Indigenous Australians to restore their own welfare through taking 
“responsibility for their actions” (2010, p. 190) there should be a focus on and 
recognition of problematic policy and colonisation. Thus there is a focus on  
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individualisation and controlling subjects rather than on looking at the broader 
context of disadvantage and discrimination which would provide a more adequate 
solution for communities who are despaired and depressed.  
 
Practices in income management which seek to control and monitor how 
Indigenous welfare recipients spend their money are justified through their 
representation as a problematic population (Kelada, 2008), hence similar to the 
unemployed they cannot be governed through freedom. Through income 
management “[t]he Government projects a view that Indigenous people have failed 
as citizens and are underserving of equal social security entitlements” (Anthony, 
2009, p. 34). Thus rather than quarantining payments through a discretionary or 
voluntary measure they must be automatically income managed (Altman, 2010). This 
is because it is assumed that Indigenous Australians are incapable of acting in their 
own best interests. This justifies their regulation through paternalism in income 
management in the NT (Anthony, 2009; Billings, 2010a, 2011; Dawson, 2011/2012) 
where the government intervenes in the personal decisions of an individual based on 
assumptions of incapacity (M. Thomas & Buckmaster, 2010). This is not dissimilar 
from the control of the incomes of people with disability authorised through 
guardianship tribunals and the assumptions made about the capacity of people with 
disability to control their own incomes or engage in supported decision-making 
processes. This returns Indigenous Australians to an era where they are once again 
governed through paternalism (Anthony, 2009; Billings, 2009, 2010b), leading once 
again to “an erosion of liberty, esteem and self-empowerment” (Kelada, 2008, p. 5)  
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and a violation of freedom. Therefore, regulation through paternalism denies the 
right of Indigenous people to self-determination and autonomy (Anthony, 2009; 
Billings, 2010b).  
 
However, the NTER and income management represents all Indigenous 
people as ‘irresponsible’, ‘risky’ and ‘problematic’ ignoring, as scholars have argued, 
the Indigenous community initiatives put in place before the NTER to combat 
various problems which, at times, were developed in response to unanswered 
requests for help to the government by Indigenous communities. These community-
led initiatives were subsequently overridden by the NTER (Behrendt, 2007; A. 
Brown & Brown, 2007; Thill, 2009), simultaneously overriding the self-
determination and autonomy of Indigenous Australians. For example, despite 
implementing alcohol conditions, restrictions and bans in prescribed Indigenous 
communities through the NTER legislation, some Indigenous communities had 
previously negotiated their own solutions to concerns with alcohol and developed 
their own initiatives. For instance, Alexis Wright in her “factual account” (2009, p. 
2) Grog War explores  
 
how the Indigenous people of Tennant Creek [in the NT] worked together on a 
war against alcohol. This Indigenous-led act of self-determination and self-
governance formed from Indigenous Law, responsibility and work as a 
community, in a ten-year long battle, eventually led to shifting the blame of 
public drunkenness from themselves, and to convincing the government, 
authorities and the town to look at the way grog was pushed and sold (Wright, 
2009, p. 1).  
 
This example of agency and self-determination runs counter to totalising 
representations of all Indigenous people as ‘irresponsible’, ‘risky’ and ‘problematic’ 
and as incapable of exercising self-determination or autonomy and has created 
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feelings of victimisation amongst those, regulated through the NTER measures, who 
do not drink, who fought for restrictions on alcohol and developed their own 
initiatives and who spend their money appropriately.  
 
Income management removes the equal right of Indigenous Australians to 
social security (Anthony, 2009), challenges their universal right to welfare (Altman 
& Johns, 2008) and their citizenship rights (Anthony, 2009; Billings, 2011). Mendes 
(2013) suggests that income management represents a significant shift in the ideas 
underpinning Australia’s welfare system, transferring welfare from a mechanism of 
poverty alleviation to one of control. He argues:  
 
CIM [Compulsory Income Management] seems to take … [the] shift to 
conditional welfare even further by imposing an unprecedented restriction of 
individual freedom in an attempt to promote behavioural change. Centrelink is 
arguably being given judicial powers similar to those granted to Guardianship 
authorities in cases where people assessed to have significant disabilities are 
unable to manage their personal or financial affairs (Mendes, 2013, p. 503).  
 
Income management additionally violates the inalienability principle of 
Australian welfare payments (Altman & Johns, 2008) which has been described as 
unprecedented (Yeend & Dow, 2007). “Inalienability basically means that where a 
person is qualified to a payment and entitled to an amount of payment, the payment 
is their legal right and cannot be not provided, or provided to someone else” (Yeend 
& Dow, 2007, p. 5).  
 
The denial of Indigenous Australians to manage their own incomes has led to 
questions of the government’s objectives in seeking to produce self-reliant, active 
and responsible citizens through income management. It has been queried as to how 
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income management teaches those subscribed to regulate their own spending conduct 
when it is controlled by the government (Altman & Johns, 2008). This is similar to 
Humpage’s (2007a) problematisation of Welfare to Work and its capacity to produce 
active citizens, discussed earlier with regard to people with disability. Tom Calma, 
the previous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 
draws attention to a contradiction in the policy which “‘fosters a passive system of  
policy development and service delivery while at the same time criticising 
Indigenous peoples for being passive recipients of government services!’” (2007, p. 
18). 
 
Controlling Indigenous Australians through income management has led some 
scholars to argue that it will continue the dependencies of Indigenous Australians 
produced through historical policies which employed the same mechanisms of 
paternalism and control (Howard-Wagner, 2010). Maddison for example states that 
“paternalism underpinning the intervention is likely to produce negative unintended 
consequences precisely because it undermines Indigenous autonomy” (2008, p. 42). 
Maddison (2008) cautions that in order to produce self-reliant citizens Australian 
governments must understand how Indigenous dependence has been created by non-
Indigenous control.  
 
A considerable amount of existing literature makes connections between 
income management and the historical policies which regulated Indigenous 
Australians discussed above (Billings, 2009, 2010b, 2011), similarly subscribing 
Indigenous Australians to “control, management and surveillance” (Billings, 2009, p. 
2; 2010b, p. 165). Billings (2010b) suggests that income management is comparable 
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to previous policies which regulated every aspect of Indigenous people’s lives and 
racially segregated and regulated Indigenous Australians. Elements of protectionist 
policy can be seen in income management. For example, during protectionism, 
Indigenous earnings and property were controlled and managed in the NT 
specifically by the NT Director of Welfare (Billings, 2009). Therefore, once again 
“the state [becomes the] economic guardian of [Indigenous] social welfare recipients 
(and their dependants)” (Billings, 2011, p. 167). Additionally, Anthony (2009) 
argues that the top-down implementation of the NTER and income management in 
the NT without consulting with Indigenous communities is similar to the regulation 
of Indigenous people through paternalistic policies and bureaucracy during 
protectionism. Thus, as in protectionism, the justification for paternalism and the 
control of Indigenous income support payments is based on the assumption that 
Indigenous people are incapable of managing their own money (Anthony, 2009).  
 
Similarly, scholars compare aspects of income management with assimilation 
(Dawson, 2011/2012), in particular, both policies emphasis on social norms. 
Howard-Wagner (2010) suggests that assimilation, like income management was a 
policy that implied that Indigenous culture and Indigenous Australians were 
inconsistent and incompatible with whiteness and thus forced the conforming of 
Indigenous Australians to white ways which were regarded as superior. For example, 
during assimilation, rations were provided to Indigenous Australians in order to 
structure their compliance with white codes and values. When they demonstrated that 
they were capable through changing their behaviour they were rewarded with cash 
instead of rations. This has been described by Lawrence and Gibson as a relationship 
based on mutual obligation where Indigenous Australians are “rewarded for fulfilling 
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and performing a particular role in their relationship with the government” (2007, p. 
654). The organisation of relations between the government and Indigenous 
Australians in this way means that power and autonomy is retained by the 
government. This is because while the measures are defined and justified through 
claims of ‘best interests’, the state takes pleasure in being the author and enactor of  
‘best interests’. It is the power and control that comes from such a role that is valued 
(Tedmanson & Wadiwel, 2010) and is perhaps continued through income 
management. 
 
New Income Management  
Billings suggests that the further extension of income management beyond 
the original NTER measures demonstrates the support for mutual obligation and “the 
extension of conditionality beyond the welfare-to-work context and the distinctly 
racialised realm of the NT” (2011, p. 190). Dee (2013) proposes that it indicates 
bipartisan support for income management and a focus by both major political 
parties, Labor and Liberal, on producing individual behavioural change by welfare 
recipients. This is because income management was introduced by the Howard 
Liberal National Coalition government and then continued and extended by the Rudd 
and Gillard Labor governments. The New Income Management measures, including 
the long-term payment recipients measure automatically subscribes those in the NT 
who fit the category’s criteria to income management. Dee (2013) mentions briefly 
the sorting and constructing of categories by the welfare state in delineating who will 
be subscribed to conditional welfare. By doing this he partly draws attention to the 
social construction of categories in the welfare state to organise and manage subjects, 
much like the social construction of disability and race.  
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Welfare recipients who are income managed are represented as problematic 
and only avoid subscription once they prove that they are responsible, not by 
managing their income appropriately but through participating in education, 
employment or training (Altman, 2010). Altman (2010) raises problems with this 
arguing that this judges recipients as guilty and incapable rather than presuming their 
innocence and capability. These measures “fundamentally alter a citizenship rights-
based approach of welfare, replacing it with one that is skewed towards a far higher 
level of state governmentality of citizen subjects” (Altman, 2010, p. 1) through 
paternalism.  
 
Like Indigenous welfare recipients who were income managed through the 
NTER Dee suggests in his discussion of the post NTER income management 
measures that welfare recipients are “constructed as faulty citizens and flawed 
welfare subjects” (2013, p. 272), governed through paternalism. Once again the 
‘problem’ of receiving poor relief is individualised and the reforms seek to produce 
responsible citizens through mechanisms of surveillance and control. Dee (2013) 
specifically discusses the BasicsCard as one means of surveillance. “The BasicsCard 
can be considered as a paternalistic control/caring, monitoring and surveillance 
assemblage deployed to secure socially and morally ‘responsible’ behaviours” (Dee, 
2013, p. 273). Dee (2013) suggests that the BasicsCard induces behavioural change 
through controlling and restricting how and where income support payments can be 
spent. However, similar to earlier discussions, Dee (2013) questions how self-
reliance and individual control can be achieved with government control and 





This chapter indicated the operation of multiple rationalities operating in this 
context impacting on the way in which people with a PCW were constructed and 
governed. It identified a gap in existing scholarship, particularly highlighting the lack 
of research on the possible income management of people with a PCW. Existing 
scholarship on the PCW category focuses on the creation of the PCW category, 
rather than its continued construction and regulation by other policies since inception 
in the Howard government’s Welfare to Work reforms in 2006. This chapter 
examined existing scholarship by governmentality scholars on the welfare state, 
disability studies scholars on the welfare state and CRAWS scholars on income 
management. It was suggested that examining existing literature by CRAWS 
scholars on income management was required as a result of the lack of scholarship 
on the income management of people with a PCW, hence the need to understand how 
Indigenous welfare recipients are constructed and governed in income management.  
 
‘Governmentality Scholars and the Welfare State’ focused on the 
unemployed, the first group to be affected by changes to the welfare state and 
shifting understandings of welfare. Unemployment for the unemployed was 
individualised. It was suggested that the unemployed are assumed to be welfare 
dependent and dole bludgers and unemployment was seen to be a choice. This 
justified their regulation through surveillance and monitoring which was 
institutionalised in the structure and organisation of the income support system and 
employment services. Particularly, their activities were monitored, surveyed and 
tracked and they were disciplined through breaching penalties. They were also  
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assumed to be risky and constructed through risk profiles with measures assigned 
depending on one’s assumed level of risk. However, the unemployed were also 
subjectified through policy in their recasting as jobseekers.  
 
The role of broader society in the management of the unemployed was also 
discussed in this section. Broader society is encouraged to survey the unemployed. 
There was reference also made to the normalising gaze which constructed the 
unemployed as abnormal and thus in need of regulation.  
 
It was additionally highlighted through drawing on existing literature that the 
unemployed are expected to internalize the mechanisms of discipline in order to 
learn how to control and self-regulate their own conduct. Therefore, reforms to the 
welfare state encourage self-reformation through a conditional allowance based on 
producing an active individual.  
 
The mechanisms of government employed to regulate the unemployed were 
extended to people with disability through Welfare to Work and the cause for the 
unemployment of some people with disability was individualised. Additionally like 
the unemployed, some people with disability were at times represented as lazy, 
deviant and immoral. Welfare to Work was suggested to continue the control of 
people with disability and erode their autonomy. ‘Disability Studies Scholars and the 
Welfare State’ also outlined the distinction between the social model of disability 
and the medical model. However, it was suggested that the Welfare to Work reforms 
and mutual obligation appeared to be underpinned by the medical model of 
disability, despite the changes appearing to employ the language of the social model.  
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This section described how disability studies scholars argue that disability 
was constructed through the institution of formal paid work, following 
industrialisation. People with disability were excluded from employment because 
they were seen as inefficient and unable to keep up with the demands of the modern 
labour force. As a result they were forced into a state of dependency and/ or 
institutionalised. Disability was thus suggested to be shaped by definitions of work 
both historically and contemporarily. For example, through Welfare to Work 
disability was determined by how many hours an individual could work. Welfare to 
Work was suggested to challenge deserving and undeserving poor notions and shift 
welfare from a social right for people with disability to a right for those with 
disability most deserving of disability support.  
 
Welfare to Work was discussed as overriding the autonomy of people with 
disability which continues to be overridden through the control and management of 
their finances in guardianship cases and the lack of encouragement for supported 
decision making. Similarly, it was examined how despite deinstitutionalisation, 
people with disability are still excluded from society and their lives and decisions are 
controlled by professionals. This was evidenced through a discussion of 
accommodation and activities. Thus people with disability are denied choice, agency 
and autonomy and their voices and experience are often silenced.  
 
The emergence of a rights discourse was suggested to challenge the 
restrictions placed on people with disability exercising their autonomy. A rights 
discourse emphasises a right to self-determination and control. This became 
expressed through an emphasis on individualised funding, which would facilitate 
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self-determination and encourage service innovation, and is embodied in the NDIS. 
The NDIS shifts the care and support of people with disability to an entitlement and 
enables people with disability to exercise choice and control.  
 
Existing literature on the NDIS suggests that the NDIS represents disability 
as acquirable by everyone. The NDIS is often discussed alongside the social and 
economic benefits of enhanced participation by people with disability which are 
suggested to result from the NDIS. However, there are questions about whether 
individualised budgets and a person-centred approach will facilitate choice in what is 
described by Fawcett and Plath (2014) as a liberal/ market framework. This section 
also discussed whether the NDIS reflects the social model of disability or the medical 
model. There were suggestions that it does not address social and structural barriers 
to participation for people with disability through Tier 3, though consistent with the 
social model in enabling people with disability to exercise their autonomy. This 
discussion on the social model, medical model and NDIS is also briefly addressed in 
Chapter Six.  
 
The loss of agency and autonomy experienced by people with disability based 
on power relations and the social construction of disability can also be seen in 
discussions by CRAWS scholars and income management with regard to Indigenous 
Australians. The section ‘CRAWS scholars and income management’ describes how 
race is socially constructed and provides an explanation of CRAWS. It also 
examined the history of Indigenous Australians and the welfare state, suggesting that 
Indigenous Australians have often been constructed and governed separately since 
colonisation. Indigenous Australians were originally excluded from the welfare state.  
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Indigenous Australians have been criticised for being welfare dependent both 
historically and contemporarily. However though their dependency is problematised, 
Pearson (2000) suggests that in part the dependence of Indigenous Australians results 
from their exclusion from the labour market, much like people with disability.  
 
This section also provided a description of the NTER which has been 
depicted as racist, reflecting policies previously employed to regulate Indigenous 
Australians. It additionally discussed the purpose of income management and its 
implementation. Specifically, income management extended mutual obligation and 
welfare conditionality to Indigenous welfare recipients beyond participation in 
employment and sought compliance with the values of whiteness. Indigenous 
Australians and Indigenous culture through income management are represented as 
risky and Indigenous Australians are assumed to be incapable of acting in their own 
best interests. This justifies their regulation through paternalism, denying their right 
to autonomy and self-determination.  
 
Income management, as extended through New Income Management, 
represents support for income management and mutual obligation beyond Welfare to 
Work and the racialized context of the NTER. It too individualises welfare receipt 







Importantly, the literature review moving forward grounds the findings of this 
study but is also extended by the findings of this research. In particular, the 
discussion of governing mechanisms; the social construction of social categories; the 
medical model and the social model; and the autonomy and agency of people with 
disability and Indigenous Australians, are examined in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
 
The following chapter outlines and discusses this research’s methodological 
approach, governmentality and CDS, and method, a Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
These are employed to conduct an analysis of policy documents, seeking to address 
the gaps in existing research. There is therefore a focus on how people with a PCW 
are constructed and governed in recent changes to the income support system for 
people with disability and the Australian disability care and support system.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
Introduction 
The previous chapter identified a gap in existing research on the PCW 
category suggesting that existing scholarship does not examine the intersection of 
policies regulating this category and that resultantly there is a dearth of literature on 
the possible income management of people with a PCW as well as the NDIS and the 
PCW category. This chapter will discuss the methodologies and method of this 
research which aims to address this gap by exploring how people with a PCW are 
constructed and governed in recent changes to income support payments for people 
with disability and the provision of disability care and support services in Australia.  
 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the research question and objectives. It 
will then discuss the methodologies of this research, governmentality and CDS 
providing an explanation of each. Both governmentality and CDS make an important 
contribution to this research. This is because governmentality provides an approach 
which enables the researcher to identify and draw attention to the construction of 
subjects and how they are governed. In addition, it provides a lens and language to 
apply, discuss and explain the mechanisms or techniques employed to construct and 
govern subjects, and their implications. It also encourages the researcher to question 
the naturalness of the PCW category and governing practices, which are taken for 
granted. Governmentality is a framework which enables the researcher to ask 
questions similar to the ones in this research. CDS also makes an important 
contribution to the research. This is because CDS provides a lens from which to 
interpret the research, as its core tenets resonate with the ideas and conclusions of 
this study. It also provides a framework from which to consider the way forward for 
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constructing and governing people with a PCW. After this it will explore the 
qualitative method of this research, a Foucauldian discourse analysis, followed by a 
discussion of the rationale for choosing policy documents as the site of analysis. It 
will draw on Bacchi’s (2009) suggestion that policy documents are a historically and 
culturally contextual way of constructing and governing subjects and outline the 
policy documents chosen. Finally, the chapter will conclude by highlighting the 
limitations of this study and how the researcher has sought to address them. 
 
Review of the research question and objectives 
This research questions how people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed in relation to recent changes to income support payments for people with 
disability and the provision of disability care and support services in Australia. It 
intends to provide further information into how the category is constructed and 
governed, which is often limited in the existing literature to an examination of the 
category’s inception in the Howard government’s Welfare to Work reforms. It also 
seeks to address a limitation of existing research, examining how the category is 
constructed and governed through other policies such as income management and the 
NDIS. This is because existing scholarship does not examine the intersection of the 
PCW category with other policies such as, the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and 
Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010, which legislates income management, and the 
NDIS, and the implications and effects of this for the way that people with a PCW 








This research adopts two methodological approaches, one of which is 
governmentality. Governmentality as a concept and a theory was developed by 
Michel Foucault (Dean, 1999, 2010) and is a theory about modern government and 
how governing is practiced. It examines how people are governed and through what 
means. Governmentality also seeks to understand how power is organised and 
orchestrated in society. Governmentality ultimately encourages one to question how 
power and rule is understood in modern society (Marston & McDonald, 2006b).  
 
In governmentality, Foucault understands government as the “conduct of 
conduct” (Dean, 1999, p. 10; McNay, 1994, p. 127; Rose, 1999, p. 3; Smart, 2002, p. 
xv). This refers to the idea that individuals and populations are managed and 
regulated as subjects through certain techniques or mechanisms which influence and 
impact on their ability for action (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). This occurs through 
“structuring the field of conduct” (Smart, 2002, p. xv). Further, Foucault (1994 
[1978]) refers to government as an ‘art’, essentially inferring the ‘how’ of governing. 
With regard to governmentality this can refer to the numerous and often invisible 
techniques and mechanisms employed to guide individuals and populations. A 
governmentality approach draws attention to these techniques and mechanisms 
employed to guide and regulate individuals and populations, suggesting that 
governing generally and the way it is exercised in society is not natural, inevitable or 
primordial, rather it is a socially constructed way of organising society to achieve 




A governmentality approach specifically responds to liberalism as a modern 
form of government (Dean, 1999, 2010; Foucault, 1994 [1978]) and analyses 
liberalism as a way of governing (McNay, 1994). In liberalism, persons are not 
understood as “a flock to be herded or tended, [or] the inhabitants of a territorial 
possession” (Gordon, 1994, p. xxiv); instead as subjects of a population that should 
be governed through freedom and less governmental interference. Governmentality 
lends itself as a means to analyse the mechanisms of government in liberalism which 
may be external to state regulation but nonetheless, guide and direct conduct to 
achieve specific objectives. “Liberalism advocates an “economic government” – a 
government, in other words, that economizes on the use of resources and effort to 
achieve its ends, and, ... accepts that to govern well is to govern less” (Gordon, 1994, 
p. xxvii). This aspect of liberalism, that is, the notion that “to govern well is to 
govern less” (Gordon, 1994, p. xxvii) relates to the emphasis in governmentality on 
examining forms of indirect rule, that is, mechanisms external to state regulation 
(McNay, 1994).   
 
It is suggested through a governmentality approach that one of the ways in 
which subjects and populations are governed in liberalism is through the dispersion 
of sites of government. This dispersion repositions the role of the state from a 
position of centrality in the relationship of power and rule to one where other 
institutions also direct and regulate conduct (Marston & McDonald, 2006b). 
Governmentality, then, does not focus on the state as the predominant institution of 
regulation. Rather, governmentality moves away from the notion that governing is 
only a function of the nation-state and examines other institutions or mechanisms in 
society which also function to direct and regulate conduct (Dean, 1999, 2010; 
115 
 
Foucault, 1994 [1978]; Marston & McDonald, 2006b; Rose, 1999; Rose, O'Malley, 
& Valverde, 2009). For example, “in institutions such as the family, school, hospital, 
prison, commercial enterprise and so forth, the conduct of individuals and groups is 
directed, in short, it is subject to government” (Smart, 2002, p. xv). Governing 
through other institutions alongside the state points to an implicit extension of power 
and rule in modern society (Marston & McDonald, 2006b) and enables the state to 
govern at a distance (Rose, 1999). To govern at a distance simply means regulating 
at length, which according to Dean (2002) is less intrusive or obvious. 
 
Another technique through which people are governed in liberalism is 
through freedom. Freedom is understood as a right of modern individuals and 
populations which governing institutions and the state must respect (Foucault, 2007 
[1977-1978]). Rose (1999) suggests that by governing through freedom in liberalism 
one is recognising the capacity in those governed to manage and regulate their own 
conduct. To ‘govern’ means to direct and manage conduct while at the same time 
acknowledging the agency and ability of subjects to act, therefore presupposing their 
freedom. Rose (1999) suggests that by having such an understanding, governing 
institutions can achieve desired ends by working through the freedom of subjects. 
Alternatively, “the absence of freedom to resist or act otherwise implies a state of 
absolute domination or physical constraint” (McNay, 1994, p. 127). Foucault (1982) 
suggests that to exercise power in this way, as in through domination or control, is 
not based in a power relationship but is rather a formation akin to slavery, hence the 
importance of governing through freedom. However, governing through freedom is 
based on establishing and forming a subject whose conduct is consistent with the 
expectations and norms of rule. It also means that, there are obvious constraints on 
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such freedom in order to manage and control deviance, delinquency and to maintain 
social order (Foucault, 2007 [1977-1978]). Therefore, those who are unable to 
conduct themselves in a manner consistent with social norms and expectations are no 
longer governed through freedom but disciplined, to encourage the development of 
the capacity for conducting oneself in a more congruent manner. McNay states “even 
when individuals think they are most free, they are in fact in the grip of an insidious 
power which operates not through direct forms of repression but through less visible 
strategies of ‘normalization’” (1994, p. 5).  
 
Knowledge is also identified by governmentality scholars as a technique 
employed to govern individuals and populations. According to Foucault the 
employment of knowledge as a technique to govern is situated within or has a 
relationship to power. This knowledge comes through mechanisms used to survey 
and document the movements and desires of individuals and populations harnessing 
information such as birth rates, death rates, marriage rates, unemployment rates, 
statistics of home ownership and attendance numbers at various events. For people 
with disability, for example, the knowledge of the medical profession has been 
privileged over their knowledge, and employed as a mechanism to govern them. 
Medical professionals are seen as experts (Oliver, 1996). The medical profession 
objectifies people with disability, surveying, examining, assessing and treating their 
bodies. Foucault discusses “the production of effective instruments for the formation 
and accumulation of knowledge – methods of observation, techniques of registration, 
procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control” (Foucault, 1980, p. 
102). He emphasises the importance of examining these mechanisms, used as means 
of obtaining knowledge. The knowledge produced through such instruments then 
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assists in establishing mechanisms to shape conduct in order to effectively achieve 
specific ends (Foucault, 1994 [1978]; McNay, 1994) at times “working through our 
desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs” [italics in original] (Dean, 1999, p. 11). 
Using knowledges of the governed means that governing takes place through 
something that is not external or separate to subjects (Rose et al., 2009) and yet 
subjects are treated as objects of government, much like people with disability and 
their regulation through the medical profession. 
 
Further, governmentality highlights how subjects in liberalism are managed 
and regulated through macro and micro techniques of power. Macro and micro 
techniques refer to the format or structure of governing in modern society and the 
way that it is organised and signify government on two levels: at the collective or 
population level and at the individual level (Rose, 1999). Rose (1999) refers to macro 
techniques as those employed to govern the population as a collective, whereas, 
micro techniques are those which function to direct and regulate the individual. 
Acknowledging both modes of governing is important, as Smart states, “to conceive 
of the exercise of power in modern societies purely and simply in terms of totalizing 
procedures of the state is to neglect the significance of the techniques of 
individualization which are to be found in the same political structures” (2002, p. 
128).  
 
One of the micro techniques of modern government examined by 
governmentality scholars is what Foucault terms “techniques of the self” (1994 
[n.d.], p. 87). This refers to the creation of certain relations to the self that are 
developed by subjects through or in response to mechanisms which seek to regulate, 
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manage and direct conduct (Marston & McDonald, 2006b; Rose et al., 2009). 
Governmentality then, focuses on how subjects self-regulate or self-govern (Dean, 
1999, 2010), or develop the capacity to undertake the two functions listed formerly. 
This approach of government recognises the capability of subjects to regulate their 
own conduct (McNay, 1994). Through analysing this aspect of government a 
governmentality approach examines the mechanisms which work to produce an 
individual who forms or alters their own conduct in order to comply with social 
norms or expectations, in this way forming a particular relation to the self. Such 
relations are developed through self-examinations and “the guidance of the 
conscience” (Smart, 2002, p. xv) which Smart terms “truth obligations” (2002, p. 
xv). Through employing such practices on oneself one’s own conduct is under 
scrutiny by oneself which may lead to self-transformation. This focus on self-
government objectifies human behaviour (Smart, 2002). Additionally, through such 
self-management or regulation the individual becomes aware of them self as a 
subject (Smart, 2002). Therefore, through self-management and self-government the 
individual turns their self into a subject (Foucault, 1982).  
 
Foucault was, and governmentality is, heavily occupied with attempting to 
understand the production of the subject through governing and, while this occurs 
through technologies of the self, Foucault also discusses dividing practices as a 
mechanism of subject formation. Foucault suggests that “there are two meanings of 
the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to 
his or her own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (1982, p. 781). The 
formation of the subject is a technique of modern governing however, it also 
becomes an effect of governing in that it produces and impacts tangibly on the way 
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subjects see themselves and are able to interact with social institutions. Foucault 
understands the notion of the ‘subject’ as a social construction which is a product of 
power and also social and historical contexts which work to structure society through 
governing (McNay, 1994). Foucault thus argues that this creation of subjectivity and 
the defining of identity is “a form of power ... [which] applies itself to immediate 
everyday life ... categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches to him his own identity, imposes a law of truth which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him” (1982, p. 781).  
 
Power is particularly employed in the creation of subjects through dividing 
practices. Dividing practices are when “the subject is either divided inside himself or 
divided from others” (Foucault, 1982, pp. 777-778) through objectification as an 
object of knowledge and research as well as power (Smart, 2002). Foucault 
throughout his work discusses the division of certain subjects from what can be 
termed the ‘rational’ or ‘normal’ subject. Such subjects include ‘the mad’, ‘the 
delinquent’ and ‘the ill’. Dividing practices creates and uses bodies of knowledge 
established about specific subjects (Smart, 2002). Power and knowledge thus work 
on the body and transform the body into an object of knowledge and a subject whose 
identity is categorised. This categorisation of a subject’s identity through knowledge 
informs discourses surrounding certain social categories. The formation of subject 
identity through dividing practices is something that operates external to the subject. 
However, the effects are felt by those subjugated into a subject identity that is 
considered ‘problematic’ or ‘deviant’. By forming a dualistic relation between one 
type of subject, the “mainstream” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 275) and another, the 
“marginalised” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 275) not only is the ‘other’ objectified but it 
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appears undesirable and abnormal (McNay, 1994). This also creates tensions 
between different “political subjects” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 275). By highlighting the 
employment of dividing practices to govern it draws attention to how regulating the 
behaviours of the marginal contributes to the government of the broader population 
(Bacchi, 2009) and also draws attention to the construction of subjects. 
 
In summary, governmentality draws attention to the techniques and 
mechanisms used by the state and other institutions to direct, manage and regulate 
conduct to achieve specific ends. It enables such practices to be exposed and their 
inevitability and naturalness challenged. Governmentality also enables the 
construction of subjects to be considered (Dean, 1995).  
 
Usefulness of governmentality for analysing policy and its relevance to this 
study 
However, there is no structured process to undertaking research using a 
governmentality methodological approach (Marston & McDonald, 2006b) and no 
one accepted way to utilise the work being produced by governmentality scholars 
(Dean, 1999). This contributes to the “flexible and open ended” (Rose et al., 2009, p. 
26) nature of governmentality as a methodology.  
 
Governmentality is employed effectively in policy research in order to expose 
and acknowledge the relationship between governing undertaken through the state 
and connectedly other non-state institutions (Marston & McDonald, 2006b). As a 
result of the capacity of governmentality to challenge the inevitability of particular 
forms of governmental regulation referred to earlier, an analysis using 
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governmentality as the methodological approach has been described as liberating for 
policy analysis (Marston & McDonald, 2006b). This is because it reframes the way 
that social policy analysis is undertaken because it extends an analysis of policy and 
governing beyond the state to examine and analyse other institutions or mechanisms 
which construct and govern subjects (Marston & McDonald, 2006b; Rose, 1999).  
 
Additionally, through examining the micro and macro technologies of 
government “rich possibilities for social policy research and analysis” (Marston & 
McDonald, 2006b, p. 4) can be exposed. As well, it “helps avoid reductionist (or 
totalising) accounts of policy” (Marston & McDonald, 2006b, p. 7). Governmentality 
also enables one to go beyond the common sense and taken for granted world of 
policy and question and challenge the way that policy problems and solutions frame 
the ‘problem’ and solution in certain ways  (Marston & McDonald, 2006a). 
Undertaking a governmentality analysis of policy encourages and enables researchers 
to problematise and question policy then contributing to some form of transparency 
and establishing a level of accountability (Marston & McDonald, 2006a). It then also 
enables the possibility of policy alternatives by “problematising existing practices” 
(Marston & McDonald, 2006a, p. 229). Marston and McDonald (2006a) suggest that 
governmentality as an approach for analysing policy can contribute significantly to 
enriching policy analysis.  
 
A governmentality approach is apt and of value to this project specifically 
because of its ability to extract and highlight the construction of subjects and 
techniques and modes used to govern and regulate conduct (Marston & McDonald, 
2006b). It provides a methodology to question, disturb, challenge and draw attention 
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to the mechanisms and processes of governing. Governmentality then usefully 
supplies a lens to examine the way that people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed in Welfare to Work and at the intersection of other policies which could 
regulate the PCW category, such as income management. Governmentality also 
provides a language to discuss governing and a guide as to what to look for in 
seeking to analyse how people with a PCW are constructed and governed. It can also 
provide an explanation of the techniques or mechanisms employed and the possible 
effects or implications of governing.  
 
Additionally, through governmentality, the researcher is able to question the 
naturalness of the PCW category and examine the impact of the category’s 
construction on the actions of people categorised with a PCW. This is because 
employing a governmentality methodological approach enables one to extract and 
then challenge common sense or taken for granted modes of governing which are 
often implicit and invisible. Governmentality thus “increases our awareness of the 
role of construction and the constructed in governmental landscapes and institutions, 
and of the way in which habit leads us to accept these constructions as facts of nature 
or universal categories” (Gordon, 1994, p. xxiv). Destabilising the naturalness of the 
PCW category’s construction further allows the researcher to examine how people 
with a PCW are constructed and governed to achieve specific ends, for instance, as a 
solution to the ageing population, as a means to destabilise the benefit dependency of 





Governmentality thus enables the researcher to deconstruct, analyse and ask 
questions of policy like those expressed in this research (Marston & McDonald, 
2006b), provides a language to describe the way that people are governed and 
exposes the social construction of social categories which are assumed as natural. In 
this way then, it serves as an appropriate methodology to apply in order to develop 
answers to the research question and fulfil the research objectives.  
 
CDS 
The second methodological approach of this study is CDS. CDS is an 
important part of the methodological approach of this study because it provides a 
perspective from which to interpret the findings. In particular, CDS resonates with 
some of the ideas and conclusions of the research. It also provides a language to 
explain the concerns identified with the way that people with a PCW are constructed 
and governed with regard to recent changes to Australia’s income support system for 
people with disability and in relation to Australia’s new scheme to provide care and 
support to persons with disabilities. Additionally, the research supports suggestions 
by CDS scholars who emphasise a need to move beyond governing through binaries 
such as, abled/ disabled, same/ different and impairment/ disability to consider the 
embodied experience of all subjects.  
 
CDS developed in response to criticisms of disability studies (Meekosha & 
Shuttleworth, 2009). Disability studies is underpinned by three key ideas. The first is 
that people with disability are a marginalised and discriminated against group. The 
second is that people with disability are a minority group and the third reflects the  
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social model suggesting that disability is a social problem and not a medical one 
(Roulstone et al., 2012). According to Roulstone, Thomas and Watson the first two 
ideas “have combined and been used to reinforce the latter” (2012, p. 3).  
 
However, as highlighted in the Introduction, some disability studies scholars 
have critiqued the social model (Shakespeare, 2006; Shakespeare & Watson, 2002). 
One criticism is levelled at the distinction between impairment and disability made 
by the social model, in particular its tendency to ignore the implications of 
impairment in favour of removing social barriers. Shakespeare (2006) challenges the 
impairment/ disability binary, questioning the ease with which persons with 
disability are able to separate or distinguish the effects of impairment and disability 
in their everyday lives. For example, “[p]ain itself is generated through the interplay 
of physiological, psychological and socio-cultural factors and thus the individual 
experience can never be separated from the social context” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 
34). Similarly, Morris (1991) contends that while social barriers and negative 
attitudes do impact on people with disability it is problematic to ignore the personal 
experience of impairment and restrictions which may result from this.  
Additionally, sometimes impairments can be exacerbated by social barriers 
(Shakespeare & Watson, 2002). To then focus on social barriers rather than 
impairments ignores the combination of impairment and social barriers and the 
complexity of the experiences of persons with disabilities (Shakespeare, 2006). 
 
Therefore, the social model is critiqued for failing to acknowledge the lived 
bodily experiences of impairment (Shakespeare & Watson, 2002), focusing instead 
on the social environment. Shakespeare and Watson (2002) suggest that people with 
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disability are not only ‘disabled’ as society marginalises and excludes them, but are 
also impaired. To ignore the pain and daily experience of impairment invalidates the 
experience of disability hiding it through only focusing on social barriers. Thus the 
social model ignores the embodied experience of impairment.  
 
Oliver (2004, 2009) defends the social model from these claims. He argues, 
firstly, that the social model was not intended to focus on the “personal experience of 
impairment (Oliver, 1996) but the collective experience of disablement (Oliver, 
1990)” (Oliver, 2004, p. 8) as there already was and is extensive emphasis on 
individual impairment through the medical model at the expense of social barriers 
(Oliver, 2009). Secondly, he suggests that the limitations placed on individuals as a 
result of impairment are inadequate to build a political movement on (Oliver, 2009). 
 
The former argument however, constructs the experience of impairment as 
individual and biological rather than recognising that impairment is also socially 
constructed and culturally contextual and “[i]f disability is defined as social, while 
impairment is defined as biological, there is a risk of leaving impairment as an 
essentialist category. Impairment is not a pre-social or pre-cultural biological 
substrate” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 35). The social model also suggests that because of 
the individualised and biological nature of impairment that it cannot be changed and 





terms this social production of meaning assigned to bodies as “[B]ody-reflexive 
practices … [which] are not internal to the individual [rather] … involve social 
relations and symbolism” (2005, p. 64). Meekosha (1998) suggests:  
 
if biology is not destiny, then culture may be the determining context. If so, 
this means that all bodies are fundamentally culturally and socially determined 
and thus particular cultural forms determine the configuration of the body … 
Seen in this way, the body has been forced to vacate its residence on the nature 
side of the nature-culture duality and take up residence within culture 
(Meekosha, 1998, p. 167).  
 
The social model thus fails to acknowledge impairment as the embodied experience 
of disability, both individually experienced and socially produced.  
 
Recently, CDS has emerged as a departure from and in response to some of 
the criticisms of the social model (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). It has also 
developed in reply to questions about the relevance of the social model in 
postmodernity and late capitalism (Goodley, 2013). CDS extends the work of the 
social model (Shildrick, 2012). Some CDS scholars acknowledge the social model as 
the foundation for disability studies and its achievements (Goodley, 2013). However, 
CDS takes the social model and its theoretical underpinnings “in innovative new 
directions that challenge not simply existing doxa about the nature of disability, but 
questions of embodiment, identity and agency as they affect all living beings” 
(Shildrick, 2012, p. 30). CDS seeks to develop a more complex understanding of the 
oppression of people with disability whilst using ideas about disability from the 




binarised thinking, for example; impairment/ disability, ability/ disability and the 
medical model versus the social model (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). Its 
objective is the emancipation of people with disability (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 
2009). 
 
CDS encourages interdisciplinarity, that is, examining and working with 
other disciplines including other critical theories such as queer studies, CRAWS and 
feminism for what they can bring to analysis and to disability studies (Shildrick, 
2012). Many CDS scholars interact with alternative theories alongside CDS to draw 
their conclusions, for example, “post conventionist (Shildrick 2009); postmodernist 
(Corker and Shakespeare 2002) and post-structuralist (Tremain 2005)” (Goodley, 
2013, p. 634). 
 
One of the key tenets of CDS is that it captures the relationship between 
impairment and disability. Accordingly, “disability is best characterised as a complex 
interrelationship between impairment, individual response to impairment, and the 
social environment” (Hosking, 2008, p. 7). Therefore, rather than seeing impairment 
and disability as analytically distinct, CDS sees a relational dialogue between 
impairment and disability (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009) as they each impact on 
one another (Goodley, 2013). It also sees impairment as also embodying repressive 
social relations rather than as solely biological (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). 
This is because “social attitudes, aesthetics, cultural discourses and discursive 
structures and representation [have a role] in determining and conditioning the social 
experience of living with an impairment” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 34). The body in CDS  
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thus also becomes a site of analysis because “[t]he body … is neither a biological nor 
sociological category … it is an interface, … a field where multiple codes … are 
inscribed” (Goodley, 2013, p. 636).  
 
A CDS perspective additionally, emphasises the importance of questioning 
and disturbing the binary of ability and disability and the power relations it sustains. 
Through this it becomes particularly crucial to examine and deconstruct the 
normalised able-body which often avoids examination. This is because binaries 
through simplifying complex relationships “cannot capture the rich interweaving of 
bodily states” (Shildrick, 2012, p. 33). Therefore, Shildrick favours a “fluidity of all 
categories” (2012, p. 32) rather than a seemingly stark contrast between ability and 
disability operating in binary thinking.  
 
By deconstructing binary thinking Shildrick (2012) encourages the 
examination of all embodied subjectivities, particularly the ‘norm’ which would 
particularly illuminate how the  
 
parameters around all and any types of embodiment – and not just disabling 
conditions – are in any case uncertain. In the postconventional approach, all 
putative categories are slippery, unfixed, permeable, deeply intersectional, 
intrinsically hybrid and resistant to definition (Shildrick, 2012, p. 34).  
 
“In place of modernist stereotypes that [then] construct an insidious devaluation of 
bodily difference, and of disabled people, postconventional theories of embodiment 
expose the uncertain and vulnerable nature of all forms of embodied selfhood” 
(Shildrick, 2012, p. 38) and challenges the distinctness between ability and disability 
employed in binary thinking. CDS thus engages with embodiment (Coleman-
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Fountain & McLaughlin, 2013). This is an approach which could capture the 
diversity of impairments and disabling experiences. This is because by questioning 
and destabilising binaries the differences within social categories can be examined 
(Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009) and challenged. 
 
Shildrick (2012) suggests that through deconstructing the ability/ disability 
binary the binary of sameness/ difference is also challenged because it seeks to 
highlight and deconstruct the power of the normative in defining sameness and 
difference. This is unlike the social model which seeks inclusion within the existing 
paradigm of equality for people with disability which casts them as either the same 
or different to the able-bodied norm. CDS instead challenges the equality paradigm 
“[b]y complicating the liberal humanist claim that, like other identifiable oppressed 
groups, disabled people should simply be afforded the same rights and benefits 
enjoyed by the mainstream members of their society” (Shildrick, 2012, p. 34). This 
limits the consideration of the “multiple irreducible differences” (Shildrick, 2012, p. 
34) of people with disability, instead requiring that the concept of equality be 
challenged and destabilised in order to embrace diversity (Hosking, 2008).  
 
Further, while the social model emphasises that the ‘problem’ is with society 
and the social barriers experienced by people with disability Shildrick (2012) raises 
concerns with the social model. She argues that removing social barriers does not 
impact on the ingrained subconscious attitudes and prejudices around disability 
(Shildrick, 2012). Thus any response must “go beyond simply extending the formal 
framework in which disabled people can maximise their status as good citizens of the  
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neo-liberal polity” (Shildrick, 2012, p. 35) and focus on critiquing ingrained fears 
and attitudes about bodies which are often problematised and represented as sub-
human and incomplete.  
 
CDS therefore seeks to disturb and deconstruct the binaries of impairment 
and disability, ability and disability and sameness and difference and their power, 
and challenge ableism and the social model. It “intends to unsettle entrenched ways 
of thinking on both sides of the putative divide between disabled and non-disabled, 
and to offer an analysis of how and why certain definitions are constructed and 
maintained” (Shildrick, 2012, p. 35). 
 
Another reason for the emergence of CDS is the appropriation of the 
language of disability studies and the social model in government policy. Like in 
Chapter Two where it was suggested that Humpage (2007a) and Galvin (2004) 
problematise this, Meekosha and Shuttleworth (2009) also raise concerns with this 
and highlight that this co-option has resulted in measures which are inconsistent with 
the intentions of disability studies. “CDS represents a distancing from those who 
have coopted disability studies for simply normalising ends” (Meekosha & 
Shuttleworth, 2009, p. 51).  
 
Meekosha and Shuttleworth (2009) also highlight the relevance of Foucault’s 
understanding of power and knowledge to CDS, and Soldatic (2009) draws attention 
to the applicability of governmentality. “What makes Foucault’s ideas so useful to 
CDS is that they perform a radical de-familiarisation of modern institutions and 
practices as caring and benevolent and reveal technologies and procedures that 
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classify, normalise, manage and control anomalous body subjects” (Meekosha & 
Shuttleworth, 2009, p. 57). While the social model critiqued social institutions for the 
economic and materialist exclusion of people with disability and the power of the 
medical profession, power is conceived more broadly by Foucault, including through 
governmentality. The difference is Foucault’s concern, with micro techniques of 
power which govern subjects who at times become complicit in their subjectification 
(Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009).  
 
This research will apply CDS as its methodology alongside governmentality. 
This is because both in combination provide a useful approach for this research 
which explores how people with a PCW are constructed and governed in recent 
changes to income support policy for people with disability and the disability care 
and support system. 
 
A qualitative approach: Foucauldian discourse analysis 
This research adopts a qualitative method to analyse the policy documents.  
Specifically, the researcher adopts a Foucauldian discourse analysis. The application 
of a Foucauldian discourse analysis to the policy documents works alongside the 
methodological approach of this study, governmentality, which is also based on 
Foucault’s work (Dean, 1999, 2010). It also relates to CDS, the other methodology of 
this study, which as highlighted also employs the ideas of Foucault and 
governmentality. Unlike other approaches to discourse analysis a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis suggests that there is a connection between the text and the wider 
social realm inferring a link between power relations and social and historical 
contexts. A Foucauldian analysis is concerned with how texts are produced as a 
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product of such social and historical contexts (Jacobs, 2006). This requires the 
researcher to consider the construction of the text as well as the themes and meanings 
that may be contained (Jacobs, 2006). The Foucauldian approach sees texts as 
documents produced within particular social and historical contexts, with even shifts 
in society becoming reflected in the way that texts are constructed. A Foucauldian 
discourse analysis seeks to expose, challenge and destabilise discourses which are 
entrenched within society. Employing a Foucauldian discourse analysis is 
appropriate for the fulfilment of the research question and objectives because it 
allows the researcher to analyse the historically contingent PCW category to 
understand how people with a PCW are constructed and governed. It also encourages 
the researcher to consider the construction of the PCW category as part of a wider  
process beyond Welfare to Work. For example, as discussed in the Introduction and 
Chapter One, the establishment of the category could be considered part of a broader 
trend to encourage more people with disability into employment for various reasons. 
 
Additionally, in a Foucauldian discourse analysis it is understood that 
“discourse plays a pivotal role in establishing ... regimes of truth [which] are the 
basis from which we assert our understandings of the social world” (Jacobs, 2006, p. 
142). Employing a Foucauldian approach to a text can expose such “regimes of 
truth” (Jacobs, 2006, p. 142) which permeate society at any given time. Jacobs 
summarises Foucault’s “key argument [stating] ... discourses are contested ... the key 
task is to identify how discourses exemplify conflicts over meaning that are linked to 
power” (2006, p. 142). A Foucauldian discourse analysis allows the researcher “to 
make explicit the connections between text and wider social practice” (Jacobs, 2006, 
p. 143) including how the implications of a text carry forward into other policies and 
133 
 
become accepted as regimes of truth. Using a Foucauldian discourse analysis to 
examine how people with a PCW are governed allows the researcher to draw 
attention to contradictions in regimes of truth. Additionally, a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis allows the researcher to highlight and disrupt silences in policy documents. 
This enables the researcher to expose the ableist norm regulating people with a PCW 
in Welfare to Work, which is continued through income management in governing 
them through sameness and, highlight, the ways in which people with a PCW are 
governed in comparison to people with severe and profound disabilities in the NDIS.  
 
Therefore by applying a Foucauldian discourse analysis, the method of this 
research, the researcher can draw on the social and historical context of the policy 
documents in order to expose and challenge the way texts are constructed. This 
enables the researcher to highlight the historically contingent PCW category and 
understand how people are constructed and governed as part of a wider process. A 
Foucauldian discourse analysis also provides a framework to reveal and challenge 
regimes of truth in the policy documents and any contradictions within such regimes, 
as well as disrupt the silences in the documents.  
 
Policy 
This research conducts a Foucauldian discourse analysis of policy documents. 
Bacchi’s (2009) arguments about policy are paramount to why policy documents 
were selected as the site of analysis for this project. Bacchi (2009) is a scholar who 
develops and applies Foucault’s approach to the analysis of policy documents. 
Bacchi (2009) suggests that policy is historically and culturally contextual and is a 
way of organising and governing society. To have a policy in place implies “that 
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there is a problem” (Bacchi, 2009, p. ix) that needs fixing. Bacchi’s (2009) belief that 
policy is a mechanism of governing links not only to governmentality but also 
enables the researcher to attempt to understand how people with a PCW are 
constructed and governed in recent changes to the income support system for people 
with disability as well as to the disability care and support system in Australia. This 
is because policy becomes understood as a mechanism or technique employed to 
construct, regulate, manage and govern subjects. The link between analysing policy 
documents and governing works effectively in this project to strengthen the 
outcomes of the research which respond to the research question and objectives, and 
which also link to understanding how people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed in specific policy documents.  
 
The choice, by the researcher, to analyse policy documents is thus the most 
appropriate way to answer the research question. This confidence considers the 
research question and objectives as well as Rose’s suggestion that “attempts at 
governing may be formally rationalized in programmatic statements, policy 
documents, pamphlets and speeches” (1999, p. 4). This statement implies and 
indicates the capacity of policy documents to construct subjects and direct and 
regulate conduct, through various means. 
 
The policy documents were selected through a purposive sampling technique. 
Purposive sampling was employed in order to provide answers to the research 
question and satisfy the research objectives (Bryman, 2008). The application of 
purposive sampling ensures that the policy documents selected relate specifically to 
the target area of the project. 
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Specifically, this project analyses the Employment and Workplace Relations 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006, the SSOLA 
(Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010, the Family Assistance and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 and the NDIS Act 2013.  
 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and 
Other Measures) Act 2006 
The Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare 
to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006 gave effect to the 2005-06 Welfare to Work 
Budget measures of the Howard government (Daniels & Yeend, 2005).  
 
Of most relevance however, were the changes made to the DSP qualification 
criteria which tightened the incapacity to work test. This meant DSP applicants who 
were assessed through a Job Capacity Assessment as capable of working between 15 
and 29 hours per week independent of a POS within the next two years were no 
longer eligible for the DSP, instead having to apply for an alternative payment, like 
NSA.  
 
The Welfare to Work Act also made changes to NSA. For example, it shifted 
penalties from rate reductions for breaches to payment loses, including the eight 
week non-payment period (Daniels & Yeend, 2005). It allowed for NSA recipients to 
re-engage with the system if they complied with their Activity Agreement 
requirements on the first and second time they breached their activity requirements in 
a 12 month period. It also legislated the eight week non-payment period for serious 
participation failures. The Welfare to Work Act also established RapidConnect which 
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requires a NSA applicant “to register with the Job Network [and attend an interview 
with a provider] prior to making a claim” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, p. i). 
The Act also removed the take ‘reasonable steps’ clause from persons meeting their 
Activity Agreement requirements meaning that NSA recipients must comply with all 
requirements unless they have a valid excuse. Additionally, it broadened the scope of 
work from full-time employment to work to the recipient’s capacity and made 
changes so that those engaging in part-time work would be entitled to receive a part 
rate allowance (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005).  
 
SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010 
The SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010 sought 
to implement changes to the NTER legislation including the SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 
and the income management measures. As the title implies, the Act reinstated the 
RDA as well as “State and territory anti-discrimination laws” (Buckmaster et al., 
2010, p. 3). However, most relevantly, this Act expanded income management to 
assist all ‘disadvantaged’ Australians, initially beginning in the NT, back into 
employment. Many of the changes that were implemented through the SSOLA 
(Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010 were made to ensure that 
the NTER legislation was congruent with the RDA (Buckmaster et al., 2010).  
 
Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 
The Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 made 
changes to Family Tax Benefit A and B and the DSP eligibility criteria. It also 
extended income management in Cape York for twelve months and amended the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act 1976 (Cth). 
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Most relevantly, the Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
2011 reformed the criteria for those seeking to access the DSP, requiring those 
without a ‘severe impairment’ to “test their future work capacity” (Daniels, Garden, 
et al., 2011, p. 3) before being eligible for the DSP. This meant that applicants had to 
either have previously engaged with a POS for 18 months in the 36 months prior to 
the applicant’s DSP claim in order to be eligible or if not had to engage with a POS 
for 18 months (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). This Act also redefined ‘severe 
impairment’.  
 
NDIS Act 2013 
The NDIS Act 2013 established the NDIS which provides individualised care 
and support for people with severe and profound disabilities, including individualised 
funding. It also contains legislation for the establishment of the NDIA, charged with 
implementing and managing the NDIS and provisions for the other supports to be 
provided through the NDIS (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013).  
 
Limitations of the study 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the method of this study. 
Firstly, a possible critique of this study which is also a criticism of discourse analysis 
is the question of voice and the capacity of this type of research to enable the voices 
of those concerned or impacted on by the policy to be heard. In order to somewhat 
address this limitation, the researcher has, where possible, drawn on sources which 
convey the perspectives of people with disability, particularly in Chapters Four, Five 
and Six. In particular, the researcher has used media articles by various members of 
the disability community from Ramp Up, “the ABC’s [Australian Broadcasting 
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Corporation’s] … online destination for news, discussion, debate and humour for 
everyone in Australia’s disability communities” (ABC, 2014, p. n.p.) as well as 
drawn on comments to these articles. It has also engaged with the work of various 
disability and welfare organisations including People with Disabilities Australia 
(PWDA), the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) and the NWRN. 
Additionally, it has included, where relevant, opinions from the Submissions to the 
Australian Government Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry into the NDIS 
Bill 2012.  
 
Secondly, discourse analysis as an interpretive method is criticised for its 
capacity to allow bias (Jacobs, 2006). Bryman (2008) suggests that the 
interpretations of texts offered by researchers are not necessarily concrete 
interpretations; rather, they are perspectives which can be affected by subjectivity. 
Similarly, Bacchi (2009) also acknowledges that researchers must be aware of the 
influence of their subjectivity which is bound up in their own experiences. Further, it 
has been suggested that other researchers or audiences may not arrive at the same 
conclusions as “qualitative findings rely too much on the researcher’s often 
unsystematic views about what is significant and important” (Bryman, 2008, p. 391). 
The ability of the researcher to interpret texts through an unconscious bias must thus 
be acknowledged and recognised. However, discourse analysis is precisely a tool for 
unpacking taken for granted assumptions in policy documents, recognising that 
policy documents are not neutral, rather are socially constructed and may reflect 
taken for granted assumptions. Policy practitioners for example, are “immersed in the 
conceptual logics of our era” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 19) and as such may reflect this in  
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policy. For the researcher then self-reflexivity is employed to the researcher’s own 
conclusions through discourse analysis which endeavours to limit the influence of 
unconscious bias by recognising the potential for subjectivity to penetrate the study.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has outlined the methodological approaches of this research, 
governmentality and CDS. Following this, it discussed the method of this research, a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis of policy documents, in particular the Employment 
and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other 
Measures) Act 2006, the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 
2010, the Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 and the 
NDIS Act 2013. This research aims to employ these frameworks to analyse how 
people with a PCW are constructed and governed in recent changes to the income 
support system for people with disability and in the provision of disability care and 
support. The research also emphasises the importance of examining policy 
intersections in the construction and regulation of subjects, particularly considering 
the dearth of literature on the possible income management of people with a PCW 
and people with a PCW and the NDIS. The following chapter begins to discuss how 
people with a PCW are constructed and governed suggesting that they are 




CHAPTER FOUR: SAMENESS, WELFARE TO WORK AND  
PEOPLE WITH A PARTIAL CAPACITY TO WORK 
Introduction  
This chapter examines how people with a PCW are constructed and governed 
in the Howard government’s Welfare to Work reforms. While there is an extensive 
amount of existing scholarship on concerns with the Welfare to Work reforms for 
people with disability, this research specifically problematises the underlying 
mechanisms of government which normalise and structurally disadvantage people 
with a PCW. The analysis within the chapter demonstrates how people with a PCW 
are governed through sameness in Welfare to Work which upholds the able-body as 
the normative standard by which people with a PCW are constructed and governed, 
systematically disadvantaging them.  
 
In Western societies, the white, able-bodied heterosexual male has occupied a 
position of privilege, norm and ideal in contrast to persons who are non-white, 
persons with disabilities, lesbian, gay, trans and intersex persons and women, who 
have been constructed as ‘different’ or ‘other’ (Bacchi, 2009). Scholars have debated 
about whether the ‘other’ should identify that they are the ‘same’ as the white, able-
bodied, heterosexual male or ‘different’ (Wendell, 1996) in order to seek equality 
and inclusion. However, Bacchi (1990) suggests that the norm occupies the point of 
reference, determining sameness or difference. Discussions about sameness and/ or 
difference can be seen in feminism (J. C. Williams, 1991), disability studies, 
CRAWS (J. C. Williams, 1991) and queer studies, often creating divisions within 
these fields (Bacchi, 1990). Many scholars have also sought to answer the question 
of sameness or difference, although many have developed approaches to move 
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beyond discussing sameness to or difference from (See, J. C. Williams, 1991). This 
is because discussions of difference continue to objectify and ‘other’ those already 
cast as ‘other’, and discussions of sameness ignore differences in favour of appealing 
to the sameness between subjects and uphold the norm in a position of privilege.  
 
Emphasising the difference of people with disability is not uncommon and 
this was and continues to be seen more broadly in society through the segregation, 
isolation, separation and exclusion of people with disability, who are seen as 
different, abnormal and ‘other’ to the able-bodied norm (Barton, 1993; Galvin, 2004; 
Goggin & Newell, 2005; Soldatic & Pini, 2009) which became constructed through 
the problematisation of disability (Campbell, 2005; L. J. Davis, 1997; Galvin, 2006). 
Disability and ability thus operate in a binary (Campbell, 2005). This assumption that 
the ‘disabled’ body and mind are different and deviate from the norm has justified 
and enabled unfair, constraining, “restrictive … [and] harmful” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 
182) treatment of people with disability. Goggin and Newell describe the situation as 
an “apartheid” (2005, p. 18) suggesting that, “those who are ‘able-bodied’ (at least 
temporarily so) and those who are ‘disabled’ [are partitioned]. There are special 
places, practices and accommodations that make a line not to be crossed between 
‘normal’ and ‘disabled’” (Goggin & Newell, 2005, p. 20).  
 
People with disability are largely constructed as different through the medical 
profession. The medical profession assume a level “of biological or physiological 
inferiority [and difference] upon disabled persons” (Hahn, 1985, p. n.p.) through the 
calculation, measurement and analysis of ‘disabled’ bodies and minds. Alternatively, 
the disability movement and disability scholars suggest through the social model that 
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disability is “constituted in relations of power” (Goggin & Newell, 2005, p. 53) 
which objectify, socially construct and reproduce people with disability as ‘different’ 
and ‘other’.   
 
This chapter discusses how people with a PCW are constructed and governed 
through sameness in the Welfare to Work reforms and the implications of this for 
people with a PCW. There are four sections in this chapter. The first section explains 
how as a result of the Welfare to Work reforms there has been a shift from 
constructing and governing people with a PCW as ‘different’ in the income support 
system to constructing and governing them through sameness. The next three 
sections, ‘The expectation of formal paid employment’, ‘Sameness and the mutual 
obligation contract’ and ‘Breaching penalties’, explore how people with a PCW are 
governed through sameness in Welfare to Work and critically analyses the impact of 
this on them.  
 
A shift from difference to sameness 
With regard to income support payments in the welfare state, there has 
recently been a shift away from governing through the social category of disability 
for people with disability assessed as partially able to work through the Employment 
and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other 
Measures) Act 2006. This is because those people with disability assessed as capable 
of working between 15 and 29 hours per week, independent of a POS within the next 
two years, are no longer eligible for the DSP. Instead, they have to apply for another 
type of income support payment, such as NSA, the primary unemployment benefit, if 
they want to continue receiving welfare payments. Social policy scholars suggest that 
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categorical payments are one of the defining features of the Australian welfare state. 
However, this categorical distinction between the unemployed and people with a 
PCW has been eroded through Welfare to Work.  
 
Prior to this, people who would now be categorised as with a PCW were 
eligible for the DSP. The DSP acknowledges the difference of people with disability 
and accords them protection in the welfare state. The protection of people with 
disability in the welfare state has been in place “since 1908 … [and] served to ensure 
that disabled Australians … received at least some level of income support in 
recognition of their additional needs” (Galvin, 2004, p. 352). People with disability 
were thus seen as deserving welfare recipients, largely authenticated through the 
medical profession.  
 
However, this constructed and emphasised their ‘difference’ from the able-
bodied norm, reinforcing a hierarchy between ability and disability (Humpage, 
2007a; Marston & McDonald, 2007; Soldatic, 2009). Additionally, the disability 
movement argued that the classification of people with disability as in need of 
‘protection’ and thus deserving of welfare rendered them dependent and passive as 
suggested in Chapter Two, and supported their exclusion and segregation from social 
and economic participation. This is significant because “[f]rom the disability 
perspective, employment is about rights and participation in society” (Owen & 
Parker Harris, 2012, p. n.p.) which were/ are denied to people with disability. In 
response, the disability movement campaigned for the right of people with disability 
to work, highlighting their exclusion based on social barriers. For example, Soldatic 
and Chapman discuss how “[t]he right to work has been central to the Australian 
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disability movement’s struggles for justice” (2010, p. 143) where they campaigned 
for the right to economically participate and be included. Advances were made 
through the establishment of the Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth) which created 
disability open employment services and enabled “the state [to] intervene … in 
labour markets whilst redistributing resources to services that were largely governed 
in the interests of disabled people” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 143).  
 
The DSP superseded the Invalid Pension through the Disability Reform 
Package in 1991 (Yeend, 2000). However, both these payments determined 
eligibility based on incapacity for employment measured through impairment tables 
(Daniels, 1999). Both had no job search requirements6 (Daniels, 1999) unlike other 
payment types and recipients were not penalised for failing to comply with any 
requirements placed on them by the Department (Humpage, 2007a). Thus through 
their DSP eligibility prior to Welfare to Work, people with a PCW were governed 
through difference in the welfare state.  
 
The Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare 
to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006 redefined capacity to work in the DSP 
incapacity to work test for people with disability in the welfare state from 30 hours 
per week to 15-29 hours per week, independent of a POS (Daniels & Yeend, 2005). 
This led to a “re-categorization of ‘disability’” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 142) 
in the income support system and meant that those assessed as capable of working 
between 15 and 29 hours per week were excluded from the DSP. This led to the 
establishment of the PCW category in various payment types, including NSA, for 
                                                          
6 The Abbott Coalition government have however, proposed compulsory participation requirements 
for DSP recipients under the age of 35 assessed as capable of working 8 hours or more per week from 
July 1, 2014 (DHS, 2014b).  
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those with disabilities still requiring income support and capable of 15-29 hours of 
employment per week. This significantly “reduced access to the DSP” (Daniels & 
Yeend, 2005, p. 4) for people with disability assessed as capable of working between 
15-29 hours and thus categorised as with a PCW.  
 
By removing the social category of disability for people with a PCW, a 
category which previously signified their difference from the ableist norm and 
‘protected’ them in the welfare state, the ‘difference’ of people with a PCW is to a 
certain extent erased. As a result, they are now regulated through sameness and thus 
ableism alongside the unemployed on NSA. People with a PCW become framed, like 
the unemployed, as jobseekers no longer protected by the social category of 
disability. They also become represented as undeserving of state support, with their 
‘different’ needs in an ableist society particularly unrecognised. Instead, they must 
now, like the unemployed, earn state support. People with a PCW thus have a 
compulsory obligation to search for formal paid employment, they must meet 
participation obligations and they can be disciplined through penalties for failing to 
meet their obligations and requirements with the state. This seeks to reform the 
conduct of people with a PCW so that it is consistent with the conduct of the able-
bodied norm with a particular focus on formal paid employment.  
 
Sameness, however, and the way it operates in Welfare to Work, is 
problematic for people with a PCW as it fails to produce equality for them because 
equality is tied to notions of sameness and difference. Equality in this understanding 
is underpinned by the principle that “‘likes should be treated alike’” (Bacchi, 2009, 
p. 181) where the norm is employed as a point of reference to construct who is alike 
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or who is unlike or ‘different’. “Those who are ‘equal’ are held to be the ‘same’ in 
some way. They are the ‘likes’ in ‘likes must be treated alike’” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 
184), disadvantaging those who are considered inconsistent with the norm. For 
people with a PCW sameness fails to achieve equality for them because it upholds 
the able-body “as the neutral standard of the same” (W. Brown, 1995, p. 153), 
requiring people with a PCW to live up to the ideal. Governing through sameness 
also impedes their access to resources to address the structural and social barriers that 
they experience as well as any impairment needs. This is because through sameness a 
landscape of equal affairs is presumed denying and individualising the differences of 
people with a PCW from the able-bodied norm which regulates them through NSA 
receivership. This impacts on their access to resources because the responsibility for 
their needs as persons with disabilities who have impairments and who are 
disadvantaged by the ableist structure of society shift from being the responsibility of 
the state to the responsibility of the individual.  
 
Governing through sameness is also problematic as it impacts on the access 
of people with a PCW to employment because the barriers they experience to 
employment as persons with disabilities, such as inaccessible communities and 
public transport, attitudinal barriers and discrimination fail to be acknowledged by 
the assumption of an equal landscape and therefore challenged.  
 
Relative to discussions of equality equity is also a principle underpinning the 
welfare state (Herscovitch & Stanton, 2008) as the welfare state was designed as a 
mechanism to prop up those who are disadvantaged in society delivering an equitable 
outcome. However, it does not deliver equality or equity for people with a PCW as a 
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result of governing through sameness. This can be seen using Herscovitch and 
Stanton ‘s (2008) explanaton of equity in the welfare state. They suggest that equity 
“has two dimensions: the horizontal and the vertical. The horizontal is about the 
equal treatment of people in like circumstances” (Herscovitch & Stanton, 2008, p. 
52). However, in relation to people with a PCW the assumption of “like 
circumstances” (Herscovitch & Stanton, 2008, p. 52) between the able-bodied and 
people with a PCW as a result of governing through sameness means that the 
circumstances of people with a PCW relevant to achieving equity are disregarded. 
This is because the circumstances of people with a PCW are not like the able-bodied 
as a result of the disadvantaged position of people with disability in a society which 
is constructed around the ‘norm’ of ableism and is structured to privilege able-
bodies. By basing equity and equal treatment on “like circumstances” (Herscovitch 
& Stanton, 2008, p. 52) in sameness, an assumption of “such a level playing field is 
patently unfair to many people with disabilities” (Young, 2002, p. xii), as a result of 
existing discrimination, disadvantage and assumptions about their biological sub-
human status which is ignored by sameness through assumptions of “like 
circumstances” (Herscovitch & Stanton, 2008, p. 52).  
 
Further, with regard to the second dimension of equity in the welfare state 
discussed by Herscovitch and Stanton, “[t]he vertical is about more generous 
treatment of people with fewer resources of their own. It is … the idea that social 
security benefits should be “adequate” (in other words, enough to meet the minimum 
needs of people who rely on them” (2008, p. 52). Herscovitch and Stanton argue that 
the welfare state in this regard however “does not score so well” (2008, p. 58). For 
people with a PCW the welfare state does not provide “generous treatment” 
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(Herscovitch & Stanton, 2008, p. 52) nor “meet the minimum needs of” (Herscovitch 
& Stanton, 2008, p. 52) people with a PCW as a result of governing through 
sameness. This is particularly because the payment rate of NSA has been extensively 
problematised as inadequate, failing to achieve equity for people with a PCW. In 
particular, disability scholars who compare the rate of DSP to the rate of NSA and 
concessions available to DSP recipients that are not available to NSA recipients with 
a PCW demonstrate the insufficient provision of income support to people with a 
PCW as a result of their exclusion from the DSP and positioning on NSA (See for 
example, Humpage, 2007a; Marston & McDonald, 2007; Sarah Parker & Cass, 
2005).7 Recently, during a meeting of the Abbott Government’s Commission of 
Audit Select Committee, Peter Davidson, Senior Advisor at ACOSS, stated that 
“[w]henever people are diverted from a pension payment like DSP to the lower 
Newstart allowance – the gap is around $150 a week” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Senate Abbott Government’s Commission of Audit Select Committee, February 18, 
2014, p. 54). The NWRN also highlights the impact of this for people with a PCW 
stating “[p]eople with disabilities including chronic illnesses and mental health 
problems often have their conditions exacerbated trying to live in poverty on the 
Newstart Allowance for extended periods of time” (2013, p. 5). Similarly, Humpage 
draws attention to how “Newstart’s harsher income tests and taper rates make it 
harder for people to meet their non-optional costs of disability” (2007a, p. 223) 
which are no longer met through the DSP, and are thus, through sameness, the 
individual’s responsibility. This indicates the ableist assumption underpinning NSA  
                                                          
7 It must be acknowledged however, that the rate of DSP payment has also been problematised by 
those who receive it (See for example, Nielsen, 2012). In a recent Facebook forum conducted by 
PWDA many people with disability suggested that the DSP enabled them to exist, but not to live.  
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as well as the incapacity to achieve equity for people with a PCW as a result of 
governing through sameness. It also highlights how access to resources is denied to 
people with a PCW in governing through sameness. 
 
The expectation of formal paid employment 
Through the shift of governing from difference to sameness, “ableist 
regulatory norms” (Campbell, 2008, p. 1) govern people with a PCW through their 
receivership of NSA. This can be seen with regard to the economic participation 
objectives and employment outcomes encouraged through the reforms, the notion of 
independence underpinning the changes as well as the mutual obligation contract. 
Additionally, the behavioural changes expected through Welfare to Work with regard 
to employment (Humpage, 2007a) expects behaviour underpinned by an ableist 
norm, excluding people with disability. It is worth noting, however, that the mutual 
obligation contract, behavioural expectations and Welfare to Work can also be 
problematised for the general NSA population suggesting that there is a lack of 
recognition of human difference in NSA. Nevertheless, the focus is on how Welfare 
to Work structurally disadvantages people with a PCW. As a result, this section will 
explore evidence of how the able-body is upheld as the normative standard 
governing people with a PCW in Welfare to Work and how this fails to deliver 
equality as well as access to resources and employment for them.  
 
The Welfare to Work reforms encourage people with a PCW into formal paid 
employment. This has shifted the meaning of citizenship for people with a PCW 
from “membership in a social community to participation in it” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 
221) through paid employment. However, as suggested in Chapter Two, formal paid 
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work is an institution which is organised and structured to privilege able-bodies and 
minds (Galvin, 2004; Goggin & Newell, 2005; Humpage, 2007a). Galvin, for 
example, argues that people with disability were relegated to the private sphere 
during industrialisation because they “could not perform in accordance with the 
demands of the modern labour force” (2006, p. 501) including “paid wage labour and 
profit maximization” (Barnes & Mercer, 2005, p. 530). As a result they were seen as 
unproductive, undisciplined, incapable and inefficient in comparison to the able-body 
(Barnes & Mercer, 2005; Humpage, 2007a). This resulted in the social exclusion of 
many people with disability (Barnes & Mercer, 2005). Despite Welfare to Work 
including an obligation to search for employment in the participation obligations 
placed on people with a PCW, this connection between formal paid work as a site of 
exclusion for persons with disabilities is problematically ignored through the Welfare 
to Work reforms in governing through sameness. Therefore, “… the welfare reforms 
[… do] nothing to change the fact that people with disabilities remain, just as they 
were at the time of industrialisation, at the forefront of groups who cannot provide 
the versatility and productivity demanded by the labour market” (Humpage, 2007a, 
p. 228). 
 
The Welfare to Work reforms also ignore other kinds of participation and 
work such as care. Many women with disabilities for example, are care-givers and 
have caring responsibilities, “even though their structural position many render these 
invisible” (F. Williams, 2001, p. 480). They have to fight for their rights to be 
mothers (Dowse, Frohmader, & Meekosha, 2010; Pinto, 2008) and they are 
represented as the cared for (Meekosha, 1998). Pinto (2008) suggests that for some 
persons with disabilities the subject positions of the carer and the cared for often 
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reside in the same subject. It also fails to recognise the self-care that is undertaken by 
many persons with disabilities as well as persons with disabilities as employers 
through individualised budgets and funding packages, who may hire workers to meet 
their care and support needs.  
 
Additionally silenced in governing through sameness is the role of the able-
body in constructing the ideal worker-citizen of which people with a PCW have to 
aspire to. Stephen Parker and Fopp describe, “welfare recipients should become, or 
be obliged to become, like the ideal citizen: self-reliant, calling upon one’s own 
resources in preference to calling upon others” (2004, p. 265). Similarly, Meekosha 
and Dowse discuss how “the language of the citizen is imbued with hegemonic 
normalcy and as such excludes disability” (1997, p. 49). People with a PCW are thus 
measured against a standard, the worker-citizen, which was largely formulated based 
on the exclusion of people with disability from employment. By failing to recognise 
the exclusionary nature of formal paid work, which was constructed as an ableist 
institution the Welfare to Work reforms fail to deliver equality for people with a 
PCW as a result of governing through sameness.  
 
The Welfare to Work reforms thus expect people with a PCW to seamlessly 
fit into an institution which previously rendered them incapable. The economic 
participation outcomes placed on them through their mutual obligation contract are 
required without structural reform to the institution of work and its connection to 
ability. As Oliver argues “government policies, are by and large, targeted at 
equipping impaired individuals for the unchanging world of work rather than 
changing the way work is carried out in order that more people might access it” 
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(2009, p. 47), thereby continuing to deny access to employment for people with a 
PCW. People with a PCW then are being expected to participate in an institution 
which privileges and sustains the dominance of able-bodies and minds. This 
normalising process is obscured in governing through sameness. This indicates that it 
is unlikely that governing through sameness will achieve equality or access for 
people with a PCW if the ableist norms informing the institution of formal paid work 
are not deconstructed or challenged.  
 
Further, because governing through sameness regulates people with a PCW 
through ableist norms, the barriers to employment experienced by people with PCW 
are not considered (Parker Harris, Owen, & Gould, 2012). This is problematic given 
that employment is the objective of the mutual obligation contract. It assumes that 
everyone has an equal opportunity to work (N. Jones, Sheldon, Donaghey, 
Balanzategui, & Queensland Welfare Rights Centre, 2007). People with disability, 
however, experience structural barriers to employment, for example, inaccessible 
communities, transport and information, attitudinal barriers and discrimination, as 
well as extra costs with regard to participation for instance, uniform or clothing 
alterations (Galvin, 2004; Humpage, 2007a; Oliver, 1989; Soldatic & Chapman, 
2010). Owen, for example, states “removing notions of difference ignores the wider 
structural barriers that prevent people with disabilities from entering or re-entering 
the labor market … [and] does not account for the differing needs of people with 
disabilities” (2011, p. 218). Governing through sameness and the “deliberate 
‘misrecognition’ of labour market discrimination” (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010, p. 
142) fails to produce equality for people with a PCW. This is because the barriers  
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they experience with regard to employment fail to be, firstly, acknowledged, and 
secondly, challenged. This means that their socially and economically marginalised 
position in society is reproduced.  
 
Although it could be argued that the increase in part-time and casual 
employment has begun to deconstruct and challenge the ableist notions informing the 
institution of work and that the post-industrial labour market is more appropriate for 
people with disability (Grover & Piggott, 2010) the barriers experienced by people 
with a PCW in accessing employment are not all ameliorated through part-time or 
casual employment. Humpage (2007a), while seeing part-time work as an 
opportunity for people with disability, acknowledges this through suggesting that 
people with a PCW may still experience social, structural and attitudinal barriers to 
employment, despite the presence of part-time and casual work. The presence of 
part-time and casual employment also does not mean that the ableist notions of 
efficiency and productivity which permeate employment are eradicated and because 
these are perpetuated people with a PCW may be forced to take a position with lower 
pay and poor conditions based on assumptions of inefficiency (Humpage, 2007a). 
Moreover, Barnes and Mercer (2005), argue that attitudinal assumptions based on 
such notions of productivity and efficiency can disrupt the success of part-time 
employment for people with a PCW, particularly in situations of competition from an 
able-bodied individual. This sustains “the expectation … that workers who are sick 
and/ or who have impairments should conform to the work patterns of the well and 
able-bodied” (Grover & Piggott, 2010, p. 273) and could continue their 
marginalization. It also goes to show the links between ableism, employment, 
productivity and efficiency, and additionally highlights how governing through 
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sameness will not deliver equality for people with a PCW. This is because sameness 
silences and perpetuates “meritocratic notions that frame concerns with economic 
and social advancement, systematically disadvantag[…ing] people who are sick and/ 
or who have impairments” (Grover & Piggott, 2010, p. 274). It also fails to 
deconstruct the barriers to employment experienced by people with disability.  
 
In fact using the work of CDS scholars who discuss the social construction of 
the body and impairment it can be argued that understandings of effectiveness and 
productivity govern the body through an able-bodied norm and construct the 
impaired body as unproductive. CDS scholars argue that bodies and impairments are 
not biological; rather, they are given social and cultural meaning through 
interactions. As Meekosha explains:  
 
an individual’s impairment may be paramount or temporary and will always be 
part of an embodied identity; it will change as the individual engages with 
others in communities of sameness and communities of difference. At the same 
time a person’s impairment will be influenced, read and constructed by various 
cultural, social, economic and political determinants as well as by their own 
experiences (Meekosha, 1998, p. 166).  
 
Work then socially constructs bodies into either abled or impaired and assigns people 
with impairments to an inferior status. In this case this disempowers people with a 
PCW and does not enable the inclusion of people with a PCW into paid employment 





Relative to discussions of efficiency and productivity Wendell, when 
explaining what she terms “the social construction of disability” (1996, p. 35), uses 
as an example “the pace of life” (1996, p. 37). She suggests that:  
 
[w]hen the pace of life in a society increases, there is a tendency for more 
people to become disabled, … because fewer people can meet expectations of 
‘normal’ performance; the physical (and mental) limitations of those who 
cannot meet the new pace become conspicuous and disabling, even though the 
same limitations were inconspicuous and irrelevant to full participation in the 
slower-paced society (Wendell, 1996, p. 37).  
 
Thus similar “to the pace of life” (Wendell, 1996, p. 37), notions of productivity and 
efficiency, which are constructed through an able-bodied norm, construct the 
impaired body as unproductive and inefficient. The role of the norm in constructing 
which bodies are assumed to be efficient and productive and thus inefficient and 
unproductive is continued in governing through sameness which governs people with 
a PCW through an able-bodied norm. This erases the scope to examine the norm 
underpinning how bodies and impairments are socially constructed and given social 
meaning, and how idealised views on how bodies should function are enforced 
through the structure of formal paid employment.  
 
Legislatively, though the Welfare to Work Act does put some protections in 
place with regard to employment for people with a PCW. For example, they are able 
to access DES, unlike the general NSA population who engage with Job Services 
Australia (JSA). This indicates some remnants of governing people with a PCW 
through difference as well as the very limited protection of the PCW category within 
NSA which requires people with a PCW to seek work “to their capacity” (DSS, 
2014b, p. n.p.), rather than full time employment, and provides them with access to 
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“the Pensioner Concession Card … [a] Pharmaceutical Allowance[,] a higher rate of 
Mobility Allowance” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 220) and a Telephone Allowance 
(Cowling, 2005).  
 
DES “provid[…es] specialist help for people with disability, illness or injury 
to find and keep a job” (DHS, 2013a, p. n.p.) and is the “primary employment 
service for Newstart Allowance recipients with a partial capacity to work” (DEEWR, 
et.al., 2012, p. 82). DES does achieve some employment outcomes for people with a 
PCW (See for example, DEEWR, et al., 2012, pp. 82-83). However, DES has been 
described as inadequate for finding long term, meaningful employment for people 
with disability (Taleporos, 2014) and is criticised for “undermin[… ing] and 
dismiss[ing …] human potential” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 6). This is because while DES is 
represented as assisting people with disability to reach their potential and capacities 
through employment, then addressing economic and social exclusion and deprivation 
DES falls short (Soldatic, 2009). PWDA suggest that “DES focus on getting people 
with disability into jobs, not ensuring that those jobs are retained” (2013a, p. 2), 
instead proposing an individualised, person-centred approach to employment 
services for people with disability, which could provide funding to “a potential 
employer to make a workplace accessible or [for] buying suitable clothes for an 
interview” (2013a, p. 2). This can indicate that the problem spans more broadly than 
providing people with disability with a PCW with specialised employment services.  
 
Another protection in place to combat the barriers experienced by people with 
disability to employment is the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) (1992) (Cth). 
The DDA seeks to protect people with disability from discrimination in employment 
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(Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.). However, the DDA’s achievements 
are practically challenged through the continued existence of discrimination and 
attitudinal barriers to employment. For example, the Shut Out Report describes how:  
 
[u]nfortunately too few people with disabilities are able to access meaningful 
employment. Negative attitudes and misconceptions about disability means 
few employers – whether government, non-government or corporate – appear 
willing to employ anyone with a disability … [with] cases … [of] clear 
discrimination, … [against] qualified candidates reportedly sidelined solely 
because of their disability (National People with Disabilities and Carer 
Council, 2009, p. 5).  
 
Additionally, the DDA is widely criticised with the Report also suggesting that 
systematic discrimination still exists because of the lack of redress, inconsistent 
“policies across jurisdictions” and inefficient “monitoring and enforcement of 
standards” (National People with Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009, p. 16). It also 
argued that, problematically, redress under the DDA is costly and lengthy (National 
People with Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009). In a review of the DDA by the 
Productivity Commission in 2004 it was found that the DDA was “relatively 
ineffective in reducing discrimination in employment” (Productivity Commission, 
2004, p. 83). Additionally, Dowse, Frohmader and Meekosha (2010) criticise the 
amount of time that it has taken to put standards in place for accessibility to, for 
example, transport, education and public buildings, with many areas still lagging, 
impacting on persons with disabilities access to employment. Finally, aspects of the 
DDA have been criticised for being based in a formal equality framework, in 
particular the requirement of reasonable adjustment which is the specification that 
businesses and service systems must make adjustments in order to include people 
with disability (Bigby, 2014). These adjustments only have to be made “‘as far as 
possible’ and [so as] not ‘[to] cause unreasonable hardship’” (Bigby, 2014, p. 310). 
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Bigby, however, suggests that by basing reasonable adjustments in a formal equality 
paradigm it “relies on normative comparisons between people with and without 
disability … [and] French (2013) argues that the aim is only to ensure a person with 
disability is treated the same as others would be in similar circumstances, which in 
effect disregards their disability” (2014, p. 310) (see also, Dowse et al., 2010, pp. 
263-264; Goggin & Newell, 2005, pp. 38-39; M. Jones & Basser Marks, 1998; 
Meekosha & Dowse, 1997, pp. 63-64, 66; Soldatic, 2009, p. 30). These criticisms 
indicate some of the problems with the DDA for redressing the discrimination, 
structural and attitudinal barriers to employment experienced by people with a PCW.  
 
In response to the Shut Out Report, which undertook an extensive consultation 
process, the National Disability Strategy was formulated (DSS, 2013b). The National 
Disability Strategy is also a mechanism which could redress the barriers to 
employment for people with disability.  
 
The Strategy is a ten year national policy framework that sets out six priority 
areas for action to improve the lives of people with disability, their families and 
carers. These are inclusive and accessible communities; rights protection, 
justice and legislation; economic security; personal and community support; 
learning and skills; and health and wellbeing (DSS, 2013b, p. n.p.).  
 
However, there are concerns with the National Disability Strategy which could 
inhibit its capacity to impact on the barriers to employment experienced by people 
with disability. In particular, PWDA argue that the National Disability Strategy is:  
 
under resourced and lacks leverage and specificity. It requires greater 
resourcing, a public reporting mechanism, and transparent accountability 
measures within State and Territory agreements to ensure strategy outcomes 
are achieved at both the State and Federal level (PWDA, 2013b, p. 1).  
159 
 
Addressing these broader barriers to employment however, would require a 
shift away from the neoliberal focus on the individual as the barrier to employment 
which constructs “those marginalised from the market economy [… as] ‘social 
problems’ external to the system” (Walter, 2007, p. 162) who require reformation. 
Instead focus needs to be on the effects of social categorisation which is obscured as 
a result of governing through sameness in this context, the structure of employment 
and the barriers to employment experienced by people with disability which remain 
unaddressed. “The failure to address these issues appears to stem from the perception 
that the barriers faced by [… people with disability] in finding work are simple, 
singular and located within the individual, rather than complex and multilayered” 
(Humpage, 2007a, p. 223) and this is reflected in the mechanisms of governance 
imposed on people with a PCW. The existence of barriers beyond the individual is 
perhaps no more clearly indicated than through the OECD rates for disability and 
employment participation where Australia ranked 21st out of 29 OECD countries 
(OECD, 2010). However, while similar figures were used in part to justify the 
Welfare to Work changes, highlighting the high incidence of disability 
unemployment (Lantz & Marston, 2012), this is a figure widely used by the 
Australian disability movement in a context to indicate broader problems with the 
employment system for people with disability (See for example, PWDA, 2013a; 
Taleporos, 2014). Additionally, the reforms did not substantially move people with a 
PCW off welfare and into work. “Fewer than one in five of those diverted to 
Newstart in 2006-07 obtained employment and left income support during that year. 
The rest, for the most part, remained on Newstart” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Senate, June 16, 2011, p. 3148). There is also evidence that some people with a PCW 
eventually receive the DSP. For example, 11, 933 people assessed with a PCW as at 
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July 1, 2007 were on the DSP in June 2012 (DEEWR, et.al., 2012). Additionally, 
further reforms by the Gillard government to the DSP eligibility criteria have not 
produced increased employment outcomes for persons with disabilities. Labour force 
statistics by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that there has been no 
improvement in the rates of employment participation for persons with disabilities 
since 2009 (Siewert, 2013). Australian Greens Senator, Rachel Siewert, suggests that 
““[t]he new harsh approach forcing people to live on Newstart before applying for 
the Disability Support Pension hasn’t resulted in more people with disability finding 
work [… rather] more people are condemned to the poverty that comes with 
Newstart”” (2013, p. n.p.). 
 
Further evidence of problems with the system are indicated through JSA 
employment placements for people with a PCW and duration of people with a PCW 
on payment which are invisibilised in the “likes should be treated alike” (Bacchi, 
2009, p. 181) principle, discussed earlier, underpinning the shift of people with a 
PCW onto NSA and governing them through sameness. For example:  
 
while the evidence identifies at the aggregate level JSA is performing well, 
there are potential areas where there may exist scope for improvement. Only 
three per cent of the job placements achieved for Newstart Allowance job 
seekers since the start of JSA have been achieved for job seekers with a partial 
work capacity (DEEWR et al., 2012, p. 72).  
 
[Additionally, t]here is a strong correlation between partial capacity to work 
and long-term duration on payment. Average duration on payment for people 
with a partial capacity to work at the end of June 2012 was 257.7 weeks on 
payment or slightly less than five years, compared to 179.8 weeks for the 




The poor assistance provided by JSA and the extensive duration on payment for 
people with a PCW indicates how the barriers to employment for people with a PCW 
are broader than the individual and how the able-body is the standard through which 
people with a PCW are measured. Equality then fails to be achieved for people with 
a PCW as a consequence of people with a PCW not being ‘the same’ as the able-
bodied norm regulating NSA recipients, despite being governed as such. It is clear 
then through the poor meaningful employment outcomes for people with a PCW 
through DES and JSA and the continued existence of barriers to employment for 
people with a PCW that  
 
welfare reform intends to remove only the protective classification of 
“disability” in an attempt to make disabled people, as a welfare category, 
disappear, without doing much, if anything to remedy the actual conditions of 
exclusion this term represents (Galvin, 2004, p. 345).  
 
This indicates large problems with the employment expectations placed on people 
with a PCW as a result of Welfare to Work.  
 
In spite of broader barriers to employment evidenced above, the Welfare to 
Work reforms sought to encourage behavioural change in NSA recipients with a PCW 
in relation to employment and income support receivership, seeking to “… foster 
‘independence, choice and self-reliance’” (Stephen Parker & Fopp, 2004, p. 24). This 
emphasis on behavioural change individualises the ‘problem’ of unemployment 
implying that it is the recipient who needs to change and not the broader labour 
market and society. These terms and objectives of the welfare reforms are largely 
defined through ableism, making it difficult for people with disability with a PCW to 
conform to the behavioural expectations because they are socially constructed on 
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able-bodies. For example, “independence is associated with paid labour” (Bacchi, 
2009, p. 64) and ““self-reliance” [refers to] the capacity to do things without help” 
(Galvin, 2004, p. 346). This is unrealistic for some people with disability, 
particularly in a society which constructs and formulates their dependence on the 
welfare state, as discussed in Chapter Two, and renders their impairments and bodies 
as incapable. It also ignores the deception of able-bodied notions of independence 
(Wendell, 1996) and “the reality that we are all dependent on one another and on a 
variety of existing structures for access to resources and meaningful lives” (Galvin, 
2004, p. 346). The disability movement has, however, attempted to redefine 
independence by challenging its ableist connection to the labour market and 
definitions which suggest that independence is doing things for yourself. In effect, it 
argues “‘that independent people have control over their lives, not that they perform 
every task themselves’” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 139). This is underpinned by 
principles of self-determination and autonomy. This demonstrates how the terms of 
the welfare state are premised on the able-body which is obscured in regulating 
people with a PCW through sameness. This then fails to deliver equality to people 
with a PCW.  
 
Sameness and the Mutual Obligation Contract  
Problems with governing through sameness for people with a PCW can also 
be seen in the mutual obligation contract. The mutual obligation contract places 
reporting requirements as well as obligations on NSA recipients and manages and 
regulates NSA recipients through penalties and directives. Humpage (2007a), in 
particular, problematises the reporting requirements of NSA receivership, which 
requires NSA recipients to report their employment earnings per fortnight. This 
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requirement and the rules surrounding the reporting, fail to consider people with 
disability indicating how governing through sameness and removing disability as a 
social category does not produce equality for people with a PCW. This is because 
“[f]or those with cognitive difficulties or poor memory [for example,]… it is easy to 
forget to call and report paid work on the correct day every fortnight, even when it is 
understood that this is what the system requires” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 225). Failing 
to regularly report is an “activity test breach”, specifically, “[c]ommon examples of 
activity test breaches are when a job seeker: refuses to declare, or fails to correctly 
declare earnings from employment” (Daniels & Yeend, 2005, p. 38). This indicates 
how the system and this aspect of the mutual obligation contract upholds the able-
bodied ideal and regulates people with a PCW through such an ideal failing to 
acknowledge the impairment barriers experienced by people with “cognitive 
difficulties or poor memory” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 225), for example, from meeting 
their activity requirements. This highlights how governing through sameness 
systematically disadvantages people with a PCW. This is because it requires them to 
aspire to the able-body by controlling and managing their impairments in order to 
meet their contractual obligations and disciplines them for failing to meet such 
requirements. 
 
Concerns have also been raised with regard to the mutual obligation contract 
for people with mental health impairments, with arguments that it could negatively 
affect them (Humpage, 2007a). This is because the regime of “surveillance and 
coercion” (Humpage, 2007a, p. 225) placed on people with a PCW, through the 
mutual obligation contract in the Welfare to Work reforms, puts an increased amount 
of stress on those regulated. For example, requiring people with mental health 
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impairments to search for employment contacts per fortnight as a person with a 
PCW, places increased pressure on someone whose impairment may be exacerbated 
by stress. By failing to consider this as a result of governing through sameness the 
reforms fail to deliver equality for people with a PCW and acknowledge the 
embodied experience of impairment on people with a PCW meeting their 
participation requirements, thus governing people with a PCW through an able-
bodied norm.  
 
Additionally, of concern to disability advocacy organisations is the inability of 
Centrelink’s assessment to adequately assess people with disability. An inadequate 
assessment could position someone on NSA who may struggle with meeting their 
participation requirements as a result of various social and impairment barriers which 
are not recognised on NSA in governing through an able-bodied norm and could also 
result in a payment suspension. For example:  
 
[b]y nature, mental illness is not easily detected, making it easy for those 
suffering undiagnosed mental health disorders to be wrongly classified as 
“work-ready”, and therefore not entitled to the DSP. An example is highlighted 
in the case of one young homeless male, where it was reported that in 
interviews he presented well and could “keep it together” for short periods, but 
who generally suffered “disorganised thinking, extreme mood swings and 
paranoid thoughts”. This client suffered a participation failure for failing to 
attend Centrelink-organised job interviews and harassing Centrelink staff. 
Centrelink’s capacity to recognise mental illness is severely limited by the 
ability of the client to self-identify as having a mental illness (N. Jones et al., 
2007, p. 13).  
 
While it must be acknowledged that the income support system perpetuates a 
medical model in its ‘diagnosis’ of eligibility for the DSP, relying on self-
identification is problematic, based on the stigma and discrimination attached to 
identifying with a mental illness in broader society (Mental Health Council of 
165 
 
Australia, 2014). Additionally, from a medical perspective, this assumes that the 
individual has knowingly been diagnosed with a mental illness. The importance of 
having the right mechanisms in place to assess persons with disabilities’ eligibility 
for income support which considers both impairment and disability is crucial to 
ensuring adequate support for people with a PCW. Additionally, considering the 
voices of people with a PCW in such an assessment of capacity as experts in their 
impairment and capacities, as well as their embodied experience, would also be 
beneficial, as currently the knowledge of specified medical professionals certify and 
assess impairment and capabilities (Humpage, 2007a). Instead inadequate 
assessments place people with a PCW onto a payment which regulates them and their 
bodies through an able-bodied norm as a result of governing through sameness.  
 
Breaching Penalties  
NSA breaching penalties are also problematic in their regulation of people with 
a PCW. Breaching penalties are used in the mutual obligation contract to manage and 
regulate activity test failures and participation failures (Employment and Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006). 
A breaching penalty occurs when a NSA recipient violates or breaks their mutual 
obligation contract with the Secretary or the Department. Contract requirements 
generally include an obligation to search for employment, to apply for jobs, to attend 
interviews, to accept reasonable job offers, to report any income received regularly 
and to appropriately conduct oneself so as not to jeopardise an employed position 
(Daniels & Yeend, 2005). The first or second time a recipient does not uphold one of 
these requirements and breaches their contract they are allowed to continue receiving 
payment if they comply with their original contract requirement or with an 
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alternative requirement made by the Secretary or the Department. In the case that a 
NSA recipient does not comply a third time within a twelve month period (Daniels & 
Yeend, 2005) then their payment is suspended for a period of eight weeks (Marston 
& McDonald, 2007). However, those with a “reasonable excuse for the failure” 
(Daniels & Yeend, 2005, p. 40) may not be penalised. This could be of benefit to 
people with a PCW who, as suggested, may face social and impairment barriers to 
fulfilling their participation requirements. In spite of this: 
 
the highly personal nature of most of the barriers experienced by vulnerable 
people [for example, mental illness and drug and alcohol dependency] is a 
factor in individuals being unlikely to disclose this information to Centrelink 
staff in order to avoid suspension by providing a “reasonable excuse” (N. Jones 
et al., 2007, p. 12).  
 
Cowling (2005) problematises the format of breaching penalties suggesting 
that they disadvantage people with a PCW, in particular people with mental illness, 
providing evidence of the able-bodied norm informing such penalties. Firstly, she 
raises concerns with the form of first and second breaches for people with mental 
illness arguing that the conditions of complying with an original requirement or an 
alternative one in order to quickly reengage with the system may be less likely “for 
persons experiencing an episode of acute ill health” (Cowling, 2005, p. 9). This 
indicates an impairment barrier which may be experienced by a person with PCW 
who has a mental illness in meeting their participation requirements, which fails to 






Failures, in particular the loss of income support for eight weeks should the 
individual’s actions cause unemployment, arguing that:  
 
the eight week non-payment period is of particular concern to people with 
mental illness who may be forced to stay in a ‘suitable job’ until they 
experience an acute episode or relapse, rather than risk benefit suspension by 
withdrawing from work when symptoms first appear. Non-payment also [she 
argues] increases the likelihood that individuals will be unable to afford 
medications or other treatment essential to the management of their illness 
(Cowling, 2005, p. 9). 
 
This indicates that these penalties are particularly problematic for people with a 
PCW because they were designed for the regulation of the able-bodied (Humpage, 
2007a) and do not consider the impairments of people with a PCW and the disabling 
social barriers they experience. This presents the dangers of governing through 
sameness where an individual with a PCW, essentially someone who experiences 
impairment and disabling social and structural barriers can lose payment for up to 
eight weeks as a result of a breaching system which uses the able-body as the norm, 
exacerbating their existing disadvantage and denying them access to much needed 
income support. This reveals how governing through sameness fails to produce 
equality for people with a PCW because it invisibilises difference and simultaneously 
disadvantages those whose bodies are different to “the neutral standard of the same” 
(W. Brown, 1995, p. 153), the able-body. This suggests that rather than governing 
through sameness (or difference) the sameness/ difference binary should be 
deconstructed and an approach to income support and service delivery which 
encompasses an “embodied ontology” (Shakespeare & Watson, 2002, p. 2) should be 
considered. This “would argue … that there is no qualitative difference between 
disabled people and non-disabled people because we are all impaired” (Shakespeare 
& Watson, 2002, p. 27) or, as Goggin and Newell (2005) contend, temporarily able-
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bodied. This is significant because it would recognise that we all require support, 
albeit at different levels, at different points in our lives and would provide scope to 
consider the embodied experience of all who engage with the income support system.  
 
Disability scholars, the disability movement and welfare rights organisations 
also raise concerns with the breaching criterion of the mutual obligation contract for 
people with disability (Humpage, 2007a) because it measures the conduct of people 
with a PCW through the expectations of the mutual obligation contract which 
sustains an able-bodied norm. Marston and McDonald (2005) describe breaching 
penalties as an expression of coercive authority which suggest through the 
individualised regulation of problematic recipients who breach their obligations that 
the problem is innately part of the NSA recipient’s character and choices. This then 
ignores evidence indicating that disadvantaged groups are more heavily impacted by 
breaching penalties as a result of their structurally disadvantaged position, 
emphasising the lack of recognition of human diversity in recipients of NSA. For 
example, “Indigenous people are heavily over-represented amongst those penalised 
by loss of benefits for not fulfilling their ‘mutual obligations’” (Walter, 2007, p. 
163). However, “factors influencing these higher rates” (Marston & McDonald, 
2007, p. 238) do not reflect a problem in the individual; rather, for Indigenous people 
the impact of “historical, structural and situational factors in relation to Indigenous 
disadvantage such as racism, dispossession, … institutionalisation and child-removal 
policies” (Billings, 2010b, p. 167) which are overlooked as a result of governing 
through individualisation in sameness. Similarly, in governing through sameness, 
Welfare to Work displaces the effects of institutionalisation on people with disability, 
their exclusion from education and employment and their disadvantaged position 
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reproduced through structural and systemic barriers. Goggin and Newell (2005), for 
example, discuss the institutionalisation of people with disability and how people 
with disability were oppressed, excluded and assumed to be biologically inferior 
through institutionalisation. They describe circumstances of “rape, violence, urine-
soaked days, physical and chemical restraint, physical, emotional and spiritual 
abuse” (Goggin & Newell, 2005, p. 122) occurring in institutions and they touch on 
the legacy of institutionalisation for those institutionalised. For example, Doug 
Pentland, a Victorian with an intellectual impairment (Goggin & Newell, 2005) who 
spent more than 20 years in different institutions after being institutionalised at five, 
received limited education as a child (Goggin & Newell, 2005; Gooch, 2005). 
Similarly, Crossley in an excerpt from a Ramp Up article describes how children in 
St Nicholas Hospital Melbourne, “lay on the floor, with no therapy or education, no 
personal possessions, no toys and no affection. None could talk. They saw things no 
child should see. Nobody seemed to care” (Crossley, McKay, & Biklen, 2012, p. 
n.p.). Upon deinstitutionalisation, people with disability were no longer shut inside 
institutions; they were, however, shut out of society. This was highlighted by the 
Shut Out Report which argues that while most institutions have now closed, people 
with disability remain excluded from social and economic participation (National 
People with Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009). Governing through sameness and 
ableism thus ignores how experiences of institutionalisation and exclusion from 
education and society impact on the ability of people with a PCW to meet their 





In fact governing through sameness displaces the impact of social 
categorisation on socially categorised groups, like people with a PCW, rendering 
categorisation separate and private. This component of governing through sameness 
reduces equality “to race, … ethnic [and disability] blind sameness” (Walter, 2007, 
p. 166), “wip[…ing] the slate clean” (Walter, 2007, p. 164) of historical and existing 
disadvantage experienced by people with a PCW as people with disability. This then 
through the individualisation of the ‘problem’ of unemployment holds them 
responsible for their disadvantaged position and renders the effect of categorisation 
as “not a concern of the state” (Walter, 2007, p. 166) despite having a role in 
constructing social categories and classifying and managing bodies. Speaking with 
regard to Indigenous Australians, Walter (2007) states: 
 
where inequalities are present … the individual behaviours, attitudes and 
values of the disadvantaged [are looked at] for explanation. This ideology sits 
at odds with the overwhelming and long-term evidence of Aboriginality as a 
catalyst for the denial of rights in … Australia. As Glazer contends, if group 
membership is the key factor in reduced life chances, then attempts to allocate 
rights that are colour – or racial grouping blind cannot be adequate (Walter, 
2007, p. 166).  
 
Similarly, the individualisation of disability and impairment through sameness 
perpetuates and continues to deny access and rights to people with a PCW as people 
with disability because the effects of categorisation are rendered private. To ignore 
through sameness the social and cultural categorisation of the bodies and 
impairments of people with a PCW without acknowledging or destabilising the able-





By failing to consider difference, in governing through sameness, Welfare to 
Work ignores the possibility of increased payment breaches for people with a PCW 
as a result of obscuring existing structural disadvantage and impairments. This has 
been identified for other disadvantaged groups, including Indigenous Australians 
(See, Marston & McDonald, 2007; Sanders, 1999) and the unemployed (See, 
Henman, 2004) indicating more broadly the failure of the policy to consider human 
difference. For example, Marston and McDonald highlight how high breaching rates 
for Indigenous Australians do not consider:  
 
lower levels of literacy and higher rates of mobility among the Indigenous 
population; lack of confidence in dealing with bureaucracies; a lower 
propensity to seek appeal or review of breaching; inadequate postal services to 
some rural and remote areas; and lack of appreciation of the difficulties for 
indigenous people seeking employment (2007, p. 238).  
 
Similarly, Henman (2004), with regard to the unemployed, suggests:  
 
that most non-compliance results from the complexity of government policies 
and procedures and from the lack of user-friendly information about one’s 
obligations … For example, gross (not net) income must be reported when it is 
earned (not received). Poor information about requirements is particularly 
galling given that the unemployed are, on average, less educated (Henman, 
2004, p. 179).  
 
People with disability with a PCW could similarly have high rates of breaching 
because the obligations placed on them through the mutual obligation contract 
uphold the able-body as the normative standard and fail to acknowledge the 
structural disadvantage of people with disability, the impairment barriers they may 
experience and the embodied experience of people with PCW which are obscured in 
governing through sameness. In fact “[r]esearch conducted by ACOSS and the 
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National Welfare Rights Centre suggests that among those most affected [by 
breaching penalties] are people with mental illness, people with acquired brain 
injuries, and people with drug and alcohol related problems” (Abello & Chalmers, 
2002, p. 3). This could be because these factors make it difficult for them to find and 
maintain employment (Eardley, 2006). Although this research is prior to the Welfare 
to Work changes, it can indicate that the problem with the Welfare to Work reforms 
in governing through an ideal may not be limited to people with a PCW or indeed the 
Welfare to Work reforms; rather, with the unemployment benefit in general. This 
conclusion can be supported by Eardley (2006) in research conducted by himself and 
the Social Policy Research Centre into the impact of breaching penalties on income 
support recipients for the Department of Family and Community Services in 2002, 
which found that breaching penalties disproportionately affect those who are already 
financially disadvantaged. Additionally, Butterworth highlighted how mental illness 
was more predominant in the unemployed with  
 
almost one in three income support recipients (more than 30 per cent) hav[… 
ing] a diagnosable mental disorder … [which] is 66 per cent more than the 
prevalence of mental disorders among Australians adults not receiving income 
support (2003, p. viii).  
 
According to Butterworth (2003), this impacts on the achievement of their social and 
economic goals.  
 
However, with regard to the assumption of high breaching rates for people with 
a PCW more specifically, this can be supported by Jones, Sheldon, Dongahey and 
Balanzategui in conjunction with the Queensland Welfare Rights Centre (2007) in 
their report ‘Welfare to Work Reforms and the Breaching Cycle’. Jones, et.al. (2007) 
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identify homelessness, drug and alcohol dependence and mental health issues as 
barriers to complying with activity test requirements. They label these individuals as 
‘vulnerable’ and suggest that these barriers often occur simultaneously (N. Jones et 
al., 2007). Although they do not make a direct link with the PCW category, their 
discussion of the Welfare to Work reforms and breaching leads to the assumption of 
some connection (although again it could also indicate that the reforms pose 
problems for some members of the general NSA population also). Further, the 
assumption that some people with a PCW could be homeless, which means that they 
have no fixed address for Centrelink to send their correspondence to, indicates 
another barrier with which people with a PCW may have to contend with. This is an 
important consideration given that there is evidence of a connection between 
disability and homelessness. Research “funded under the Australian Government’s 
National Homelessness Research Agenda 2009-13” (Australian Government, 2012b, 
p. n.p.) identified that people with disability are at greater risk of homelessness than 
the broader population  (Beer et al., 2012), particularly persons with mental illness 
and intellectual impairments. This results from low incomes and poor engagement 
with the work force. Additionally, Beer et al., (2012) described how many homeless 
persons with disabilities have co-morbidities which impact on their risk of 
homelessness. The research also found that  
 
persons with moderate impairments were more likely to be at risk [of 
homelessness] as their disability was sufficient to affect their interactions 
within broader society [though] … no[t] to such an extent that they received a 
comprehensive package of assistance (Beer et al., 2012, p. 5),  
 
suggesting that they often fell through the cracks resulting in homelessness. Failing 
to receive correspondence from Centrelink as a result of homelessness may mean 
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that appointments are not kept, resulting in a participation failure. This can again 
provide evidence of the ableist underpinnings of the Welfare to Work reforms, which 
structurally disadvantage people with a PCW and others thus failing to produce 
equality.  
 
Additional evidence to support the argument that Welfare to Work governs 
through an ableist norm can be drawn from the example referred to earlier using 
Humpage, with regard to people with “cognitive difficulties or poor memory” 
(2007a, p. 225). People with ‘cognitive difficulties or poor memory’ jeopardise 
payment and risk being breached when they fail to report.  
 
All of these examples and evidence go to the heart of what Bacchi (2009) 
argues in a discussion highlighting the problems with the “likes should be treated 
alike” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 181) principle with regard to race. In this context she argues 
that, although there is hope that people are not judged based on their race, because 
they are by ignoring this through an equal treatment approach this harm remains 
unacknowledged. Therefore, with regard to people with a PCW according to the 
“likes should be treated alike” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 181) principle underpinning 
equality, disability or impairment should not matter. However, because people with 
disability are structurally and systemically disadvantaged as a result of their 
disability and impairment ignoring this for those categorised as with a PCW 
continues to disadvantage them. In fact, anybody who deviates from the norm who 
defines the “likes should be treated alike” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 181) principle is 
disadvantaged. This indicates how NSA fails to consider human diversity and thus 




This chapter has made clear that governing through sameness in the Welfare 
to Work reforms is problematic for people with a PCW, failing to deliver equality as 
a result of upholding the able-body as the “neutral standard of the same” (W. Brown, 
1995, p. 153) to which people with a PCW are measured. Additionally, it was argued 
in this chapter that governing people with a PCW through sameness fails to deliver 
access to resources and employment for people with a PCW. This is because 
sameness ignores the ‘differences’ of people with a PCW, individualising the 
responsibility for ‘differences’ to people with a PCW. It also assumes an equal 
landscape which fails to then acknowledge and challenge the structural and 
impairment barriers to employment and compliance with the income support system 
experienced by people with a PCW.  
 
This chapter, highlights how there has been a shift from governing people 
with a PCW through difference in the welfare state to instead governing them 
through sameness. Both difference and sameness are problematic for people with a 
PCW as the norm is the point of reference in both (Bacchi, 1990), defining and 
constructing sameness and difference. The norm’s role in this construction however, 
avoids interrogation, scrutiny and disruption, retaining its position of hegemony, 
universalisation and privilege. Specifically, difference is problematic because it 
objectifies and ‘others’ those who are constructed as ‘different’ to the norm and 
establishes a hierarchy between the norm and the ‘other’ (Lorber & Martin, 2005). 
For people with disability their assumed difference has often been used to justify 
their segregation, oppression, unfair and harmful treatment, particularly as the  
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medical profession has cast them as biologically ‘different’. Alternatively, the 
disability movement, through the social model, argues that people with disability are 
socially constructed as different.  
 
The ‘difference’ of persons with disabilities led to their protection in the 
income support system through, for example, the DSP. On the DSP, no requirements 
or obligations were placed on recipients. This acknowledged the ‘different’ needs of 
people with disability (Galvin, 2004) and constructed them as deserving of state 
support. However, in contrast, the disability movement suggested that the 
‘protection’ accorded to people with disability in the income support system also 
represented them as dependent, excluded them from social and economic 
participation and failed to acknowledge the social barriers experienced by people 
with disability to employment.  
 
Disability was re-categorised (Soldatic & Chapman, 2010) in the welfare 
state through the Welfare to Work Act 2006 and people assessed with a PCW became 
governed through sameness. Sameness ignores differences in favour of appealing to 
the sameness between subjects. People with a PCW, that is, those assessed as capable 
of working between 15 and 29 hours per week independent of a POS, lost the 
protection of the social category of disability; instead, they became regulated through 
ableism alongside the unemployed. 
 
Evidence of governing through ableism in sameness with regard to Welfare to 
Work was provided through a discussion of the economic participation objectives, 
the employment outcomes encouraged, the notions of independence underpinning the 
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legislation, the mutual obligation contract including the breaching penalties and the 
behavioural changes expected. While sameness appears to provide scope for 
equality, the chapter argued that sameness does not provide equality or access for 
people with a PCW.  
 
Particularly problematised was the connection between formal paid 
employment as a site of exclusion for people with disability and the denial of this in 
governing through sameness. It was also suggested that other forms of participation 
were ignored in the legislation as well as the role of the able-body in constructing the 
ideal worker-citizen. The fact that people with a PCW are expected, as part of their 
mutual obligation contract, to seek employment without structural change to the 
institution which previously excluded them was raised as concerning.  
 
Additionally concerning was how in governing through an able-bodied norm 
sameness failed to acknowledge the barriers to employment experienced by people 
with a PCW, again despite requiring people with a PCW to seek employment. This 
created the assumption that everyone has an equal opportunity to work (N. Jones et 
al., 2007) which this chapter suggested is not the case. This chapter also 
demonstrated how part-time or casual work was not necessarily a solution to the 
ableist norm nor more appropriate for people with disability without structural 
reform and a recognition of social barriers. However, the chapter did draw attention 
to attempts to address the social and structural barriers to employment for people 
with disability, through for example, DES, the DDA and the National Disability 
Strategy; although, these were argued to be inefficient and ineffective.  
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The chapter also suggested though that any attempt at addressing broader 
barriers required a shift away from the individual and evidence indicating that the 
‘problem’ is broader than the individual was provided through an OECD figure, JSA 
placement figures and figures which detailed the length of duration on payment for 
people with a PCW. However, it was conceded that despite the need to focus on the 
broader barriers, the reforms sought behavioural changes established on an able-
bodied norm and ignored evidence, such as high breaching rates, indicating that the 
problem was broader than the individual. 
 
It was argued that in governing through sameness the ‘differences’ of people 
with a PCW become individualised rendering the effects of social categorisation for 
people with disability, such as institutionalisation, discrimination and disadvantage 
separate and private. This also individualised responsibility for ‘difference’, 
impeding their access to resources and led to the perpetuation of their disadvantaged 
position. This is because through sameness there is a presumption of a state of equal 
affairs. As Bacchi suggests with regard to women and pregnancy, sameness leaves 
women “shouldering the responsibilities” (1990, p. 261) of their needs. Similarly in 
sameness people with a PCW are left “shouldering the responsibilities” (Bacchi, 
1990, p. 261) of their impairment needs and needs in a disabling society which 
structurally disadvantages them.  
 
As well as failing to acknowledge the social and structural barriers to 
employment experienced by people with a PCW it was argued that the mutual 
obligation contract requirements, specifically, the reporting requirements, did not 
consider in governing through sameness the impairment barriers experienced by 
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some people with a PCW. Also not considered was how surveillance and coercion in 
the mutual obligation contract could exacerbate the mental health impairments of 
some people with a PCW. Both these provide evidence for the argument that people 
with a PCW are governed through ableism and that the embodied experience of 
impairment is not acknowledged. Similarly, it was highlighted how the format of 
breaching penalties does not consider the difficulties of re-engagement for some 
persons with impairments nor the trouble with Newstart Participation Failures for 
people with mental illness.  
 
In parts, the chapter drew attention to the social construction of the body and 
impairment arguing that concepts of effectiveness and productivity were underpinned 
by an ableist norm constructing impaired bodies as unproductive and inefficient. It 
was suggested that people with a PCW are expected to control their bodies and move 
into paid employment as consistent with the ableist preference for bodies under 
control (Wendell, 1996). The social construction of disabled bodies and impairments 
through an able-bodied norm was ignored in governing through sameness.  
 
The chapter also suggested that as well as the measures being a problem for 
people with a PCW they were also problematic for other groups of income support 
recipients, including the unemployed and Indigenous Australians. This indicates that 
there is a lack of recognition of human difference and diversity in NSA.  
 
The continuation of governing people with a PCW through sameness in New 
Income Management further demonstrates how sameness does not deliver equality or 
access to people with a PCW, reproducing the socially and economically 
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disadvantaged position of people with a PCW. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter where there is also further emphasis on the need to move beyond sameness 




CHAPTER FIVE: INCOME MANAGEMENT AND CONTINUED SAMENESS  
Introduction  
 This chapter discusses how people with a PCW are constructed and governed 
in the New Income Management “long-term welfare payment recipients” measure 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3). Drawing on the importance of examining 
the intersection of policies in constructing and regulating subjects, this chapter, 
suggests that as a result of re-categorising people with disability as NSA recipients in 
Welfare to Work, there is scope for people with a PCW to be income managed 
alongside the broader NSA population at the intersection of Welfare to Work and the 
SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010. It will also 
become evident that there is scope for people with a PCW to be income managed 
because the criterion determining a long-term recipient is likely to reflect the 
situations of people with a PCW. The analysis in this chapter highlights how 
sameness continues in income management by regulating people with a PCW 
through an able-bodied norm, furthering their structural disadvantage. Sameness in 
Welfare to Work means that people with a PCW can be income managed as NSA 
recipients and sameness also continues to regulate people with a PCW in income 
management.  
 
However, in spite of a considerable amount of literature on the Welfare to 
Work reforms, there is a dearth of scholarship on the income management of people 
with a PCW, despite the capacity for the policies to intersect in their regulation of 
NSA recipients thus resulting in the income management of people with a PCW. This 
dearth of literature, it could be suggested, is because the DSP is currently not a 
payment where automatic income management applies and people with a PCW are 
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often overlooked as NSA recipients. As Senator Rachel Siewert explains, “[q]uite 
often we look at Newstart as one cohort; whereas, if you break it down, there are lots 
of cohorts” (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, October 24, 2012, p. 3). While 
DSP recipients could be income managed, it can only be applied following an 
assessment by a third party for example, a Centrelink social worker or the FRC. This 
is not the same as the automatic income management applied to people with a PCW 
as NSA recipients.  
 
Previously, however, in the SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007, the DSP for Indigenous 
people with disability was income managed in prescribed communities in the NT 
where income management applied under that Act. This though was reformed when 
the SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 was superseded by the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and 
Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010. To remove DSP recipients from being income 
managed indicates that income management was considered as an inappropriate 
mechanism to regulate people with disability. This is  evident through the Report on 
the NTER Redesign Consultations where respondents felt that if income management 
were to continue it “should not apply to certain groups such as disability pensioners” 
(Australian Government, 2009b, p. 25), “especially those who are able to budget 
their money the right way” (Australian Government, 2012a, p. 26). Buckmaster, 
et.al. suggest that income management does not target DSP recipients because they 
are “deemed to be less at risk” (2010, p. 19). This is further evidenced through the 
fact that following the suspension of the SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007 income 
management can only be applied to someone on the DSP following an assessment by 
a third party. This however, does not protect people with a PCW as NSA recipients 
who are governed through sameness and who as a result of the long-term payment 
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recipients measure of income management can be compulsorily and automatically 
income managed. This is a significant problem with governing through sameness for 
people with a PCW as they can be subscribed to income management as a result of 
the intersection of Welfare to Work and the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and 
Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010 and can continue to be governed through 
sameness in income management, sustaining their structurally disadvantaged 
position.  
 
This chapter will explore how people with a PCW continue to be governed 
through sameness in income management. It begins by discussing how the criterion 
determining long-term welfare payment recipients silences the able-bodied norm 
which informs the criterion and categorises long-term welfare payment recipients. 
This criterion is likely to capture people with a PCW because in governing through 
an able-bodied norm (sameness) it obscures the reality of people with a PCW, 
including the lengthy duration that people with a PCW are on income support 
payments. Secondly, it examines how the income management exemption criterion is 
inadequate for people with a PCW who may seek an exemption from income 
management because it perpetuates an able-bodied norm which people with a PCW 
have to aspire to, but which is obscured in governing through sameness. Thirdly, this 
chapter considers how the determination of priority needs by the SSOLA (Welfare 
Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010, to be met by income managed 
funds employs the able-body as the reference point to determine priority needs. This 
and governing through sameness individualises the ‘different’ needs of people with a 




Long-Term Welfare Payment Recipients and the Able-Bodied Norm 
The criterion of New Income Management is likely to automatically capture 
NSA recipients with a PCW. New Income Management targets ‘at risk’ people in 
‘vulnerable regions’ (Buckmaster et al., 2010) who become categorised as 
“disengaged youth” or “long-term welfare payment recipients” (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2009, p. 3). “The Long-Term Welfare Payment Recipient measure is 
directed at people [in the NT,] aged 25 and over who have been in receipt of income 
support and family assistance payments” (DSS, 2010, p. n.p.) for at least 52 of the 
last 104 weeks (SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010), 
this includes NSA recipients (Buckmaster et al., 2010). This criterion is likely to 
capture people with a PCW because the long-term payment recipients measure does 
not consider the disadvantaged position of people with a PCW who have difficulty 
accessing the labour market due to structural barriers as well as the dominance of 
ableism underpinning formal paid work which could impact on their duration on 
payment. Additionally, the criterion to determine recipients who are ‘at risk’ and 
therefore, considered long-term payment recipients ignores the barriers experienced 
by people with disability to education, the social isolation experienced by people 
with disability and the average length and median duration on payment for people 
with a PCW. 
 
The automatic income quarantining of long-term payment recipients has been 
extensively problematised. Particularly, problematised is the homogenous 
assumption that such recipients are incapable of managing their income support 
payment because “[m]any income support recipients are quite capable of managing 
(their) limited finances without outside help and intervention – despite falling into 
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the Government’s ‘at risk’ categories” (Buckmaster et al., 2010, p. 31). For people 
with a PCW they are likely to fall within the targeted ‘at risk’ categories because of 
their exclusion and disadvantaged position in society based on the dominance of 
ableism. “By ‘at risk’, the Government means those people who are susceptible to 
social isolation and disengagement, possess few or poor financial literacy skills and/ 
or participate in risky behaviours” (Buckmaster et al., 2010, p. 17). It is clear through 
this criterion that ableism is the norm through which the conduct of people with a 
PCW is assessed; however, this is silenced in governing through sameness. This 
obscures the reality of people with disability who have poor education outcomes and 
are restricted through multiple barriers from being socially engaged, including the 
rate of NSA payment.  
 
The Shut Out Report describes how educational opportunities for people with 
disability, their independence and further achievement are impeded by a lack of 
resources, funding, teacher training, knowledge and understanding, poor quality 
education, poor support for inclusion and inadequate preparation for post-school 
transition in the education system (National People with Disabilities and Carer 
Council, 2009). Some of the submissions to the Shut Out Report consultations 
suggest that the education system does not meet the individual needs of people with 
disability, in particular their learning needs, disadvantaging them. Additionally, the 
education system was described to have systemic problems for people with disability 
(National People with Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009). With regard to social 
engagement, the Report detailed how people with disability are often isolated, 
experiencing both social and attitudinal barriers to participation in the community. 
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This was suggested to impact on identity and self-esteem (National People with 
Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009). Similarly, Meekosha and Dowse state how  
 
[i]ndividuals born with disabilities, particularly developmental disabilities, 
have usually had very limited access to any form of effective participation 
within civil society and are regarded as having little/ no role in any of the 
public, private, domestic or familial spheres (1997, p. 52). 
 
Some “… people with disabilities liv[…e] in relative isolation” (Meekosha & 
Dowse, 1997, p. 53). Supporting this, a recent report by The Salvation Army 
highlighted that NSA recipients with disability and/ or illness “are more socially 
isolated tha[…n] either of the other two groups [that is, NSA and DSP recipients who 
access The Salvation Army emergency relief services and responded to the survey]” 
(The Salvation Army, 2014, p. 25). While the Report does not specify whether those 
respondents on NSA with disability and/or illness are those categorised with a PCW 
by Centrelink, the Report does make reference to continued changes to DSP 
eligibility in this section. This failure to explicitly mention people with a PCW 
supports suggestions that the problem with NSA is broader than people with a PCW 
discussed in the previous chapter. The reforms then fail to deconstruct the dominance 
of ableism as a result of governing through sameness and instead perpetuate it, 
reproducing the ‘risks’ which lead to the categorisation of people with a PCW as ‘at 
risk’ and thus requiring income management.  
 
In fact the criterion that designates a long-term payment recipient does not 
consider the average length and median duration on payment for people with a PCW 
and the overrepresentation of people with disability considered to be long-term 
unemployed (Fowkes, 2011). This suggests that an able-bodied norm informs 
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compulsory income management for long-term payment recipients in the NT. People 
with a PCW receive welfare payments for an average of five years as opposed to 
approximately three and a half years for the general NSA population (DEEWR et al., 
2012). The “median duration for Newstart Allowance recipients with a partial 
capacity to work [on payment was] … 151 weeks compared to 88 weeks for the 
general Newstart Allowance population” (DEEWR et al., 2012, p. 81). While the 
long-term payment recipients criteria could capture both groups of NSA recipients, 
the prolonged duration for people with a PCW and their fit with the ‘at risk’ criteria 
means that it is more likely that people with a PCW would be automatically income 
managed. The long-term payment recipients category then uses an able-bodied norm 
to measure adequate duration on payment, ignoring the barriers experienced by 
people with a PCW in accessing employment and the difficulties with moving off 
welfare and into work for this group. It also fails to recognise the implications of 
impairment for people with a PCW and similar to discussions of breaching penalties 
in Chapter Four the embodied experience of living with an episodic impairment or 
mental illness. This indicates how income management governs bodies through an 
able-bodied norm, encouraging people with a PCW to condition their bodies and 
comply with norms about the expected duration on welfare payments. In a 
submission to a Senate Inquiry into the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement 
of the RDA) Act 2010 ACOSS suggested that: 
 
[m]ost long term unemployed people lack work for reasons such as disability 
or age discrimination … A 2006 Job Network Services Survey of highly 
disadvantaged long-term unemployed recipients found that the most common 
barriers to employment reported were age, poor health or disability … 




This can suggest that the problematisation of “long-term welfare payment recipients” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) governs through an ableist norm that does 
not consider the reasons for extensive duration on payment for people with a PCW 
and the general NSA population as a result of governing through sameness. This fails 
to produce equal outcomes for people with a PCW.  
 
Further, the criticisms of DES discussed in Chapter Four highlights concerns 
with DES delivering meaningful employment for people with disability (PWDA, 
2013a). It is then concerning that people with a PCW could be income managed if 
they have been receiving NSA for at least 52 of the last 104 weeks given the poor 
employment retention outcomes of the employment services meant to move people 
with a PCW off welfare and into work. This again indicates that the ‘different’ 
experience of people with a PCW fails to be accommodated as a result of governing 
through sameness, thus falling short of delivering equality.  
 
Sameness and Time  
Additionally, the time frame attached to automatic subscription to income 
management under the long-term payment recipients measure could create anxiety, 
particularly for people with psychosocial disabilities or mental illness, (who are 
anecdotally, reported to make up the majority of the PCW category) exacerbating 
their impairment. Governing through sameness then fails to produce equality for 
people with a PCW because people with disability are expected to live up to the able-
bodied ideal and the reforms could have a detrimental effect on their impairment. 
This problematic timeframe for people with a PCW becomes particularly evident 
through Soldatic’s (2013) discussion of the Welfare to Work reforms and how the 
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Appointment time becomes a mechanism which regulates welfare recipients as 
discussed in Chapter Two. This becomes useful for considering the timeframe which 
triggers income management as a long-term welfare recipient. Soldatic (2013) 
identifies the Appointment as part of a disciplining technique; similarly, the income 
management time trigger acts as a disciplining technique to encourage employment 
and punish those who do not comply. With consideration of disability and the 
Appointment, Soldatic asks  
 
what if the individuals involved in the Appointment do not actually ‘set’ the 
Appointment? And what happens when our bodily temporal patterns are unable 
to be synchronized with the multiplicity of rhythmic temporal patterns of 
everyday life with this forced appointment time? (Soldatic, 2013, p. 411).  
 
The income management trigger for people with a PCW who have been in 
receivership of NSA for at least 52 of the previous 104 weeks is a deadline, similar to 
the Appointment, which has not been set by them. Also, similarly, particularly for 
people with episodic conditions, the capacity to synchronize bodily patterns on top of 
the barriers to employment and the activity test requirements, part of the mutual 
obligation requirements of Welfare to Work, in order to locate (and maintain) 
employment could be challenging. This can suggest that people are able “to control 
and synchronize the competing set of temporalities managed in everyday life” 
(Soldatic, 2013, p. 411) and that a failure to do this is a problem of the individual 
who has deliberately chosen to remain on income support. In reference to the 
Appointment, Soldatic states “[d]isabled people are highly cognizant of the 
disciplining role of the Appointment … and its implications of having to make their 
bodies mobile to move through a multiplicity of workfare spaces and places” (2013, 
p. 412). The deadline of NSA receivership as triggering income management in the 
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NT indicates that welfare receivership is time limited. However, the effects of 
placing a time limit on people with a PCW, such as increased anxiety and unrealistic 
expectations based on social and impairment barriers, is ignored as a result of 
governing through sameness. This overlooks the cost and labour involved in 
attempting to perform in accordance with the able-bodied norm for persons with 
disabilities. In fact, the Australian Law Reform Commission which was 
commissioned by the Attorney General to “inquire and report on the treatment of 
family violence in Commonwealth laws [like income management]” (2011, p. 2) 
highlighted how income management is criticised for failing to consider the impact 
of “the prescriptive and punitive approach … [of income management on] people 
with a disability or mental health problems” (2011, p. 40). This indicates, as does the 
discussion above on the Appointment time, how income management as a result of 
continuing the sameness attached to people with a PCW through the Welfare to Work 
reforms employs the able-body as the ideal to which people with a PCW and their 
impairments are measured, thus denying people with a PCW equality.  
 
The Exemption Criteria  
Further evidence that the SSOLA (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of the 
RDA) Act 2010 upholds the able-body as the “neutral-standard of the same” (W. 
Brown, 1995, p. 153) impacting on the delivery of equality for people with a PCW is 
clear through the criteria which allows exemption from income management for 
those automatically income managed under the long-term welfare recipients 
measure. Long-term payment recipients can be exempted if they have “a history of 
engaging in work” (Buckmaster et al., 2010, p. 18). Chapter Four outlined the 
barriers to employment participation experienced by people with disability as well as 
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the exclusion of people with disability from work since industrialisation (Galvin, 
2004), making it unlikely that some people with a PCW will have an employment 
history to draw on. Governing through sameness obscures the ableist norm 
underpinning the exemption criteria of “long-term welfare payment recipients” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3) income management, failing then to 
produce equality for people with a PCW.  
 
Additionally, with regard to exemption from income management, the onus is 
on the individual to seek exemption placing the “burden of proof … on those 
[income managed] recipients to demonstrate that they are socially responsible” 
(Buckmaster et al., 2010, p. 17), demonstrable through prior work history, enrolment 
in study, engagement in paid work or evidence of responsible parenting (Buckmaster 
et al., 2010). This does not consider the circumstances of people with a PCW who 
face structural and impairment barriers to employment and education, and additional 
costs to employment and education (Salthouse, 2005) which are not adequately met 
by NSA. This again indicates how the conduct of people with a PCW is regulated 
through an ableist norm which is concealed through sameness, continuing the 










Sameness and Priority Needs  
Another area in which the continuation of governing through sameness in 
income management upholds the able-body as the standard to which people with a 
PCW have to live up to is in the determination of priority needs. Priority needs are 
defined in the Act as:  
 
food; non-alcoholic beverages; clothing; footwear; basic personal hygiene 
items; basic household items; housing, including rent; home loan payments; 
repairs and maintenance; household utilities; rates and land tax; health; child 
care and development; education and training; items required for the purpose 
of the person’s employment; funerals; public transport services; and the 
acquisition, repair, maintenance or operation of: a motor vehicle; or a motor 
cycle; or a bicycle (SSOLA (WPR) Act 2007, pp. 25-27).  
 
However, governing through sameness obscures and individualises the ‘different’ 
needs of people with a PCW which stem from impairment and social and structural 
barriers, thus failing to deliver equality and access. This also provides evidence that 
it is the able-body which is the yardstick for the determination of what priority needs 
are considered as such. For people with a PCW their needs as persons with 
impairments and disabilities were previously acknowledged through their DSP 
receivership (Galvin, 2004). The fact that there is inadequate acknowledgement of 
these under NSA receivership (Humpage, 2007a; NWRN, 2013) and income 
management suggests that ableism informs the regulation of people with a PCW 
through income management. Despite  
 
it … [for example, being] widely acknowledged that disabled people ‘face 
extra non-discretionary costs associated with their disability such as specialised 
aids and equipment for mobility or communication, additional transport and 





By leaving this out it denies their access to resources, highlights the able-body 
underpinning income management and establishes an assumption that “needs … 
[are] simply given and [left] unproblematic” (Fraser, 1989, p. 294). This silences and 
ignores the interpretive dimension of need determination and delivery which is 
discussed by Fraser who argues that focusing on whether or not priority needs will be 
provided for ignores and makes unproblematic “who interprets the needs in question 
and from what perspective and in light of what interests” (1989, p. 294). Governing 
through sameness fails to deliver equality for people with a PCW with regard to the 
determination of priority needs because the able-body is the reference point with 
regard to need determination, thus obscuring and individualising the needs of people 
with a PCW. It is clear then that by continuing to govern people with a PCW through 
sameness in income management as in Welfare to Work that the disadvantaged 
position of people with a PCW is reproduced, as they become implicitly income 
managed and as a consequence regulated through an ableist norm which denies them 
equality and access.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter suggested that as a result of being governed through sameness in 
Welfare to Work and the reclassification of people with disability as NSA recipients 
through Welfare to Work, people with a PCW in the NT could be income managed. 
Sameness was argued to continue as a mechanism governing people with a PCW in 
income management through the criteria determining “long-term welfare payment 
recipients” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 3). This chapter also proposed that 
sameness continues to govern people with a PCW in income management 
perpetuating their structurally disadvantaged position. This was because the income 
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management criteria does not consider the disadvantaged position of people with a 
PCW, the difficulties they experience in accessing the labour market, and the ‘at risk’ 
criterion does not regard the poor education outcomes of people with disability based 
on social and structural barriers, their social isolation and their average and median  
duration on NSA. This provided evidence for the suggestion that people with a PCW 
continued to be governed through ableism in income management and thus 
sameness. 
 
Additionally, it was argued that the income management timeframe could 
create anxiety for people with a PCW exacerbating their impairments and that the 
deadline triggering income management is similar to Soldatic’s (2013) discussion of 
the Appointment. The deadline triggering income management was suggested to be 
based on an able-bodied norm because it failed to consider the structural barriers 
experienced by people with disability to accessing employment and expected people 
with a PCW to manage their bodies so that they could comply with demands for 
adequate duration on payment as informed by an able-bodied norm. 
 
This chapter also discussed the income management exemption criteria 
suggesting that it continues to govern people with a PCW through sameness and an 
able-bodied norm. This is because the criterion is unlikely to be met by people with a 
PCW based on barriers to employment and education, making it difficult for them to 





Similar to Welfare to Work, governing through sameness in the long-term 
payment recipients measure ignores the differences of people with a PCW from the 
norm individualising the responsibility of disability and impairment to the individual, 
denying them access to resources for their needs that are “associated with living with 
an impairment in a disabling society” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 155). In particular, it was 
suggested that the determination of priority needs is informed by an able-bodied 
norm which is obscured in governing through sameness and its regulation of people 
with a PCW. 
 
The continuation of governing people with a PCW through sameness from 
Welfare to Work is problematic because again governing through sameness fails to 
deliver equality and access for people with a PCW. Again, then, as in Welfare to 
Work, the normativity assigned to ableism through sameness means that the socially 
and economically disadvantaged position of people with a PCW is perpetuated, thus 
failing to deliver equality and continuing their structurally disadvantaged position.  
 
The following chapter, Chapter Six, will continue to demonstrate how people 
with a PCW lack equality and access in the welfare state. This chapter also highlights 




CHAPTER SIX: GOVERNING THROUGH DIFFERENCE:  
PEOPLE WITH A PARTIAL CAPACITY TO WORK AND  
NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME PARTICIPANTS 
Introduction 
This chapter, similar to Chapters Four and Five argues that people with a 
PCW lack equality and access. It draws on the work of the previous two chapters as 
well as analysis of the NDIS to suggest that people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed differently to NDIS participants, people with severe and profound 
disabilities producing then a lack of equality and access.  
 
As outlined in Chapter One, the NDIS emerged as a ‘Big Idea’ of the 2020 
Summit in 2008, after Bruce Bonyhady now Chair of the Board of the NDIA and 
Helen Sykes submitted a proposal to the Summit outlining a care and support scheme 
for people with disability. From November 2009, the scheme and its feasibility for 
people with disability were investigated by the Productivity Commission. The 
Productivity Commission in its report Disability Care and Support (2011) 
problematised the adequacy of the previous care and support system for people with 
disability, supporting the need for a NDIS. This need was endorsed by the Gillard 
government and legislation was passed in 2013.  
 
People with a PCW however, are not eligible for the main component of the 
NDIS, individualised care and support for people with severe and profound 
disabilities, known as Tier 3. This is because the disability requirements exclude 
people with a PCW from becoming participants in this main component of the 
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Scheme. The Tier 3 disability requirements, as specified in Chapter One, base 
eligibility on the presence of a disability which relates to “one or more intellectual, 
cognitive, neurological, sensory or physical impairments, or [a] psychiatric 
condition” (NDIS Act 2013, p. 28). It must be permanent, impact on one’s functional 
capacity and social and economic participation and the supports needed should be 
likely to continue over a lifetime (NDIS Act 2013). Therefore, while people with a 
PCW could be assisted through Tier 1, in particular the awareness raising component 
and the promotion of opportunities which is also part of this Tier, the tangible impact 
of the awareness raising component is yet to be seen in producing practical policy 
differences or opportunities to the lives of people with a PCW. Additionally, while 
they are eligible for Tier 2 it is unclear exactly how Tier 2 will provide support to 
people with a PCW because “there has been little focus on” (NDIA, 2014e, p. 14) the 
development and operation of this Tier. The NDIS then excludes people with a PCW 
from the NDIS as they do not qualify as disabled within the Tier 3 requirements.  
 
The analysis within this chapter suggests that people with a PCW and NDIS 
participants, people with severe and profound disabilities are governed through 
hybrid rationalities in which each group is constructed and subjected to distinct 
techniques and mechanisms of rule. On the one hand, people with severe and 
profound disabilities through their eligibility for NDIS support are predominantly 
managed through social rationalities of government and neoliberalism, in particular 
neoliberal market principles. These rationalities of governing combine in the NDIS 
to produce a policy which has been described as “revolutionary” (McLucas, 2013, p. 
n.p.) to people with disability who receive care and support in Australia. On the other 
hand, the predominant hybrid rationality regulating people with a PCW in Welfare to 
198 
 
Work, the Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 and income 
management is disciplinary, combining aspects of neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism. However, it is important to acknowledge that although emphasising 
their distinctness there are points of comparison between the way that people with a 
PCW and people with severe and profound disabilities are governed, particularly 
through neoliberalism. This suggests that some of the rationalities do operate to 
govern both populations. This complexity will be seen in this chapter.  
 
This chapter begins with an explanation and exploration of hybrid 
rationalities. Following this, under the subheadings ‘Choice, control and autonomy’ 
and ‘Individual risk and social risk’ is a discussion about the different ways in which 
people with a PCW and people with severe and profound disabilities are constructed 
and governed. For people with severe and profound disabilities the NDIS 
collectivises the risk of disability by pooling the costs of disability care and support 
and describing impairment as something which can be acquired by anyone. It is also 
represented by the government and the disability movement as enabling people with 
disability to exercise autonomy, choice and control over their care and support needs. 
In addition, it is constructed as delivering justice and social and economic inclusion. 
People with severe and profound disabilities are governed through freedom in the 
NDIS and their ‘difference’ is legitimated through access to resources and support.  
 
Alternatively, people with a PCW in Welfare to Work and income 
management are represented as incapable of being governed through freedom 
because they are irresponsibly unemployed, welfare dependent and unable to regulate  
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their own conduct. In response the government intervenes to regulate, manage and 
reform the problematic unemployed position of people with a PCW and the 
unemployed individual themselves through authoritarianism.  
 
Hybrid Rationalities  
Subjects are constructed and governed through rationalities. A rationality or 
mentality of government according to Dean (1999) is:  
 
[a]ny relatively systematic way of thinking about government. This can include 
the form of representation of the field to be governed, the agencies to be 
considered and enrolled in governing, the techniques to be employed, and the 
ends to be achieved. Rationalities of government can be theoretical 
knowledges, particular programmes, forms of practical know-how, or strategies 
(Dean, 1999, p. 211).  
 
Different rationalities inform the regimes, practices and mechanisms used to govern, 
although these are irreducible to specific rationalities (Dean, 1999). Rationalities are 
underpinned by various assumptions and produce various effects. For example, a 
liberal rationality assumes the freedom of its subjects, and as such it governs through 
this freedom (Dean, 1999). Drawing attention to the rationalities which govern and 
how they govern has the capacity to destabilise what is taken for granted with regard 
to the regulation of subjects (Dean, 1999). It can also highlight how the way in which 
subjects are governed is socially constructed. By doing this, Dean (1999) argues, it 
gives scope to challenge or to resist such modes of governing.  
 
Rationalities can be hybrid. Hybrid government is heterogeneous and refers 
to the operation of multiple rationalities of governing, with each making a 
contribution to governing (Clarke & Newman, 2007). Hybridity can also refer to and 
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include the influence of non-government organisations or social movements, such as, 
the disability movement. Hybrid governmentalities are common (Clarke, 2004; 
Larner, 2000a). For example, Larner states that “contemporary forms of rule are 
inevitably composite, plural and multi-form” (2000a, p. 20). “[R]arely [are they] 
‘pure’ expressions of larger logics. They are compound formations” (Clarke, 2004, p. 
41). Therefore, reforms or situations cannot simply be reduced to one rationality. 
Hybrid rationalities govern people with disability in the Australian welfare state. 
 
While hybrid rationalities are common (Clarke, 2004; Larner, 2000a), the 
types of rationalities and their presence in governing people with disability reflect the 
contemporary political and policy context in Australia. Australia’s welfare state, 
alongside other countries has undergone significant change within the last half a 
century (Chouinard. 2010; Lantz & Dee, 2012; Wilton, 2004), indicating a shift in 
“welfare rationalities” (Harris, 2001, p. 6). Harris describes the “welfare 
rationalities” (2001, p. 6) operating in the welfare state from 1901 to the present, 
specifically “‘relief’ (1990 to the mid-1930s); ‘full employment’ (1940s to 1960s); 
[and] ‘mutual obligation’ (1970s to present)” (2001, p. 7), providing a useful 
framework to understand and capture the shift from the prior and post-war welfare 
state to its current form. Prior to reform the post-war welfare state acted in a 
supportive role to an economic policy of full employment (Fenna, 2004) and sought 
to protect “against the rigours, vagaries, demands and inequities of the market and 
the unconstrained powers of capital” (Clarke, 2005, p. 452). It also sought to provide 
equality and security for vulnerable members of society (Hartman, 2005). Harris 
suggests that the full employment welfare rationality took as its object of government 
the control of “economic cycles, rather than unemployed individuals” (2001, p. 11). 
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The ‘problem’ of unemployment was socialised and responded to at a public level. 
Unemployment was a government responsibility (Bacchi, 2009) and government 
played an active role in providing employment for its citizens and “‘stimulating 
spending on goods and services to the extent necessary to sustain full employment’” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, May 30, 1945, p. 2239). In 
this context, welfare provision for unemployment was seen as a social right of 
citizenship in a “welfare rationality” (Harris, 2001, p. 6) underpinned by a concern 
for social justice and the social wellbeing of citizens. 
 
In this context though people with disability were rendered dependent, 
passive, objects of charity and pity and were subjected to exclusion and oppression. 
They were relegated to the private sphere, enforcing their exclusion from the labour 
market. This denied people with disability “parity of participation” (Soldatic, 2009, 
p. 135), inclusion and the right to work (Soldatic, 2009). This exclusion of people 
with disability from employment and the public sphere during this time was built on 
an assumption of their inability to contribute to society through employment, “a 
generalisation which served to reinforce the prevailing view of disability as an 
individual deficit and medical concern” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 99). As highlighted in 
Chapter Four, in response to the exclusion of persons with disabilities from 
employment, the disability movement argued that people with disability have a right 
to participate in the mainstream economy.  
 
Changes to the welfare state have shifted notions of welfare as a social right 
for the unemployed and people with a PCW, thus shifting the way that subjects are 
constructed and governed. Responsibility for unemployment is no longer attributed 
202 
 
to the state; rather, responsibility has transferred to the individual and the market 
(Hartman, 2005). In particular, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, through Welfare to 
Work the notion that people with disability are worthy of state support shifted for 
people with a PCW. These changes to the welfare state have been triggered by 
globalisation, in particular the need to be economically competitive in a global 
economy (Clarke, 2004; Dean, 2002; Larner, 2000a) and neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism developed from a concern around the interventionist nature of 
government evident in the previous period of full employment and “is associated 
with the preference for a minimalist state” (Larner, 2000a, p. 5). It presupposes the 
freedom and capacity for self-government of its subjects (Clarke, 2005; Dean, 1995; 
Larner, 2000b) employing this as a precedent to govern those incapable or partially 
incapable of exercising autonomy (Dean, 1995). In this context, the long-term 
unemployed, such as some people with a PCW, are represented as posing a risk to 
Australia’s economic global prosperity and do not behave like other Australians in 
the sense that they are unemployed and ‘rely’ on the government for subsistence. 
This logic led to a focus on the active income support system and welfare recipient 
who should personally strive to move off welfare and into work. People with a PCW 
are therefore expected to be “entrepreneurial [… and] enterprising” (Larner, 2000b, 
p. 246) of their self, a product to market to potential employers. They are expected to 
make themselves job ready by participating in training and programs, “enhancing [… 
their] skills, motivation and self-esteem” (Larner, 2000b, p. 258).  
 
Linked to governing through freedom in neoliberalism are authoritarian 
mechanisms employed to regulate those subjects assumed to be incapable of being 
governed through freedom. “[I]n a neoliberal rationality subjects are ‘assisted’ to 
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practise their own freedom, but only in ways the state has defined anteriorly – for 
example as workers rather than as welfare recipients” (Hartman, 2005, p. 60). For 
those who are incapable of practising their own freedom in the ways defined by the 
state they become governed through authoritarianism. Authoritarian government 
intervention thus becomes justified as guaranteeing and protecting the freedom of 
those who are capable of self-government and conduct themselves appropriately 
(Dean, 2002). In this way government seeks to teach the capacities for self-
government and responsibility, and objectify and discipline inappropriate conduct 
(Larner, 2000b). 
 
For people with disability neoliberalism is problematic and aspects of it are in 
tension with disability rights (Owen & Parker Harris, 2012). Firstly, this is because 
of the focus of neoliberal policies on economic efficiency and reducing costs. In 
endeavouring to reduce costs, the eligibility criteria for the DSP changed through 
Welfare to Work and the 2011 Gillard government reforms, in order to move more 
people with disability into work. This extended the “neoliberal workfare” (Soldatic, 
2009, p. 154) agenda to people with disability who are no longer eligible for the 
DSP, have to apply for NSA and then become categorised as people with a PCW. 
This sought to produce fiscal savings, by decreasing the amount of people receiving 
the higher paying DSP and moving people off welfare and into work. Secondly, 
neoliberalism focuses the ‘problem’ of unemployment on the individual with a PCW. 
As a result and as highlighted in Chapter Four, the structural barriers impeding their 
economic participation and inclusion fail to be acknowledged and the supports they 
may require for employment are not provided. Thirdly, the disability movement was 
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constrained through neoliberalism during the years of the Howard government. 
According to Soldatic (2009): 
 
[t]he institutional arm of the movement, disability advocacy services, endured a 
round of reforms, driven by neoliberal principles of fiscal restraint and 
individualism rather than collective structural advocacy (Jakubowicz and 
Meekosha 2002). These reforms consequently restrained the disability 
movement’s representative role in the policy making process (Meekosha 2002) 
(Soldatic, 2009, p. 129).  
 
Fourthly, employment services were privatised under the Howard government, 
funding shifted from block funding to case based funding and employment services 
became outcome focused. This brought neoliberal market principles to bear on the 
provision of employment, repositioning “funding formulas in line with the neoliberal 
principles of competition, markets and individualism” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 143). 
Problematically for people with disability, outcome-focused services led employment 
services to concentrate on those who were easiest to employ. This meant excluding 
those with high support needs who were ‘difficult to place’, continuing the 
individualisation of unemployment. Thus outcome-focused disability employment 
services targeted “the ‘most able of the disabled” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 134) where a 
“new excluded class of disabled citizens was defined as the truly disabled and most 
deserving of nation state support” on the DSP (Soldatic, 2009, p. 161). 
 
The neoliberal reforms to the welfare state have led Rose to question whether 
‘the social’ is in fact dead (1996; 1999, p. 10; Rose & Miller, 2008, pp. 84-113). By 
‘the social’ Rose is referring to the government of society and in particular, the 
nation state, through government centred programmes and technologies, like the 
welfare state “in the interests of social protection, social justice, social rights and 
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social solidarity” (1996, p. 329). However, Dean (1999) suggests that the social has 
metamorphosed rather than died, with the welfarist form of the social transforming 
through liberalism. This means that instead of state-centred control over welfare as in 
social rationalities of government “the social will be reconfigured as a set of 
constructed markets in service provision and expertise” (Dean, 1999, p. 193). Dean’s 
(1999) suggestion on the metamorphosis of ‘the social’ rather than its death is similar 
to Hartman’s (2005) proposal that the welfare state has been reshaped because of 
neoliberalism but not abolished or dismantled. Rose (1996, 1999) also describes the 
‘death of the social’ as misleading, suggesting instead that ‘the social’ is undergoing 
a mutation influenced by neoliberalism and a restructuring of the welfare state to 
resemble the market. Also, Soldatic and Grover highlight how  
 
it would be wrong to suggest that neoliberalism necessarily involves the 
absence of the state intervention. Neoliberal thinkers themselves, for instance, 
point to the state’s ‘role in ensuring the material well-being of the least well off 
in society’ (Penna and O’Brien 2009, 111) (Soldatic & Grover, 2013, p. 224).  
 
Clarke (2004) too challenges claims that suggest that the social underpinnings of the 
welfare state have disappeared through neoliberalism arguing that the continued 
existence of some form of welfare state, despite reform, highlights rather than its 
death, the longevity of ‘the social’. This in a sense indicates aspects of ‘the social’ in 
neoliberalism because aspects of social rationalities are combined with neoliberal 
market principles.  
 
 This is also discussed by Giddens (1998; 2001), when he explores the 
relevance of what he refers to as old-style social democracy to the current political, 
social and economic climate which is challenged by globalisation, the information 
206 
 
age and changing understandings of work and welfare. In addition, it is considered 
when he examines the need for political parties previously ideologically affiliated 
with socialist values and social democracy (the political left) to find a new way 
forward. Referring to the changing nature of the welfare state and society more 
broadly as well as critiques of government intervention and provision of welfare in 
the 1970s, he discusses how the economic cost of socialist principles particularly in 
the welfare state, have been discredited. Additionally, social democracy has been 
challenged by free market philosophies of neoliberalism. Giddens’ (1998) emphasis 
on the political left responding to such changes and shifts paves the way for his 
argument about a third way8. He argues that this third way should be concerned with 
social justice and values such as equality, protection of the vulnerable and freedom 
as autonomy. It should also emphasise no rights without responsibilities, an active 
approach to welfare which places obligations on the individual but also on broader 
society (Giddens, 1998; 2001). Ultimately, the  
 
‘third way’ refers to a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to 
adapt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the 
past two or three decades. It is a third way in the sense that it is an attempt to 
transcend both old-style social democracy and neoliberalism (Giddens, 1998, p. 
26).  
 
However, hybrid government is not restricted to state regulation alone and the 
operation of the disability movement in this policy context is worth drawing attention 
to, particularly with regard to the NDIS which emerged out of the work and 
campaigns of the disability movement (Manne, 2011), including the ‘Every 
Australian Counts’ campaign. As mentioned in Chapter One, the ‘Every Australian 
Counts’ campaign lobbied the government to implement the recommendations of the 
                                                          
8 It is worth acknowledging, as Giddens (2001) does, the diversified practical enactment of ‘third 
ways’ across different nation states in response to different institutional backgrounds and constraints.  
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Productivity Commission report for a disability care and support scheme (Della 
Bosca, 2011). The work of the ‘Every Australian Counts’ campaign is suggested to 
be in part responsible for the successful implementation of policy to introduce the 
NDIS which encouraged persons with disabilities, their families and carers to 
educate broader society and the government about the importance of a NDIS from 
their perspective (Henry, 2014). This challenges the top-down assumptions 
underpinning political rule and sees “the operations of civil society … folded back 
into the operations of the state” (Dean, 2002, p. 45). The disability movement is thus 
an “active agent … in the policy process of political-economic change” (Larner, 
2000a, p. 17).  
 
Choice, control and autonomy 
It is evident that people with a PCW and people with severe and profound 
disabilities are being governed through distinct hybrid governmentalities through 
examining the key concepts of choice, control and autonomy. While the ability of 
people with a PCW to exercise their choice, control and autonomy is managed and 
regulated in Welfare to Work and income management, people with severe and 
profound disabilities are governed through the NDIS, a policy which recognises and 
enhances the choice, control and autonomy of NDIS participants. As a result of this it 
can be argued that people with a PCW are denied autonomy, choice and control in 
contrast to people with severe and profound disabilities who are represented as 





People with a PCW are represented as unable to be governed through freedom 
and autonomy because they are seen as incapable of self-government as a result of 
their unemployment. They are represented as at ‘high risk’ of welfare dependency 
and a threat to the ‘active’ focus of the reshaped welfare state. This justifies their 
regulation through authoritarianism and “illiberal practices and rationalities of 
government” (Dean, 1999, p. 204). For example:  
 
(i)ncreased surveillance through the use of mentoring (‘case managers’, 
‘advisers’, etc), increasing publicity around their obligations in respect of 
finding a job and the sanctions available to welfare agencies should they fail to 
meet these obligations, and … coercive measures such as workfare (‘welfare-
to-work’ or ‘work-for-the-dole’) programmes … deemed necessary to render 
the individual autonomous, i.e. as manifesting the sturdy independence and 
good character of those who prefer paid employment to welfare benefits as a 
source of their lively-hood (Dean, 2002, p. 47). 
 
This is then reinforced through their subscription to income management after at 
least 52 of the last 104 weeks on NSA providing further penalisation and discipline 
for recipients continued status and ‘choice’ as unemployed. 
 
Alternatively, NDIS participants are represented as responsible and capable 
of autonomy and they are governed through freedom in a Scheme which enhances 
their choice and control. They are positioned through the NDIS as consumers; that is, 
“mark[ing] a shift from ‘passive recipient’ to ‘active choice maker’ in relation to 
services” (Clarke, 2004, p. 39). For instance, recently ‘The Choice and Control 
Expo’ was held in Canberra (Peake, 2014). The Expo provided a space where 
persons with disabilities, potential NDIS participants, could look at the types of 
supports they might like to purchase through their individualised funding packages.  
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Another reason behind the Expo was to familiarise people with disability with having 
control and making choices, as previously they have been controlled by others who 
make decisions for them (Peake, 2014).  
 
The NDIS has thus largely shifted to a certain extent previous assumptions 
about people with severe and profound disability and the exercising of autonomy. 
For example, although “(fluid) categories of liberal subjects of government grouped 
according to their [capacity for] autonomy” (Dean, 2002, p. 48), Dean (2002) 
previously categorised people with disability as Group D. Group D is “those who, 
having reached maturity of age, are for one reason or another not yet or no longer 
able to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interests” (Dean, 2002, 
p. 48). He elaborates, this “includes the chronically welfare dependent, [and] those 
with certain mental and physical illnesses” (Dean, 2002, p. 48). The assumption that 
people with disability, particularly, people with severe and profound disabilities lack 
autonomy has been heavily challenged by the disability movement and disability 
studies scholars who argue that the autonomy of people with disability is impeded by 
the social barriers they experience to exercising their autonomy and how definitions 
of autonomy employ the able-body as the norm socially constructing ‘disabled’ 
bodies as lacking autonomy. This is similar to discussions of the definitions of 
‘independence’ and ‘self-reliance’ discussed in Chapter Four and is also challenged 
through the NDIS which is underpinned by autonomy, choice and control.  
 
As a result of their capacity for autonomy being recognised through the 
NDIS, participants are represented as engaging with a system underpinned by 
freedom and individualised choice and control. Alternatively, Lantz and Marston 
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highlight how as a result of Welfare to Work “individuals have little capacity to be 
self-determining: they are asked to choose from a range of limited options that are 
narrowly defined in terms of education and training to increase employability” 
(2012, p. 865). At times then, choice appears to only be an option for people with a 
PCW and the unemployed when choosing to engage or withdraw from the income 
support system restraining the freedom of unemployed people because of their 
unemployment to a decision about choosing to engage with support which they no 
doubt need. “The ‘choice’ [… the unemployed] are faced with is either to take the 
payment or suffer the consequences of having no income” (Moss, 2001, p. 5). This 
point applies particularly to those who face difficulties in finding employment, such 
as persons with disabilities (Moss, 2001) who experience social and structural 
barriers to economic participation. 
 
People with a PCW thus engage with systems which provide limited scope 
for choice and control, such as the employment service system. The privatisation of 
employment services was envisioned as providing “a market of flexible and 
responsive providers” (Marston & McDonald, 2006c, p. 13). However, because 
employment services are grounded in case-based funding (Lantz & Marston, 2012) 
and are outcome-focused (Parker Harris et al., 2012) the flexibility and 
responsiveness of providers is restricted. ACOSS in fact suggests “[a] significant 
constraint on the system’s responsiveness to jobseekers and employers is that it 
operates as a Government purchasing regime, not an employment services ‘market’” 
(2012, p. 14). Case-based funding and outcome-focused services means for 
employment services that financially it is important to have high caseloads of people 
who are easy to achieve employment outcomes for in order to ensure that the 
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government renews the services contract (Marston & McDonald, 2006c). The high 
case loads of case managers means that there is an emphasis on how much time is 
spent with each client and it is difficult to deliver “support and services that are 
individually tailored to [… a client’s] particular capacities [and aspirations]” (Lantz 
& Marston, 2012, p. 865). As result of the system’s design people accessing the 
employment service system, like people with a PCW are seen as outcomes (Marston 
& McDonald, 2006c) rather than as consumers. This means that there is little scope 
for them to exercise their choice, control and autonomy. Additionally, employment 
services are expected to help job seekers find employment but also monitor and 
police their compliance with their Activity Agreement (Lantz & Marston, 2012). 
Therefore “employment services had a role not only in surveilling the disabled 
welfare subject but also monitoring the disabled welfare subject’s progress in moving 
to a state of public respectability” (Soldatic, 2009, p. 184; Soldatic & Pini, 2009, p. 
88). Choice and control by people with a PCW is inhibited by this because their 
interaction with employment services is already mapped out. In this way, their 
autonomy is limited because they are coerced to comply with their mutual 
obligations. Consequently, “their role is reduced to that of ‘followers of rules’ rather 
than active participants who influence or shape the services provided” (ACOSS, 
2012, p. 14).  
 
The assumed inability of people with a PCW to exercise choice and control 
can also be seen in the mutual obligation contract which, alongside neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism, shifted the individual from being understood “as a sovereign 
individual to a subject of paternalistic supervision” (Shaver, 2002, p. 332). The 
mutual obligation contract is not one based on negotiation and mutual consensus; 
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rather, it is designed to produce behavioural change in the subjects of regulation, 
people with a PCW. Those subscribed to the mutual obligation contract, like people 
with a PCW, have no bargaining power to change or alter the contract (Carney, 2007; 
Moss, 2001) suppressing choice and control. Moss (2001) further argues that those 
subscribed to such contracts have very little choice or option in accepting the terms 
of the contract given that they are approaching the welfare state in some form of 
financial difficulty. This is likely because the means-tested structure of the 
Australian income support system ensures that welfare payments are targeted to the 
most vulnerable citizens who are in need of assistance (Shaver, 2002). Therefore, 
unlike in the NDIS, power is disproportionate in this contractual process.  
 
The NDIS, alternatively, allows scope for negotiation and mutual consensus 
through the relationship of a NDIS participant with a NDIS delegate where the 
individual’s NDIS plan is in some ways driven by the participant. A plan maps an 
individual’s goals and aspirations and details the supports, either general and/ or 
reasonable and necessary to be provided to meet their care and support needs (NDIA, 
2014d). Once assessed as likely to be eligible for the NDIS, participants meet with a 
delegate to prepare, discuss and arrange their plan. While the delegate must approve 
the plan a NDIS participant has a role in designing their plan which must “[a]s far as 
reasonably practicable” (NDIA, 2014b, p. 1), be “directed by the participant”, 
“underpinned by the right of the participant to exercise control over his or her own 
life” and “maximise the choice and independence of the participant” (NDIA, 2014b, 
p. 1). Further evidence of opportunities for negotiation and direction by NDIS 
participants can be seen through the relationship between the delegate and the 
participant which is described in the NDIS Operational Guidelines as a “partnership” 
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(NDIA, 2014c, p. 1). Delegates are encouraged to “[a]dopt a relationship-based 
approach to the planning process with the aim of building a sustainable, supportive 
relationship between the NDIA officers, participants and their supporters” (NDIA, 
2014a, p. 2). Additionally, the planning conversation held between the delegate and 
the participant is underpinned by negotiation and enables the participant to lead, 
demonstrating the difference between the policies’ regulating NDIS participants and 
people with a PCW. For example:  
 
[t]he planning conversation will involve the delegate facilitating a participant-
led discussion based on the participant’s statement of goals and aspirations. 
The delegate is to take an active listening role, gaining a rich picture of the 
participant’s goals, aspirations, current life circumstances and supports to the 
extent the participant wishes to engage. The focus of the planning conversation 
will be on strengths and abilities which can be maximised or enabled (NDIA, 
2014d, p. 3). 
 
The ability of NDIS participants to exercise choice, control and negotiation is in 
direct contrast to the authoritarian regulation of people with a PCW, whose ability to 
negotiate and direct is withheld through the mutual obligation contract. This 
demonstrates their assumed incapacity to be governed through freedom, and most 
significantly, the diversity in the hybrid governmentalities regulating people with a 
PCW and people with severe and profound disabilities in current Australian policies 
which results in inequality for people with a PCW.  
 
In comparison to NDIS participants designing statements and plans which 
outline their goals, aspirations and care and support needs through the NDIS, people 
with a PCW do not have their employment goals, aspirations or objectives 
recognised in their relationship with the income support system. Rather, people with 
a PCW are expected to accept all reasonable offers of employment and can have their 
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payment suspended for eight weeks if they have “refused or failed, without 
reasonable excuse, to accept a suitable offer of employment” (Employment and 
Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) 
Act 2006, p. 129). Owen and Parker Harris, whose article focuses on the UK under 
New Labour, argue that this forces people with disability “into ‘any work’ rather 
than a career of their choosing” (2012, p. n.p.).  
 
Further restrictions are placed on the ability for choice and control by people 
with a PCW through the state defining their priority needs through income 
management after a year of receiving NSA. A participant in Lantz and Marston’s 
research on Welfare to Work “points to the way in which people are rendered mere 
spectators when defining their needs” (2012, p. 859) in the income support system. 
This is because decisions are made on behalf of people with disability, often by 
people who have “little understanding of the everyday reality of disabled people’s 
lives” (Lantz & Marston, 2012, p. 859), rather than by the persons with disabilities 
themselves. The same could be argued with income management where the 
legislation sets the priority needs of those income managed, making people with a 
PCW “mere spectators” (Lantz & Marston, 2012, p. 859) yet again and as suggested 
in Chapter Five, defining their needs through an ableist norm. As explained in an 
Indigenous context income management controls and manages what Indigenous 
Australians can purchase and where they can purchase goods and services from 
(Altman & Hinkson, 2010). This denies and undermines Indigenous autonomy, 
choice and control (Lantz & Dee, 2012). This is because the BasicsCard can only be 




In contrast, NDIS participants can choose how their plans and packages will 
be managed. They can choose to self-manage, elect “a plan nominee”, “registered 
plan management provider” (Buckmaster & Tomaras, 2013, p. 25) or choose for the 
NDIA to manage their plan. They can also use a combination of the above. NDIS 
participants who choose to self-manage their plans are represented as being able to 
control who they employ for their care and “sourcing and arranging … [their] own 
supports” (NDIA, 2013, p. 1). While the plan they will develop is established in 
consultation with an NDIA delegate, NDIS participants are able to identify their care 
and support needs and self-managed NDIS participants have the freedom to choose 
how they attend to their care and support needs, therefore, exercising their agency 
and autonomy. This is unlike people with a PCW whose needs are predetermined 
through income management, indicating different forms of hybrid rationalities and 
the inequality in the mechanisms employed to govern people with a PCW and people 
with severe and profound disabilities, and the lack of opportunity that people with a 
PCW have to exercise choice and control.  
 
Further, unlike people with a PCW, the NDIS provides mechanisms to 
maximise the choice and control of NDIS participants. For example, a participant has 
to develop a statement of goals and aspirations. The Operational Guidelines highlight 
how “to maximise choice and control the statement is to be prepared by the 
participant (with or without support) to the fullest extent possible in the 
circumstances subject to participant preference” (NDIA, 2014d, p. 4). The inclusion 
of guidelines to advance the choice and control of people with severe and profound  
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disabilities indicates its importance to the NDIS, unlike for people with a PCW 
where choice and control is managed and contained to a ‘choice’ to engage with the 
income support system.  
 
Neoliberal market principles 
The NDIS as underpinned by choice and control relates to neoliberal market 
principles which provides further evidence of hybrid rationalities. Larner describes 
how “[m]arkets are understood to be a better way of organizing economic activity 
because they are associated with competition, economic efficiency and choice” 
(2000a, p. 5). The market then provides a mechanism to deliver on the diverse needs 
of people with disability, centred on the individual (Clarke, 2006). The disability 
movement, as a policy actor, critiqued the existing disability service system and 
argued for recognition of the autonomy of people with disability through choice, 
control and individualised planning (Bleasdale & In Control Australia, 2011) in ways 
that fits with neoliberalism’s emphasis on the market (Gibbs, 2013). Positioning 
NDIS participants as consumers in the market means that they are empowered in 
their relations with service providers having the choice to withdraw their funding 
should they not receive the outcome they want. As Clarke suggests  
 
[t]he active consumer is the force that requires modern public services to be 
adaptive, responsive, flexible and diverse [as well as “entrepreneurial, 
enterprising, and innovative” (Larner, 2000b, p. 246)] rather than paternalist, 
monolithic and operating on a model of ‘one size fits all’ (2004, p. 39).  
 
This puts NDIS participants in control of the care and support system which used to 
control them and determine their life chances and livelihoods. For example, 
reflecting the experiences of numerous people with disability under the previous care 
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and support system Manne (2011) discusses Lillian’s testimony to the Productivity 
Commission’s inquiry into disability care and support.  Lillian “ha[…d] no idea at 
what time of the day the care workers might arrive to shower her … com[…ing] 
when it suit[…ed] their timetable and refus[…ing] to be pinned down” (Manne, 
2011, p. n.p.). Thus disability services through the market are envisioned to be 
provided by “efficient suppliers, disciplined by the competitive realities of the 
market” (Clarke, 2004, p. 31). This has therefore shifted disability service provision 
from the public to private industries which according to Clarke “has been legitimised 
in a number of ways” (2004, p. 32) and which reflect criticisms of existing disability 
services by the disability movement and people with disability. For example, many 
commentators and submissions to the Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry 
into the NDIS Bill 2012 highlight excessive amounts of red tape (Gerathy, 2012; 
King, 2012; Manne, 2011), waiting lists (King, 2012; Mihailof, 2012), a complex 
system and inadequate service provision (Davies, 2012). Clarke states“[a]t the core 
was an assault on ‘bureaucratic’ inertia and inefficiency (Du Gay, 2000) and the 
celebration of the market as dynamic, innovative and flexible” (2004, p. 32). Though 
Clarke (2004) is referring to a UK context there are some similarities between the 
critiques he identifies of public provision and Australian criticisms of the previous 
disability care and support system. Such critiques are envisaged to be addressed 
through the market.  
 
However, while the market is assumed to deliver choice and control to NDIS 
participants, engaging in the NDIS requires participants to engage with the NDIA as 
it is their gateway to individualised funding. This links with arguments made by 
Moss (2001) in relation to the mutual obligation contract discussed earlier where he 
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argues that power is disproportionate in the welfare state and there is little scope for 
negotiation given that those approaching the welfare state generally do so in a 
position of financial difficulty. This link can be made because people with severe and 
profound disabilities approach the NDIA from a care and support system which, as 
highlighted previously, has been identified as inadequate (Productivity Commission, 
2011). Their access to care and support resources to be provided by the NDIS are 
essential. It could be argued then that it is difficult to negotiate with an Agency that 
provides much needed access to care and support. From this perspective NDIS 
participants are not empowered and power is disproportionate. This could relate to 
arguments made by participants in a study by Clarke (2007) on the National Health 
Service in the UK, who suggest that they do not feel like consumers because they 
need the services that are being provided. While the National Health Service is a 
public health system in the UK it is the similarity between the need for health 
services or care and support in order to economically and socially participate for 
NDIS participants that a comparison can be made. In this sense then there is no 
choice, it is not a matter of “take it or leave it” (Clarke, 2007, p. 243).  
 
Additionally, parts of the NDIS are dismantling existing disability services in 
order to align services with market principles (See for example, T. McIlroy, 2014) 
and work on a model of individualised rather than block funding. While essentially 
this dismantling is justified as delivering a new system based on choice and control 
that can adequately provide for the needs of people with disability, it leaves people 
with severe and profound disabilities little choice but to engage with the NDIA 
because their existing support or program may no longer exist or may be 
transitioning to the NDIS. For some it also means that their current ‘choice’ may be 
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problematised and deconstructed. Winther (2014), for example, discusses how he 
lives in a Youngcare apartment complex which is built on a block funding model. He 
argues that while he understands that often block funding is associated with the 
institutionalisation of people with disability in his experience the block funding 
model works for him, suggesting that “if the NDIS is about choice, our [or rather his] 
choice is block funding” (Winther, 2014, p. n.p.). Winther’s (2014) concerns about 
the NDIS and individualised budgets illustrate the point made by Fawcett and Plath 
(2014), discussed in Chapter Two, which draws attention to the success of schemes 
which offer individualised budgets as a choice. This is as opposed to Tier 3 of the 
NDIS where individualised budgets are distributed to most participants. 
 
Some have also raised concerns about negotiating the bureaucracy of the 
NDIA. For example, parents whose children are NDIS participants in South Australia 
have suggested that funding for plans has been restricted and NDIA delegates have 
made recommendations about where to spend funding “instead of the tailor made 
programs which were promised” (Winter, 2014, p. n.p.). They also suggest that the 
pledge of individualised support which is unique to each individual has to an extent 
failed to be delivered. The individuality of plans was tied to enabling choice and 
control. For example:  
 
Harry’s mother says the initial assessment meeting with NDIS workers was 
positive about what her son required.  
 
But she says the follow-up sessions left her feeling judged, unsupported and 
confused about how to negotiate the support system.  
 
“I guess we were seeking something very unique to Harry and to what he needs 
as an individual and what we got was more of a one-size-fits-all plan, so ‘here 




This can suggest that on some level choice and control is impeded by aspects of the 
NDIA. The operation of the market alongside the NDIA is not dissimilar to the 
“British ‘personal social services’” (Rose, 1999, p. 146) discussed by Rose. Rose 
(1999) suggests that ‘personal social services’ in ‘Britain adhered to “the so-called 
purchaser-provider split [which] separated the responsibility for identifying need and 
identifying a care plan, which was still to be undertaken by a social worker, from the 
provision of the required care. This was to be purchased in a quasi-market” (Rose, 
1999, p. 146). While the NDIS encourages the individual to design their plan to meet 
their goals and aspirations alongside a NDIA delegate, it is the delegate who decides 
how much funding is allocated to each plan. To a certain extent then they become the 
expert in valuing the costs of people’s needs. Rose suggests that while it appears that 
power is dispersed from bureaucracies through neoliberalism, in fact “new 
techniques of control [are established], strengthening the powers of centres of 
calculation who set the budgetary regimes, the output targets and the like, reinstating 
the state in the collective body in a new way” (1999, p. 147). Further evidence of 
aspects of centralised control is the fact that the NDIA sets the prices for supports 
included in participants’ plans (NDIA, n.d.-a). “Prices for supports to be included in 
participant plans are developed and published by the … NDIA” (NDIA, n.d.-a, p. 
n.p.). For NDIS participants then, on the one hand, choice and control is enabled 
through the market and on the other, access to the NDIS and therefore, choice and 
control is concentrated in the NDIA. This indicates the hybrid governmental 
rationalities operating within the context of the NDIS and some similarities between 
the government of people with a PCW and people with severe and profound 
disabilities through neoliberalism. This indicates some of the complexity that was 
referred to in the introduction of this chapter.  
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Gibbs (2013) raises concerns about the neoliberal market principles 
underpinning the provision of care and support to people with severe and profound 
disability in the NDIS. She argues that despite “[t]he deregulation of the disability 
support system being sold as a continuation of the activist drive for people to have 
more control and choice over the services they use” (Gibbs, 2013, p. n.p.) the market 
principles are not also being broadly employed to challenge the structural barriers to 
inclusion and participation that people with disability experience. In this model, 
rather, “[t]he rights that are being defended are those of individualised consumers 
within a deregulated market, with no expectations of structural change” (Gibbs, 
2013, p. n.p.). Gibbs suggests that as a consequence there is an “unravelling of the 
social contract between citizens and government” (2013, p. n.p.) through a focus on 
individualised funding packages to be met by the market. She argues that this could 
mean that the government has less of an obligation to deliver broader social change 
and break down the social barriers experienced by people with disability that are not 
experienced by able-bodies (Gibbs, 2013). In this context then she questions whether 
individual choice will facilitate structural change for people with disability (Gibbs, 
2013).  
 
Defining (or confining) choice, expectations and flexibility by responsibility and 
reasonable and necessary  
Also, despite the possible achievements of a market model of disability support 
for people with severe and profound disability in a format which enables choice and 
control, Clarke (2006) cautions about the flexibility and expectations of choice. For 
instance, he suggests that because social care in the UK is based around “the question 
of ‘need’ – … this skews the argument about choice in peculiar ways” (Clarke, 2006, 
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p. 427) because “need is never simply a matter of ‘what people want’. Need (rather 
than want) implies the existence of an objective condition” (Clarke, 2006, p. 427). 
The NDIS is also centred around need (Bonyhady, 2009) and “reasonable and 
necessary supports” (NDIS Act 2013, p. 4) are funded for participants. However, 
there are questions and contestations emerging around what can be considered as 
‘reasonable and necessary’ and who determines and defines this ‘choice’. This can be 
seen, for example, in a discussion about ‘reasonable and necessary supports’ where 
McKim (2014) writes about her NDIS participant plan which includes a goal to 
travel overseas. Its classification as ‘reasonable and necessary’ is debated in the 
comments section of her opinion piece on Ramp Up with ‘Honest’ stating  
 
[i]t is beyond me how anyone can even think of holidays overseas as 
reasonable. I and others I know are being told by the NDIA wanting to eat is 
unreasonable and we shouldn’t expect the community to be burdened with our 
care costs, for simply day to day life needs … (2014, p. n.p.).  
 
Similarly, ‘Reasonable …’ (2014) declares:  
I suppose we in the disability community are fortunate that we have a great 
deal of public support behind the NDIS and are lucky that the 'shock jocks' 
have not attacked the NDIS. 
 
However I believe that those attacks will occur and I do not believe that 
supported holidays overseas are reasonable. 
 
Would the public accept that 400,000 plus people with disabilities will or could 
be supported to travel overseas? Is that reasonable? 
 
Anyone receiving supports should as[k] the same question, i[…]s what[’]s 
reasonable to me reasonable to others. 
 





Reasonableness in this context appears to tie to responsibility, that is, a responsibility 
as a consumer to exercise your choice and control in a way that considers others, 
referring to taxpayers and those also seeking resources. As Clarke (2005) argues:  
 
it would be wrong to mistake this independence [or platform to exercise 
choice, control and autonomy] for freedom, since autonomy must be exercised 
responsibly … Citizen-consumers must make ‘reasonable’ and ‘responsible’ 
choices when consuming public services (rather than abusing or wasting tax 
payers’ money) (Clarke, 2005, p. 451).  
 
Exercising choice responsibly could also relate to the management of finite resources 
(Clarke, 2006) and financial budgets. In particular, the cost of the NDIS has been met 
with criticism by financial advisors to the Abbott government since its election 
generating concerns about potential delays to the roll out and full implementation of 
the NDIS or possible cutbacks (Ireland, 2014). For example, Maurice Newman “head 
of the Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Council” (Harrison, 2013, p. n.p.) 
describes the previous Labor government’s commitment and implementation of the 
NDIS as “reckless” (Newman, 2013, p. n.p.) knowing the poor state of the nation’s 
budget. Similarly, the National Commission of Audit in its Report Towards 
Responsible Government made several recommendations to the Abbott government 
about reducing the cost of the NDIS (National Commission of Audit, 2014). In 
addition, the NDIS has been challenged by reports of cost blowouts, with “plans 
completed in the first three months of the scheme … more than 32 per cent higher 
than the … average cost modelled by the Productivity Commission in designing the 
scheme” (Harrison, 2013, p. n.p.). According to the National Commission of Audit 
this could suggest that the scheme will cost more than anticipated “[a]s most of the 
costs of the scheme are participant driven, any unanticipated increase in participant 
numbers or package costs will have a substantial impact on total expenditure” 
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(National Commission of Audit, 2014, p. 90). Concerns about the cost of the NDIS 
could thus limit the expanse of choice. Similarly, a UK social care worker in 
Clarke’s study describes how with regard to choice “the world is not our oyster, we 
can’t say you can have what you want” (2006, p. 432). Choice, often assumed to 
mean whatever one wants, is problematic in a landscape of limited funds and 
resources.  
 
While rights, wants or needs outstrip resources, some processes of ‘demand 
management’ will necessarily come between demands and outcomes. Our 
study revealed significant organisational effort being expended on trying to 
construct ‘responsible consumers’ who would have ‘reasonable’ expectations 
of what services would provide. This level of effort reflected anxiety about the 
ways in which the ‘choice’ agenda might inflate expectations in difficult ways 
(Clarke, 2006, p. 436).  
 
However problematically, arguments about finite resources steeped in 
economic rationalism have often been used to oppress people with disability and to 
deny their rights. Goggin and Newell (2005), for example, discuss the priority placed 
on the needs of people with disability in comparison to the able-bodied norm 
suggesting the needs of people with disability have often been denied based on 
impairments and using a justification of finitude. For instance, they examine “[‘]the 
lower priority [placed] on children with Down’s syndrome and other disabilities, 
who need heart transplants’ … [suggesting that] Savulescu [a prominent medical 
ethicist argues …] that it is indeed justifiable … in a climate of finite resources” 
(Goggin & Newell, 2005, p. 32) to place a lower priority on persons with disabilities. 
Alternatively, Goggin and Newell contend that this ignores “the values, concepts and 
methods to comprehend – and allow – the full benefits as well as costs of disability, 
and the complex issues posed in resource allocation, consumption and production” 
(2005, p. 32). This means that it positions people with disability as merely passive 
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recipients of resources. It also compares with a medical model of disability which 
individualises the ‘problem’ of disability and represents disability as a tragedy. 
Arguments of finite resources could divert people with disability back to justifying 
their equal right to support in a competition with able-bodies.  
 
Yet also brought into the comments section of McKim’s (2014) opinion piece 
is a discussion of rights and how what is defined as “reasonable and necessary” 
(NDIS Act 2013, p. 4) should be determined by a right to equality. For example, 
some of the comments discuss how politicians and the able-bodied public are able to 
take holidays and suggest that it is only fair based on the right to equality that people 
with disability have the same options (Big thinker, 2014; Hoolibob, 2014). Vidler 
and Clarke (2005) discuss rights and needs, suggesting that in the context of social 
care recipients in the UK access to resources was dependent on a needs assessment. 
In this context, rather than needs and rights being constructed as the same thing they 
are in fact in conflict because a “needs assessment renders rights to services 
conditional and contingent rather than universal and absolute” (Vidler & Clarke, 
2005, p. 31).  
 
Income support and responsibility  
The responsibility tied to the receivership of government or taxpayer funds or 
resources particularly in the welfare state is reflected in governing people with a 
PCW. For example, their regulation through the mutual obligation contract in 
Welfare to Work reflects the responsibilities tied to income support receivership. For 
people with a PCW their conduct is surveyed and monitored through Job Capacity 
Assessments, Activity Agreements (Lantz & Dee, 2012), reporting their weekly 
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earnings, attending interviews, searching for and recording a specified number of 
employment contacts per fortnight, and producing Employer Contact Certificates 
which document their application for work. The Welfare to Work legislation states 
for example that, “[t]he person must give the Secretary a written statement from each 
employer whose job vacancy the person applied for during that period that confirms 
that the person applied for that job vacancy” (Employment and Workplace Relations 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006, p. 84). 
They are also disciplined through breaching penalties where they can lose their 
payment for eight weeks if they lose their job due to their inappropriate conduct as a 
worker (Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to 
Work and Other Measures) Act 2006) and must ensure that they do not commit a 
Newstart Participation Failure. Further, through income management people with a 
PCW are monitored through the BasicsCard (Lantz & Dee, 2012), part of their 
income is quarantined and their spending conduct is restricted through disallowing 
their access to lump sum payments which exceed $200 (SSOLA (Welfare Reform and 
Reinstatement of the RDA) Act 2010). For people with a PCW the receivership of 
state support should not be expected, rather earned, and is not deserved but rather 
conditional. As Pearson explains “social income support is different. It is part of our 
social contract, and the contract should be conditional” (2011, p. n.p.). This connects 
to the principle underpinning mutual obligation discussed by Moss which assumes 
that because “[o]thers have sacrificed their labour in order to ensure that there are 
resources available to provide welfare … it is fair that the beneficiaries of that 
sacrifice give something back” (2001, p. 5). This is reflected in the Budget Speech 
2005-06 by the Honourable Peter Costello, former Treasurer of the Howard 
government, when he states “[p]eople who are unable to work deserve support from 
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the taxes paid by those who are working. But those who are working deserve to 
know that others capable of work are at least looking for work in return for their 
income support” (Costello, 2005, p. 3). Also illustrating this, “The Policy Statement 
foreshadowing the Welfare Reform Act” (Billings, 2011, p. 178) Landmark Reform 
to the Welfare State, Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act and 
Strengthening of the Northern Territory Emergency Response which extended 
income management stated:  
 
[t]he welfare system needs to be seen as a two-way transaction. Governments 
have a responsibility to support people and families through hard times. In turn, 
welfare recipients have a responsibility to demonstrate personal responsibility 
and spend payments appropriately (Australian Government, 2009a, p. 1).  
 
The disability movement however, does not have a problem with mutual 
obligation, rather, with the way that mutual obligation operates in the Welfare to 
Work reforms. Instead, Wallace argues obligations should be held by “governments, 
businesses and communities” (2014a, p. n.p.) to provide the necessary supports to 
enable people with disability to economically participate. This was to a certain extent 
recognised by the Reference Group on Welfare Reform who conducted a review into 
income support in 2000 for the Howard government, who suggested that “[a]ll these 
groups [governments, businesses, communities and individuals …] need to be more 
active in identifying and developing opportunities for social participation” 
(Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000, p. 5). The mutuality of the mutual 
obligation agreement between the government and people with a PCW however, 
lacks reciprocity by the government and Moss (2001) suggests rather, that it is more  
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heavily based in obligation on the part of unemployed welfare recipients. This 
suggests that “the ‘problem’ … is represented to be a supply-side ‘problem’” 
(Bacchi, 2009, p. 66), continuing the individualisation of unemployment.  
 
The responsibilised citizen produced as a product of neoliberalism is, therefore, 
expected to spend state support responsibly. This idea of the responsibilised citizen 
will be explored further in the section below which discusses how through this 
responsibilised discourse the individual is now held accountable for their 
unemployment and is expected to meet their needs through employment and the 
market (Owen & Parker Harris, 2012).  
 
Individual Risk and Social Risk 
The attribution of risk and responsibility within Welfare to Work and income 
management and the NDIS highlights the discrepancy in the hybrid governmental 
combinations governing people with a PCW and people with severe and profound 
disabilities. “[R]isk [operates] as a governmental rationality” (Dean, 2002, p. 176) 
becoming “a way – or rather, a set of different ways – of ordering reality” (Dean, 
1999, p. 177). As Dean argues, risk “is a way of representing events in a certain form 
so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and 
for particular goals … the significance of risk lies not with risk itself but with what 
risk gets attached to it” (1999, p. 177) and how that risk is governed. Both NSA and 
the NDIS insure against risk and uncertainty, for example, NSA insures against the 
‘risk’ and uncertainty of unemployment by providing a ‘safety net’ and the NDIS 
ensures that the long-term care and support needs of people with severe and profound 
disabilities are addressed as well as provides security for the ‘risk’ of impairment 
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(Bonyhady, 2009). However, the ‘risk’ of unemployment is individualised impeding 
the access of people with PCW to resources in contrast to the ‘risk’ of impairment 
which is socialised through the NDIS. This provides evidence of the distinct hybrid 
governmentalities operating in this context to regulate people with a PCW and 
people with severe and profound disabilities, resulting in a lack of equality for people 
with a PCW.  
 
The ‘problem’ of unemployment is individualised to people with a PCW in 
Welfare to Work and income management, reflecting a neoliberal rationality. 
Neoliberalism shifted the responsibility of unemployment from the state to the 
individual (Galvin, 2006). According to Dean, O’Malley refers to this “as the ‘new 
prudentialism’” (1999, p. 167). This is because the individual through this shift is 
encouraged to be prudent, taking responsibility for their own insurance and 
protection through the market (Rose, 1999). In this context of unemployment “social 
insurance is no longer seen as a socializing and responsibilizing principle of 
solidarity [rather] it … stifles responsibility, inhibits risk taking and induces 
dependency” (Rose, 1999, p. 159). This resulted in the “privatization of risk 
management” (Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 215) where “social and economic risks are… 
increasingly individualised” (Lantz & Marston, 2012, p. 855). Therefore, while the 
government still provides income support through the welfare state which indicates 
an element of social rationalities, the individual is expected to take up an active 
identity and become responsible for one’s needs (Larner, 2000a). Dean explains, “the 
responsible subject seeks to optimize his or her independence from others and from 
the state … [encouraging one] to adopt … what Foucault called ‘practices of the 
self’” (1999, p. 191) where the individual acts upon their own conduct and manages, 
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regulates and reforms it, if necessary. The unemployed individual with a PCW thus 
became ‘the cause’ of their unemployment which focuses on their moral character 
and motivations, and unemployment is seen as a ‘choice’ (McCoy & Peddle, 2012; 
Soldatic, 2009) through the individualisation of unemployment constructing them as 
undeserving of state support and thus denying their access to resources. This, 
however, “oversimplifies the causes of unemployment” (Carney, 2007, p. 7). In 
particular, the social barriers and “structural processes of exclusion and inequality” 
(Soldatic, 2009, p. 132) experienced by people with disability which impede their 
employment participation. It also fails to recognise the supports required for their 
economic participation as discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
In contrast, the NDIS collectivises the ‘risk’ of severe and profound 
impairment and the responsibility of the care and support of people with severe and 
profound disabilities. This indicates the regulation of people with severe and 
profound disabilities through principles of social insurance as well as a distinct 
hybrid rationality in comparison to the rationality applied to people with a PCW. The 
social insurance underpinnings of the NDIS, as suggested, collectivise the ‘risk’ of 
severe and profound impairments. As Ewald explains “[i]nsurance […. is] quite a 
different idea of justice: the idea of cause [for damages or ills] is replaced by the idea 
of a distributive sharing of a collective burden” (1991, p. 206). This “distributive 
sharing of a collective burden” (Ewald, 1991, p. 206) can be seen in the Productivity 
Commission report which explains that “[m]ost families and individuals cannot 
adequately prepare for the risk and financial impact of significant disability. The 
costs of lifetime care can be so substantial the risks and costs need to be pooled” 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 2). Additionally, the collectivisation of risk can 
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be seen in the Productivity Commission’s explanation of Tier 1 which is for 
“Everyone” and states “[i]n one sense, the NDIS is for all Australians, since it would 
provide insurance against the costs of support [for any Australian who] acquire[s] a 
significant disability” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 10). Wallace, for example, 
states that “we’re all paying for it and we might all need it” (2014b, p. n.p.), 
“[d]isability is a slip on a bath mat or a complicated pregnancy away from every 
Aussie family” (2014b, p. n.p.) and Bonyhady describes the Scheme as “for the 
benefit of all Australians. With each of us at risk of experiencing a disability” (2009, 
p. 146). This rationale also underpins disability scholars and the disability 
movement’s suggestions that most in society are “temporarily able-bodied” (Goggin 
& Newell, 2005; D. Marks, 1996, p. 66).  
 
Additionally, NDIS campaigns and the disability movement problematised the 
previous disability care and support system which was described by the Productivity 
Commission as “underfunded, unfair, fragmented, and inefficient, and gives people 
with a disability little choice and no certainty of access to appropriate supports” 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 2). Responsibility for redressing the problems 
with the previous system are represented as lying with the state as well as broader 
society and this is reflected in the submissions to the Senate Community Affairs 
Committee Inquiry into the NDIS Bill 2012. For example, often in reference to the 
previous disability care and support system, submissions describe adequate care and 
support for people with disability as a human right (Di Blasio, 2012) and an 
entitlement (McCandless, 2012). It is additionally described as expected of a 
“modern civilisation” (Damiani, 2012, p. 1) and a “first world democracy” 
(Stephens, 2012, p. 1), and a responsibility of citizens (Davies, 2012; Thornhill, 
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2012). One submission states “I expect governments at all levels to address the 
unmet need issues for people with disabilities” (McCandless, 2012, p. 1). Similarly, 
another suggests that “it is the responsibility of government and community to assist 
the needy who lack choices, opportunities, skills and capacities to cope and live a life 
as a community member with full dignity and respect” (S. Brown, 2012, p. 1). These 
submissions essentially collectivises the responsibility of risk.  
 
Additionally, the NDIS, unlike the unemployment benefit, is underpinned by 
the collective hope of redressing the exclusion, isolation and poverty experienced by 
people with disability. For example, the ‘Every Australian Counts Campaign’ 
Director, John Della Bosca describes how the NDIS seeks to address the social and 
economic exclusion experienced by people with disability in the community and 
their treatment as second class citizens (Kyriacou, March 20, 2014). Also in the 
‘Every Australian Counts’ campaign, the NDIS is described as delivering “peace of 
mind” (NDIA, n.d.-b, p. n.p.) to individuals, families and carers, “changing lives” 
(NDIA, 2012, p. n.p.) and giving “people with disability a better future” (Kyriacou, 
March 20, 2014, p. n.p.). These aspects of the NDIS have framed it as a “worthwhile 
endeavour” and “has led to broad public and political support for the [S]cheme” 
(Baker, 2012, p. 1). The right to care and support coverage which can facilitate the 
right of people with disability to economically and socially participate is pushed as 
an outcome of NDIS receivership and a pursuit of justice for people with disability 
(Manne, 2011). The NDIS is thus seen as an investment (Baker, 2012), rather than, 
welfare. Ewald states, “[w]hat distinguishes insurance is not just that it spreads the 
burden of individual injuries over a group, but that it enables this to be done no 
longer in the name of help or charity but according to the principle of justice, a rule 
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of right” (1991, pp. 205-206). Framing NDIS support as a right, justice or an 
entitlement as referred to earlier in the submissions reflects Frisch’s (2013) 
suggestion that the NDIS is an entitlement and not welfare, as well as represents 
NDIS participants as deserving of state support unlike people with a PCW. Frisch 
(2013) explains her argument that the NDIS is an entitlement and not welfare by 
stating:  
 
[t]he objects of the Bill establishing the NDIS include promoting an inclusive 
and equal society, and giving effect to Australia’s obligations as a signatory to 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, a document 
which recasts disability rights as human rights. Different to the Disability 
Support Pension … funding under the NDIS is not means tested recognition 
that people with disability are entitled to the support they need to participate 
meaningfully in society (Frisch, 2013, p. n.p.). 
 
However, unlike NDIS support which is framed through a justice lens, 
unemployment support is no longer framed as a right, entitlement or a “principle of 
justice” (Ewald, 1991, p. 206). Instead “the concern for disadvantage and … social 
justice has become linked to a fear of long-term welfare dependency and its 
consequences” (Dean, 1995, p. 579). Pursuits of insurance then to mitigate the 
effects of inequality and poverty (Dean, 1999) through social rights while still in 
pursuit for NDIS participants are reproduced for people with a PCW because their 
position of inequality and poverty is represented to be a product of their own choices 
and irresponsibility through individualisation, constructing them as undeserving of 
state support and thus reproducing their position of inequality. This reflects the shift 
from welfare as an entitlement to welfare conditionality (Moss, 2001) and supports a 
move from a social rationality of government to neoliberalism in the context of 




Deserving and legitimate versus undeserving and illegitimate impairment 
On some levels entitlement to NDIS support and deservedness of NDIS 
support appears to be based on the severity of disability, which relates to an 
individual or medical model of disability, rather than based on rights. This is despite 
one of the objects of the NDIS Act being to “give effect to Australia’s obligations 
under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” as well as to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (NDIS Act 
2013, p. 4 & 5). Deservingness based on severity of disability can be seen, for 
example, in former Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer the Honourable Wayne 
Swan’s 2012-13 Budget Speech when he stated: 
 
[t]onight I am proud to announce funding for the historic first stage of a 
National Disability Insurance Scheme … An NDIS will ensure people with 
disabilities get the individual care and support they need. Over 400, 000 
Australians live with a significant and permanent disability and are among the 
most deserving of our support (Swan, 2012, p. n.p.).  
 
Representing the NDIS as an entitlement or deserved based on the severity of 
impairment is problematic because it reinforces a medical model focus on the 
individual body rather than also considering the social and structural barriers 
experienced by all people with disability. This can often require persons with 
disabilities and their carers to frame themselves through this deserving discourse, 
emphasising the severity of their impairment in order to receive much needed  
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support. For example, the Shut Out Report discusses how people with disabilities 
have to construct themselves as ‘deserving’ in order to receive support. It highlights 
prior to the NDIS how:  
 
[s]ervices [… were] often so limited that individuals report[ed] going to 
extraordinary lengths to meet eligibility criteria and receive support[, a …] 
process [which] often [… left] them feeling demeaned and humiliated. Parents 
also expressed frustration at … being forced to paint the worst possible picture 
of their child and their needs in order to access support (National People with 
Disabilities and Carer Council, 2009, p. 20). 
 
Gibbs (2014) also highlights the connection between the medical model and 
evaluating ‘deservedness’ based on impairment through her discussion of eligibility 
changes to the DSP. She suggests that this simplifies the complexity of disability and 
that  
 
continuing to focus on who is the ‘right’ kind of disabled person completely 
misses the point … [and] should be reframed to change the focus from who 
deserves a pension, which is irrelevant, to the myriad of ways that people with 
disabilities are excluded (Gibbs, 2014, p. n.p.).  
 
However, this assumption of deservedness is perpetuated with regard to the NDIS 
and can also be seen in an article in The Australian titled “Mildly disabled threaten 
viability of NDIS” (Sloan, 2013, p. 16). In this article people with “mild” disabilities 
are represented as a “threat” (Sloan, 2013, p. 16) to the NDIS. The article states “… 
the danger is that more and more individuals with milder disabilities will secure 
coverage” (Sloan, 2013, p. 16). Again this implies that in some ways ‘deservedness’ 
is problematically based on the value of one’s impairment. Further, this can also be 
seen in the Gillard government changes to DSP eligibility through the Family 
Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011. This is because the 
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legislation’s introduction of new criterion into the ‘incapacity to work test’ excluded 
most people with disability from accessing the DSP, except for those with a ‘severe 
impairment’. 
 
A person will be considered to have a ‘severe impairment’ if they have at least 
20 points or more under the Impairments Tables, and at least 20 points is a 
result of a rating under a single impairment table. In addition, the person will 
need to be assessed as not being able to undertake any work or training within 
the next two years (Daniels, Garden, et al., 2011, p. 13). 
 
Alternatively, those seeking to access the DSP without a ‘severe impairment’ had to 
demonstrate that they had previously actively engaged with a POS, like a DES. If the 
individual had no previous engagement with a POS then they were excluded from the 
DSP and had to engage with a POS for 18 months. Therefore, through the Gillard 
government’s reforms eligibility for the DSP was determined based on the severity 
of disability framing eligibility around deservedness.  
 
This is problematic for those whose deservedness is based on their impairment 
rather than on their right to care and support and it is also problematic for those 
whom this discourse excludes because their impairment is not severe enough. This 
can pose questions to the legitimacy of their impairments, something which Welfare 
to Work already did for people with a PCW by excluding them as persons with 
disabilities from the DSP. This is reflected in the 2005-06 Budget Speech where the 
Honourable Peter Costello stated that “[t]he object of … [the Welfare to Work] 
changes [… was] to protect the genuinely disabled but to encourage those capable of 
part-time work to look for it” (Costello, 2005, p. 3). The questions posed to the 
legitimacy and genuineness of disability for people with a PCW in Welfare to Work 
and thus their ‘deservedness’ based on their impairment is also seen in the UK where 
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an investigation into people receiving the Disability Living Allowance and Invalid 
Care Allowance is described by Roulstone as “an attempt to internally separate real 
from spurious disabled people” (2000, p. 424). This challenges the integrity of some 
people with disability (Garthwaite, 2011) and marks some people with disability as 
fraudulent. Roulstone elaborates it became “… an ideological separation of real and 
fictitious disabled people [taking] on a Foucauldian binary division between real and 
imagined, deserving and undeserving” (2000, p. 435). Roulstone argues that these 
assumptions about the legitimacy of some persons with disabilities:  
 
legitimat[…ed] unreasonable denial of benefits of those who need[ed] them. 
This is particularly significant for people with severe hidden impairments or 
medically contested conditions who might be deemed too sick to employ, but 
not eligible for disability benefits (Roulstone, 2000, p. 435).  
 
Roulstone’s (2000) comments resonate with an Australian context where 
‘illegitimate’ impairments are objectified, denied access to resources, governed 
through neoliberalism and authoritarianism and regulated differently to those with 
‘legitimate’ impairments who are deserving of state support. The distinct 
mechanisms employed to govern each category of disability then produce a lack of 
equality for people with a PCW.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter discussed how subjects are governed through rationalities which 
inform the mechanisms and regimes employed to regulate them. It suggested that 
rationalities could be hybrid, in fact highlighting the commonality of this (Clarke, 
2004; Larner, 2000a), and indicating that hybrid rationalities govern disability in 
Australia. It demonstrated the shift in “welfare rationalities” (Harris, 2001, p. 6) in 
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Australia from a social rationality to neoliberalism and briefly outlined criticisms of 
each by disability studies scholars and the disability movement. It also discussed how 
rather than the death of the welfare state and a social rationality of government, the 
welfare state has undergone a metamorphosis (Dean, 1999), reshaping (Hartman, 
2005) or mutation (Rose, 1996, 1999) underpinned by neoliberalism. The chapter 
also examined the Third Way and explained the disability movement’s role in 
governing through hybridity.  
 
The chapter argued that people with a PCW and NDIS participants, people 
with severe and profound disabilities, are governed through distinct hybrid 
rationalities. Although, it was suggested, that there are instances where people with a 
PCW and people with severe and profound disabilities are governed similarly 
through a neoliberal rationality. It was proposed that people with severe and 
profound disabilities are governed through a social rationality of government and 
neoliberal market principles, in contrast to people with a PCW who are regulated 
through neoliberalism and authoritarianism. The distinctiveness with which they 
were governed was evidenced through a discussion of choice, control and autonomy 
and individual risk and social risk. Interestingly, the ‘difference’ of people with 
severe and profound disabilities legitimated their access to resources and rights 
unlike people with a PCW in the income support system.  
 
The discussion of choice, control and autonomy suggested that people with 
severe and profound disabilities become repositioned as consumers through the 
NDIS supported by a policy which facilitates their choice, control and autonomy. 
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The NDIA, for example, encourages NDIA delegates to formulate a supportive 
relationship between themselves and the NDIS participant, creating scope for  
negotiation and through designing a participant plan, the participant is encouraged to 
direct the process. Additionally, NDIS participants can choose how their package is 
managed. 
 
It is suggested that choice and control in the NDIS relates to neoliberal 
market principles. From a neoliberal perspective the market provides scope for 
flexibility and innovation and gives NDIS participants control over the support 
system which previously controlled them. The market was suggested to address 
criticisms of the previous care and support system.  
 
However, this section identified some concerns with the practicalities of a 
discourse of choice and control. This firstly related to the NDIA. For example, it was 
suggested that access to choice and control comes through the NDIA who grants 
access to much needed resources. It was highlighted that it is difficult to negotiate 
with an institution which holds the key to necessary care and support. Concerns were 
raised also about negotiating the bureaucracy of the NDIA. Secondly, it was 
questioned whether individualised choice and control delivers structural change, 
highlighting concerns that a focus on the individual and neoliberal market principles 
may detract from broader social model changes (Gibbs, 2013). Thirdly, the flexibility 
of choice in meeting expectations was discussed in a context of need and “reasonable 
and necessary” (NDIS Act 2013, p. 4). It touched on the debate about what can be  
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considered ‘reasonable and necessary’ and suggested that this appears to be tied to 
responsibility, that is, a responsibility to tax payers and in a context of finite 
resources.  
 
Further evidence of distinct hybrid rationalities was provided through a 
discussion of risk. It was suggested that through the NDIS the risk of impairment was 
socialised where there is “distributive sharing of a collective burden” (Ewald, 1991, 
p. 206). This was supported through examples from the Productivity Commission 
report and the existence of Tier 1 and was argued to be underpinned by the notion 
that everyone is “temporarily able-bodied” (Goggin & Newell, 2005; D. Marks, 
1996, p. 66). Additionally collectivised was the responsibility for redressing the 
problems with the previous disability care and support system. The NDIS became 
framed as an investment not welfare and a right and an entitlement, establishing links 
with Ewald’s (1991) explanation of social insurance. However, the chapter 
problematised the possible links between deservingness for NDIS participants being 
based on the severity of their disability which was suggested to focus on the body, 
simplify the complexity of disability (Gibbs, 2014) and could leave persons feeling 
demeaned and humiliated.  
 
In contrast, it was suggested that people with a PCW lack choice, control and 
autonomy in the welfare state. For example, the only choice available to people with 
a PCW was a ‘choice’ to disengage from the income support system as their conduct 
and bodies are managed, surveyed, controlled, penalised and disciplined through the 
mutual obligation contract and income management as a result of their 
unemployment. The mutual obligation contract is not based on a mutual obligation 
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and people with a PCW have no choice in accepting the conditions, power is thus 
disproportionate in the contractual process. Further evidence of the inability of 
people with a PCW to exercise their choice, control and autonomy was provided 
through suggesting that people with a PCW do not have their employment goals 
recognised by the income support system. Instead they are expected to accept any 
reasonable job offer (Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2006). In addition, the employment 
service system impedes choice for people with a PCW because it focuses on 
outcomes, securing government contracts and has a role in monitoring mutual 
obligations. Further evidence was provided of a lack of choice, control and autonomy 
by people with a PCW through income management, where it was noted that the 
state defines the priority needs of those with a PCW who are income managed. 
Income management also restricts where persons can spend their payments through 
the BasicsCard.  
 
In relation to the additional evidence of distinct hybrid rationalities risk was 
examined. It was highlighted that unlike the risk of impairment, which was 
socialised, the risk of unemployment was individualised as well as responsibility for 
unemployment. This was suggested to be consistent with a neoliberal shift in the 
income support system where the individual is expected to assume responsibility for 
their own needs. As in Chapter Four, it was indicated that this simplified the causes 
of unemployment. Despite this, the Chapter reflected on how unemployment support 
is no longer represented as a right based on concerns of welfare dependency and 




This Chapter however also raises concerns with the framework of sameness 
and difference. In particular it draws attention to the inequality and lack of access for 
people with a PCW in a context where they and persons with severe and profound 
disabilities are constructed and governed through hybrid rationalities. What this 
chapter makes clear then is that the directive to move beyond sameness and 





Through an analysis of how people with a PCW are constructed and governed 
in the welfare state, this research found that people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed through sameness in the Welfare to Work reforms which is continued in 
income management. Sameness is problematic because it employs the able-body as 
the normative standard to which people with a PCW have to aspire to. This was 
identified as problematic because it ignored the ‘differences’ of people with a PCW, 
in particular, their experience of disabling social and structural barriers and their 
impairment which could impact on the fulfilment of activity test requirements. It also 
ignored the effects of upholding an able-bodied norm through notions of efficiency 
and productivity which socially construct disabled bodies as unproductive and 
inefficient. Additionally, governing through sameness was highlighted as concerning 
for other groups of NSA recipients, including the broader NSA population and 
Indigenous Australians. Thus it was suggested that the reforms failed to consider 
human difference and diversity in governing through sameness, thereby also failing 
to deliver equality and access.  
 
The research also found that people with a PCW are constructed and 
governed through a distinct hybrid rationality in comparison to NDIS participants, 
those with severe and profound disabilities. Specifically, it was identified how people 
with a PCW are constructed and governed through neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism, in contrast to persons with severe and profound disabilities who are 
constructed and governed through a social rationality of government and neoliberal 
market principles. The distinct ways in which each group are constructed and 
governed produced inequality for people with a PCW. This is because persons with 
244 
 
severe and profound disabilities are facilitated in exercising choice, control and 
autonomy unlike people with a PCW. In addition, the ‘risk’ and responsibility for 
impairment was socialised for NDIS participants in contrast to the individualisation 
of ‘risk’ and responsibility for unemployment and impairment in Welfare to Work 
and income management in governing through sameness.  
 
However, though largely problematising the way in which people with a 
PCW are governed through a distinct hybrid rationality, in comparison to persons 
with severe and profound disabilities, it can be suggested that this in a way positively 
recognises the diversity of persons with disabilities and challenges the 
homogenisation of disability as a social category. By recognising the difference of 
people with a PCW and persons with severe and profound disabilities and by 
constructing and governing each group as persons with disabilities distinctly, one 
could argue that this positively deconstructs the homogenisation of the social 
category of disability, recognising the diversity within the social category and also 
diversity more broadly. This could be represented as providing an acknowledgement 
of human diversity and difference, as expressed as necessary by Chapter Four and 
Five and as therefore resolving some of the concerns of Chapters Four and Five. For 
example, Chapters Four and Five problematised how sameness in governing people 
with a PCW fails to recognise the ‘difference’ of people with a PCW from the able-
bodied norm which regulates them and the diversity of NSA recipients who are 
disadvantaged by the reforms. This, however, is inadequate as a result of the 
inequality that results for people with a PCW from both sameness and difference in  
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failing to recognise their structurally disadvantaged position suggesting that more is 
needed beyond recognising human diversity to provide a solution to sameness and 
difference.  
 
This research thus proposes, alongside other CDS scholars, that the way to 
move beyond sameness and difference is to establish an “embodied ontology” 
(Shakespeare & Watson, 2002, p. 2). An embodied ontological approach would 
acknowledge impairment, the body as socially constructed and the social barriers 
experienced by people with disabilities as part of their embodied experience. It also 
provides scope to recognise human diversity and the value of the individual, 
challenging the ability/ disability binary. This is because it deconstructs the power 
awarded to the able-body as the epitome and definer of humanness, and thus 
sameness and difference and how this causes ability and disability to operate in a 
binary which fails to adequately capture the situations of people with a PCW.  
 
An embodied ontological perspective suggests that all persons are impaired in 
one way or another, capturing the fluidity of human bodies which cross the rigid 
boundaries of the social categories of ability and disability, and which are essentially 
embraced in the notion that all human beings are temporarily able-bodied (Goggin & 
Newell, 2005). This not only is able to recognise human diversity and the 
experiences of all embodied subjects, regardless of disability, but it also deconstructs 
the power, privilege and normalisation of the able body. As Sutherland contends 
“[w]e have to recognise that disablement is not merely the physical state of a small minority 




The myth of the normal/perfect person (read: un-impaired/disabled) is 
unsustainable since categorizing into ‘normal’ is arbitrary and subjective (who 
decides who is normal, and valuable?). Acceptance of the ubiquity of 
impairment and frailty reveals an essential connection between impairment and 
embodiment (G. Mcilroy, 2005, p. n.p.). 
 
This research also supports criticisms of the social model by CDS scholars 
which suggest that impairment and disability are inseparable, particularly, in 
individual lived experience. The research for example, highlighted the intersection of 
disabling social barriers and impairment barriers to seeking (and maintaining) 
employment and fulfilling Activity Agreements. This support was also presented 
through using the work of scholars who argue that the body and impairment is 
socially constructed. However, the impairment/ disability distinction of the social 
model disappears with an embodied ontological approach as it “refers to a spectrum 
of positions of belonging” (G. Mcilroy, 2005, p. n.p.). 
 
An embodied ontological approach also values the individual which “is 
followed up in a mature society that supports everyone on the basis of the needs they 
have, not on the work they have done” (G. Mcilroy, 2005, p. n.p.). Additionally, an 
embodied ontological approach, through challenging oppression and seeking 
emancipation, gives scope to the voices of all, but in particular those who have 
previously been marginalised. This is one of the keys to the importance of an 
embodied ontological approach in this context because it allows subjects to define 
their needs and there is scope, in theory, for their delivery. Thus, embracing an 
ontological approach would resolve the tensions discussed earlier with regard to 
acknowledging human diversity and difference within the social category of  
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disability because it would regard the worth of both people with a PCW and persons 
with severe and profound disabilities, provide for their needs and give both voice and 
autonomy.  
 
From a policy perspective, by giving citizens voice in policy there is scope to 
capture the embodied experience of policy subjects. Voice, however, must be valued 
and listened to particularly with regard to policy subjects articulating their needs. By 
considering the individual, and their experiences and knowledges, the ability/ 
disability binary can also be destabilised through a focus on the embodied individual. 
Here, the distinction between ability and disability is no longer appropriate as a 
means to organise people because there is an emphasis on the subjective knowledge 
and experience of individuals. For people with a PCW this could provide the 
opportunity to acknowledge and respond to impairment, the body as socially 
constructed and social barriers which could be part of an articulated embodied 
experience. This would need to work alongside or operate following a deconstruction 
of the privileged position of ableism in broader society.  
 
People with a PCW 
This research has also contributed to existing scholarship on people with a 
PCW and drawn attention to the dearth of existing literature that examines the 
intersection of other policies which govern people with a PCW beyond Welfare to 
Work.  
 
The thesis began with a discussion of the establishment of a PCW category, 
suggesting that it was established to move more persons with disabilities capable of 
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employment into formal paid work. This category constructed in 2006 by the 
Howard government, has achieved little with regard to enhancing the employment 
participation of persons who have a PCW. This can be attributed to the design of the 
reforms which are underpinned by ableism, neoliberalism and authoritarianism and a 
representation of the individual as the barrier to employment which fails then to 
undertake broader structural reform.  
 
With regard to the PCW category this research has found that the category does 
still exist, that there have been legislative changes which have contributed to the 
increase in those categorised as with a PCW and that people with a PCW make up 
one fifth of the NSA population. It also found that often NSA recipients are discussed, 
governed and regulated in a way that homogenises them as one category without 
consideration of the diversities of NSA recipients. In addition, people with a PCW 
can be automatically income managed in the NT through a policy intersection. The 
impact of Welfare to Work for people with a PCW could then be worsened through 
the operation of income management in this context. Finally, it was established that 
people with a PCW are excluded from the NDIS. However, the PCW category 
requires further research. This is because despite the findings of this research there is 
little consolidated information or data on who makes up the category, their 
impairments, their experience in the income support system and empirical research 
on the impact of the various reforms they are subscribed to.  
 
Finally, the 2014-15 Budget changes are potentially subscribing some DSP 
recipients to work-first obligations and penalties for failing to comply with their 
contractual requirements. This is the first time that compliance measures have been 
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placed on DSP recipients (Buckmaster, 2014a). Additionally, as mentioned, the 
reassessment of those DSP recipients under 35 who were assessed as eligible for the 
DSP between 2008 and 2011 could mean that more persons are shifted into the PCW 
category. Thus as the amount of persons with a PCW reaches approximately 135, 
000 and there is the possibility that more people will be added to the category, there 
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